LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
RIVERSIDE 


Regular  troops  alone  are  equal  to  the  exigencies 
of  modern  war  as  well  for  defence  as  offence, 
and  when  a  substitute  is  attempted  it  must  prove 
illusory  and  ruinous.  The  firmness  requisite  for 
the  real  business  of  fighting  is  only  to  be  attained 
by  a  constant  course  of  discipline  and  service. 

— GEORGE  WASHINGTON 


^  ^  D 


PEACE  INSURANCE 


PEACE  INSURANCE 


BY 


RICHARD  STOCKTON,  JR, 


With  Eleven  Platel  by 

Frank  N.  Thompson 


SECOND  PRINTING 


CHICAGO 

A.  C.  McCLURG  &  CO. 

1916 


Copyright 

A.  C.  McCLURG  &  CO. 

1915 


Published  January,  1915 


It.  fall  Printing  (En.. 


To 

the  Officers 

of  our 
Army,  Navy,  Marine  Corps, 

and  National  Guard 

who,  knowing  better  than 

all  others  the  needlessness  of  the 

sacrifice,  will  willingly  go  forth  to 

the    deaths   which    public    indifference 

and  ignorance  may  require  in  our 

next  war;  who  work  unceasingly 

and  thanklessly  to  lessen 

the  probable 

calamity 


PREFACE 


one  truly  to  study  the  art  and  science  of  war, 
and  its  political  and  economic  causes  and  effects, 
and  then  to  attempt  a  work  thereon  with  a  claim 
of  marked  originality,  is  but  to  proclaim  that  one 
feels  that  the  illustrious  men,  from  the  dawn  of  his- 
tory to  the  present  day,  have  been  but  fools.  War 
and  statesmenship  are  the  oldest  of  great  sciences, 
and  while  modern  inventions  have  caused  some 
changes,  and  civilization  has  lessened  the  surface 
causes  of  international  struggles,  their  essential  prin- 
ciples are  still  the  same.  When  one  studies  these 
things  and  attempts  to  express  one's  thoughts,  the 
result  is  but  a  repetition  of  the  perhaps  forgotten 
writings  of  notable  men,  both  ancient  and  modern, 
both  American  and  foreign.  All  that  is  left,  there- 
fore, is  to  apply  these  old,  undying  facts  to  things 
as  they  now  exist,  and  in  this  case  to  the  United 
States  in  particular.  Nor  is  it  necessary  for  me 
to  express  vague,  unproven  theories  of  my  own. 
The  approved  authorities,  even,  in  fact,  my  oppo- 
nents, support  me.  I  have  therefore  no  apology  to 
make  for  numerous  quotations  from  great  men  and 
authorities  —  soldiers,  statesmen,  scholars,  and  phi- 

vii 


viii  Preface 

losophers  of  the  present  and  the  past.      I  but  thank 
them  for  expressing  what,  mayhap,  was  beyond  me. 

Similarly,  as  Professor  R.  M.  Johnston,  of  Har- 
vard, remarked  in  a  letter  to  the  author,  "  I  oppose 
not  the  pacifist,  but  the  pacifimaniac."  I  wish  every 
success  to  those  who  strive  to  bring  about  the  rad- 
ical changes  necessary  for  universal  peace,  but  I 
warn  against  imaginary  things  which  are  not,  and, 
in  our  life,  cannot  be. 

The  statistics  used  herein  have  been  compiled 
from  the  most  reliable  sources,  mainly  from  official 
governmental  reports.  It  is  believed  that  they  are 
the  most  accurate  that  can,  at  this  time,  be  obtained. 
Small  errors,  however,  would  have  but  little  bearing 
on  the  facts,  for  the  figures  selected  may  in  most 
cases  be  divided  twice  and  even  thrice  without  affect- 
ing the  material  statements  in  this  work  in  any  appre- 
ciable degree. 

This  book  is  written,  therefore,  inviting  the  oppo- 
nents of  its  thesis  to  study  the  facts  for  themselves, 
and  thereby  be  convinced;  asking  that  but  reason- 
able attention  be  given  to  the  experts  of  our  army 
and  navy,  and  to  our  greatest  statesmen. 

RICHARD  STOCKTON,  JR. 

Bordentown  Military  Institute, 
New  Jersey,  December,  1914. 


CONTENTS 


Chapter  Page 

I     Is  an  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden  During  Peace?       I 

II     A    Less    Expensive    Substitute    for    Trained 

Forces  24 

III  The  Likelihood  of  War  Today        ...     39 

IV  Will  War  ever  be  Abolished?      .       .       .       .56 
V     Underlying  Causes  of  War        ....     72 

VI     The  Cost  of  War  and  its  Horrors       ...     90 

VII     Some  Advantages  of  Military  Force  and  of 

War 109 

VIII     The  Slandering  of  the  Soldier      .       .       .       .121 

IX     "Common   People"    and    Military   Force     .  134 

X     The  Military  History  of  the  United  States     .  143 

XI     Economy    of    the    Recommendations    of    the 

General  Staff 159 

XII     The  Recommendations  of  the  Naval  Board      .  179 

XIII  Demagogue  versus  Statesman       .       .       .       .189 

XIV  Conclusions        ........  203 


IX 


PLATES 

Number  Page 

1  Costs  of  insurance 12 

2  Some  annual   expenditures  of  the  people  of   the 

United  States 18 

3  Japanese  financial  comparisons 64 

4  Average    annual    number    killed    or    dying    from 

wounds  in  war,  vs.  number  killed  in  peace 
accidents  in  the  United  States  ....  96 

5  War  of  the  Revolution  showing  extravagance  of 

militia  system  —  small  armies  but  many  pen- 
sioners   148 

6  Showing  the  number  of  troops  which  inefficiency 

compelled  the  United  States  to  use  in  various 
wars,  also  number  of  troops  used  by  enemy  .  154 

7  Organization  of  the  United  States  Army  .       .       .  168 

8  Standing  armies  of  the  leading  nations       .       .       .170 

9  The  recommendations  of  the  United  States  General 

Staff 176 

10  Number  of  trained  soldiers  available  in  seven  of 

the  great  nations,  by  use  of  reserves,  showing  also 
the  number  asked  for  by  the  General  Staff, 
U.  S.  A.,  and  number  actually  available  in  the 
United  States 178 

1 1  Dreadnaught  strength  of  the  great  sea  powers  .       .  1 82 

xi 


PEACE  INSURANCE 

CHAPTER  I 

IS  AN  ARMY  AND  NAVY  A  BURDEN  DURING  PEACE? 


United  States  has  been  fortunate  in  not 
being  involved  in  the  world-wide  strife  of 
1914.  We  are  unfortunate,  however,  in  our  evi- 
dent inability  to  read  the  true  lessons  of  the  greatest 
war  of  history.  Perhaps  that  is  to  be  expected,  for 
it  has  been  characteristic  of  the  American  citizen  to 
fail  to  heed  the  warnings  of  the  military  history 
either  of  his  own  nation,  or  of  foreign  powers. 

After  all,  it  is  not  so  much  the  present  war,  as 
it  is  war  in  general,  that  we  must  study  to  reach 
accurate  conclusions.  No  one  thing  should  ever  be 
studied  when  it  is  desired  to  be  informed  on  a  sub- 
ject, but  rather  a  number  of  examples  must  be 
taken.  Hence  it  is  that  the  European  War  is  of 
interest,  not  so  much  of  itself,  as  because  it  fur- 
nishes another  great  example.  We  must  not  reach 
our  conclusions  by  studying  this  war  alone,  but  must 
study  past  ones,  and  take  due  advantage  of  the  ad- 


Peace  Insurance 


ditional  information  which  this  greatest  of  struggles 
may  afford. 

If  the  European  War  enables  us  to  read  aright 
the  true  lessons  of  our  own  history,  it  will  serve  our 
nation  well.  We  have  always  misread  or  disre- 
garded the  military  history  of  the  United  States.  So 
great  is  the  present  conflict,  however,  that  it  is  hoped 
that  our  eyes  may  be  opened.  It  seems  impossible 
that  we  can  hear  the  tramp  of  the  millions  of  trained 
soldiers  in  Europe,  or  the  rumbling  of  the  thousands 
of  cannon,  without  at  last  awakening. 

If  we  are  to  believe  the  fanatics  of  many  of  the 
various  organizations  of  theorists,  women,  min- 
isters, and  doctors  of  various  sciences  which  have 
no  bearing  on  the  facts,  the  day  of  universal  peace 
is  at  hand.  If  we  believe  a  larger  and  more  con- 
servative element,  the  day  of  peace,  although  not 
at  hand,  approaches  rapidly.  Finally,  unless  we 
take  issue  with  the  great  mass  of  the  American 
public,  we  must  at  least  believe  that  the  moneys 
expended  for  armies  and  navies,  while  probably  a 
necessary  expense,  are  an  enormous,  serious,  and 
total  economic  waste.  A  comparatively  small  group 
of  men  in  these  United  States,  being  largely  those 
making  war  their  life  study,  lay  themselves  open 
to  the  charge  of  personal  interest  when  they  state 
that  all  of  these  theories  are  false,  and  dangerous  to 
the  nation  which  adopts  them. 

In  an  attempt  conservatively,  but  thoroughly,  to 


Is  the  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden?  3 

set  forth  the  facts  in  regard  to  armies,  navies,  their 
cost  and  the  effects  of  wars  on  economic  conditions 
in  the  world,  it  is,  perhaps,  well  to  consider  first  the 
most  reasonable  contention  of  the  anti-militarists; 
namely,  that  the  cost  of  armies  and  navies,  during 
the  many  years  of  peace,  is  an  excessive  burden. 

Military  forces,  in  which  we  include  both  armies 
and  navies,  are  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  defeat 
in  war.  Ability  to  accomplish  this  purpose  suc- 
cessfully must  depend  upon  their  size,  equipment  and 
efficiency  as  compared  with  the  forces  of  the  enemy. 
Hence,  it  is  easy  to  conceive  the  fact  that  a  suffi- 
ciently wealthy  and  powerful  nation,  by  expending 
wisely  a  sufficient  sum,  could  maintain  a  military 
force  which  would  make  defeat  practically  impos- 
sible. This  being  the  case,  war,  due  to  aggression 
on  the  part  of  any  other  nation,  would  be  extremely 
improbable.  No  nation  will  attack  another  power 
if  it  knows  that  victory  is  impossible.  When  there 
is  a  question  as  to  the  outcome,  a  nation  hesitates 
to  bring  on  a  war.  Even  when  a  power  feels  that 
victory  is  sure,  still  it  hesitates  in  proportion  to  the 
cost  involved,  in  lives  and  money. 

Mexico  affords  an  example  of  this.  Many  na- 
tions could  easily  defeat  Mexico,  but  the  cost  of  a 
Mexican  campaign  is  one  factor  in  preventing  inter- 
vention, by  any  nation,  without  great  provocation. 
Mexico's  military  force,  though  strong  enough  to 
discourage  the  powers  from  entering  lightly  into  war, 


Peace  Insurance 


was  not  strong  enough  to  prevent  us  from  seizing 
Vera  Cruz.  Even  under  much  greater  provocation, 
we  would  never  have  attempted  to  seize  a  seaport 
belonging  to  England,  or  Germany,  or  Japan,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  their  military  forces  make 
such  an  attempt  impracticable.  They  insure  against 
such  acts. 

China  affords  another  example;  perhaps  a  better 
one.  Its  weak  military  force  can  insure  nothing,  and 
in  consequence  troops  of  all  nations  camp  upon,  and 
control  China's  territory. 

Germany  is  a  notable  example  of  the  other  kind. 
That  nation,  maintaining  what  is  admittedly  by  far 
the  most  efficient  military  force  in  the  world,  pre- 
vious to  1914  had  the  largest  number  of  years  of 
unbroken  peace  which  have  blessed  any  great  nation. 

It  is  thus  that  a  military  force,  insuring  against 
defeat  in  war,  insures  against  any  war  at  all.  The 
fact  that  Germany  has  become  involved  in  the  great- 
est of  international  conflicts  affects  this  truth  in  no 
way.  If  Germany  brought  on  the  war,  at  least 
German  power  has  delayed  the  contest  until  the  na- 
tion desired  it.  If,  however,  the  allies  are  respon- 
sible, the  only  fact  proven  is  that  though  strong 
enough  to  prevent  an  aggressive  war  by  any  one 
nation,  the  German  army  was  not  formidable  enough 
to  prevent  an  attack  by  a  combination  of  powers. 
Insurance  is  a  well  recognized,  established  and  pay- 
ing business  proposition.  We  insure  against  loss  by 


Is  the  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden?  5 

fire,  theft,  burglary,  accidents,  lawsuits,  breakage, 
explosions,  and  so  on  indefinitely.  In  addition  to 
paying  premiums  to  keep  us  from  loss  we  attempt 
to  prevent  it  by  fire  departments,  police  depart- 
ments, etc.  These  forces,  it  is  needless  to  say,  do  not 
prevent  fires,  nor  crimes,  but  they  lessen  their  fre- 
quency, and  afford  the  best  means  of  protection  yet 
known.  Military  force  bears  the  same  relation  to 
conflicts  between  nations.  It,  therefore,  seems 
reasonable  that  as  long  as  there  is  a  possibility  that 
another  nation  may  make  war  upon  us,  we  should 
insure  against  war. 

No  business  man,  and  no  corporation,  will  pay 
more  for  insurance  than  it  believes  it  is  probable 
that  it  may  lose  in  the  manner  described  in  their 
policies.  Nor  does  a  corporation  or  individual  pay 
an  amount  in  premiums  that  is  out  of  proportion 
with  other  expenses,  or  a  burden  that  threatens  the 
welfare  of  those  to  whom  the  insurance  policies 
are  issued.  Moreover,  no  practical  business  man 
or  well  managed  corporation  will  carry  insurance 
in  one  company,  if  a  rival  company  of  equal  or 
greater  stability  is  issuing  equally  good  or  better 
policies  at  less  cost. 

Therefore,  in  considering  whether  or  not  mili- 
tary forces  are  the  best  insurance  against  war,  we 
must  determine  these  principal  points : 

First,  is  the  money  expended  for  our  army  and 
navy  more  than  we  may  expect  to  lose  in  war? 


Peace  Insurance 


Second,  is  the  amount  expended  out  of  proportion 
to  our  other  expenditures? 

Third,  is  the  amount  a  burden  that  is  harmful  to 
the  nation? 

Fourth,  is  there  a  cheaper  form  of  insurance 
against  war  that  would  be  just  as  effective? 

Considering  these  questions  in  order,  we  find  that 
the  American  Government  spends  approximately 
$95,000,000  annually  on  the  United  States  Army, 
and  $140,000,000  annually  on  the  United  States 
Navy.  In  addition,  the  various  states  and  the  Fed- 
eral Government  spend  about  $10,000,000  annually 
on  the  National  Guard  (or  organized  militia) 
throughout  the  country.  About  $245,000,000  is, 
therefore,  the  annual  premium  which  we  pay  as  an 
insurance  against  defeat  in  war.  This  is  almost  ex- 
actly the  sum  that  we  expend  annually  for  the  entire 
maintenance  of  all  the  military  forces  of  the  nation. 
To  determine  the  rate  of  our  insurance,  we  must 
first  determine  what  we  are  insuring  and  its  value. 

Insurance  against  defeat  in  war  insures : 

(a)  The  independence  of  the  United  States. 

(b)  The  political  and  religious  freedom  of  the 
American  citizens. 

(c)  The  use  of  the  wealth  of  the  United  States 
by  its  own  citizens. 

Who  can  place  a  value  upon  these  things?  Yet, 
if  we  take  what  may  be  considered  as  least  valuable 


Is  the  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden?  7 

of  these  three  items,  namely,  the  use  of  our  national 
wealth  by  our  own  citizens,  we  find  that  we  are  in- 
suring what  is  undervalued  at  $117,900,000,000. 
Assigning  only  equal  values  to  the  remaining  two 
infinitely  valuable  items,  we  find  that  we  are  insur- 
ing $353,700,000,000  at  an  annual  premium  of 
$245,000,000,  or  considerably  less  than  one-fif- 
teenth of  one  per  cent.  Disregarding  entirely  the 
infinitely  valuable  items  of  the  independence  of  our 
country  and  our  personal  freedom,  on  the  unsup- 
portable  argument  that  they  are  included  in  our 
national  wealth,  we  find  that  our  rate  is  still  about 
one-fifth  of  one  per  cent.  In  consequence,  at  our 
present  rate  of  expenditure,  it  would  take  over 
five  hundred  years  without  any  war  before  the  peace 
expenditures  on  our  army  and  navy  would  have 
totalled  to  a  sum  equal  to  the  amount  that  these 
expenditures  protect,  in  which  case  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  assume  that  our  national  wealth  would 
remain  for  five  hundred  years  the  same  amount. 
Adding  the  infinite  values  of  our  national  and  per- 
sonal independence  —  priceless  to  every  American 
—  we  find  it  would  take  infinite  years  of  peace  to 
make  our  military  force  a  useless  insurance. 

Brigadier-General  H.  M.  Chittenden,  a  retired 
officer  of  the  U.  S.  Army,  with  pacifist  tendencies,  in 
his  War  or  Peace  makes  use  of  a  peculiar  method  of 
computation  in  order  to  show  that  we  pay  a  higher 
rate  for  protection  than  is  here  stated.  He  says: 


Peace  Insurance 


By  any  reasonable  forecast  our  future  losses  in  war  will 
not  amount  to  more  than  an  average  of  $200,000,000  a  year, 
based  upon  our  war  record,  both  domestic  and  foreign,  of 
the  past  half-century,  or  a  tenth  as  much  based  solely  upon 
our  foreign  wars.  With  the  growing  tendency  to  resort 
to  peaceful  methods  for  settling  international  disputes  these 
estimates  may  be  considered  liberal.  Our  annual  outlay 
for  war  preparation  (army  and  navy)  is  now  about  $240,- 
000,000  with  no  prospect  of  decrease  in  the  near  future. 
It  appears,  therefore,  that  the  premium  which  we  are  paying 
for  war  prevention,  based  upon  a  reasonable  estimate  of 
probable  financial  losses,  is  really  115  per  cent,  if  we  con- 
sider only  the  larger  of  the  estimates  of  losses  just  given, 
and  ten  times  as  great  if  we  consider  only  the  smaller.  As 
an  insurance  against  property  loss  this  would  be  a  pretty 
expensive  business — in  fact  quite  unjustifiable.  The  insur- 
ance argument,  therefore,  if  considered  from  a  financial 
point  of  view  alone,  is  untenable.* 

With  due  respect  to  General  Chittenden's  the- 
ories, we  would  like  to  know  what  individual  or 
corporation  figures  the  amount  of  insurance  to  be 
carried  in  that  manner?  We  would  like  to  know 
what  insurance  company  figures  its  rates  by  that 
method?  If  that  were  the  method  employed,  a  mil- 
lion dollar  factory  which  had  sustained  only  $5,000 
loss  by  fire  would  need  only  $5,000  or  less  of  insur- 
ance; and  a  plant  which  never  had  a  fire  would  need 
no  insurance.  In  determining  the  risk  on  the  mil- 

*  War  or  Peace,  Brig.  Gen'l  Hiram  M.  Chittenden,  A.  C.  McClurg 
&  Co.,  Chicago. 


Is  the  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden?  9 

lion  dollar  plant,  which  had  sustained  only  $5,000 
loss  by  fire,  the  insurance  company  would  charge 
one-half  of  one  per  cent,  and  in  the  case  of  the 
plant  which  had  never  suffered  a  fire  would  charge 
nothing. 

In  actual  practice  an  owner  figures  the  amount 
he  should  carry,  and  an  insurance  company  figures 
the  rate  to  be  charged,  not  on  what  damage  may 
have  been  done  to  that  particular  property  in  the 
past,  but  on  what  damage  may  be  done  in  the  future. 
That  is  estimated,  in  one  case,  by  taking  the  total 
value  of  the  plant,  and  in  the  other,  by  the  experi- 
ence of  similar  plants  with  that  kind  of  loss.  There- 
fore, in  figuring  what  our  war  losses  may  be  and 
how  much  we  must  regard  as  our  principal  sum  of 
insurance,  we  should  not  average  our  past  losses, 
but  should  take  into  consideration  what  other  nations 
have  lost  through  war.  In  doing  so,  we  see  that 
many  of  them  have  lost  the  nation  itself,  as  such, 
and  all  that  goes  therewith.  Poland,  for  instance, 
certainly  lost  much  through  war.  The  Aztec  and 
North  American  Indians  lost  their  all  through  con- 
quest. Spain  and  France  lost  their  American  terri- 
tory. Mexico  lost  California,  Texas,  and  other 
territory  through  its  war  with  the  United  States,  and 
almost  lost  its  entire  existence,  as  a  nation,  in  the 
time  of  our  Civil  War.  Spain  lost  Cuba,  the  Philip- 
pines, and  Porto  Rico.  Turkey  lost  Tripoli.  France 
lost  Alsace-Lorraine.  Russia  lost  its  hold  on  Korea. 


io  Peace  Insurance 

China  has  been  continually  a  prey  to  partition  by 
the  great  and  more  powerful  military  states;  and, 
finally,  England  lost  all  that  the  United  States  repre- 
sented at  the  time  of  the  War  of  the  Revolution. 
So  could  an  indefinite  list  be  compiled  of  nations 
which  have  become  entirely  extinct  as  such,  or  where 
they  have  lost  priceless  portions  of  their  possessions 
through  conquest  —  both  in  ancient  and  modern 
times. 

To  estimate  our  probable  future  war  losses  at 
$200,000,000  annually  is  absurd.  In  fact,  it  is 
absurd  to  attempt  to  place  any  estimate  thereon. 
Rather  must  we  be  prepared  to  defend  ourselves, 
or  to  lose  any  portion,  or  all,  of  our  wealth.  We 
must,  moreover,  include  our  right  to  control  our 
internal  affairs,  such  as  what  immigrants  shall 
and  shall  not  be  admitted,  on  what  terms  they 
shall  come  here  and  hold  land,  and  other  matters 
of  vital  concern  to  our  citizens,  including  the 
entire  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States.  The 
very  fact  that  England  lost,  through  war,  that  which 
has  grown  into  all  the  wealth  of  the  United  States 
today,  shows  that  we  might  lose  at  least  our  entire 
national  wealth  if  we  could  not  defend  it.  Thus 
it  is  that  General  Chittenden's  method  of  estimating 
our  probable  losses  is  entirely  erroneous,  and  could 
not  be  maintained  for  an  instant  before  any  body 
of  business  men. 

Comparing    the    amount    spent    for    insurance 


Is  the  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden?          n 

against  war  with  other  kinds  of  insurance,  we  find 
that  for  fire  insurance  alone  the  people  of  the 
United  States  pay  $406,336,104  per  year,  or 
$161,336,104  more  than  the  combined  cost  of  the 
army,  the  navy,  and  the  National  Guard.  This 
sum,  moreover,  is  not  for  insurance  against  fire, 
but  for  insurance  against  loss  by  fire,  and  it  does  not 
even  fully  accomplish  the  latter  end. 

To  reach  a  correct  estimate  of  what  we  spend 
for  insurance,  against  loss  by  fire  and  against  fire 
itself,  we  must  add  to  the  four  hundred  and  six  and 
one-third  million  dollars  spent  as  premiums  for  in- 
surance the  seventy-five  million  dollars  expended  in 
various  forms  on  fire  departments  as  an  insurance 
against  fire  itself.  Thus  we  find  that  in  insuring 
only  such  portion  of  our  wealth  as  is  destructible  by 
fire,  we  expend  over  twice  as  much  as  to  insure  the 
entire  wealth  of  our  nation  against  war. 

For  insurance  against  loss  by  burglary,  the  nation 
expends  $2,850,000  annually;  for  insurance  against 
crime  in  the  form  of  municipal,  county,  and  state 
police  we  expend  $110,000,000  annually;  making 
a  total  of  $112,850,000  expended  for  premiums  on 
crime  insurance  alone.  Hence,  a  total  annual 
amount  on  fire  and  crime  insurance  combined  is 
$594,186,104,  or  about  350  million  more  than 
for  all  our  military  forces.  Considering  these  fig- 
ures we  may  conclude  that  our  military  expenditures 
are  by  no  means  greater  than  the  probable  loss  by  a 


12  Peace  Insurance 

war;  that  they  are  small  compared  with  the  amounts 
spent  for  fire  and  crime  insurance,  and  that  the  in- 
surance rate  is  low,  compared  with  that  for  other 
kinds  of  insurance  in  effect  in  the  business  world 
( Plate  i). 

Again,  military  force  can  show  that  for  the 
amounts  expended  in  premiums  much  return  has 
been  given,  for  under  its  "  Paid  to  policy  holders  " 
column  may  be  placed  the  birth  of  the  original  thir- 
teen colonies  as  a  nation,  the  saving  of  that  nation 
in  1812,  the  accession  of  Texas  and  California  and 
adjacent  territory  in  the  forties,  the  retention  of 
almost  one-half  of  our  territory  in  the  sixties,  the 
freedom  of  the  negro,  the  accession  of  Porto  Rico, 
the  freedom  of  Cuba,  etc.  Again  we  have  items  of 
infinite  value  upon  which  we  will  attempt  to  place 
no  price.  Who  can  accurately  value  these  things? 

It  will  be  charged  that  error  has  been  made  in 
figuring  the  cost  of  our  military  force  at  its  present 
peace  strength,  and  failing  to  consider  the  times, 
notably  during  the  Civil  War,  when  our  military 
establishment's  cost  increased  manifoldly.  It  should 
be  remembered,  however,  and  will  later  be  proved, 
that  the  cost  of  our  wars  were  due  to  lack  of  military 
force,  and  not  to  their  existence.  It  was  lack  of 
trained  military  force  on  the  northern  side  which 
permitted  the  first  southern  success  at  Bull  Run, 
thereby  compelling  the  North  to  stand  idle  while  the 
South  continued  its  preparations  in  a  manner  which 


u 


a: 

D 
0) 

z 

LL 
O 

0) 


O 
O 


5 


I 


O 

z 


a. 


Is  the  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden?          13 

enabled  it  to  prolong  the  struggle  for  four  years.  It 
was  lack  of  trained  forces  that  prevented  our  earlier 
success  in  all  wars,  and  by  prolonging  them  increased 
the  cost.  It  was  lack  of  trained  forces  that  was 
responsible  for  the  excessive  amount  of  preventable 
diseases,  and  the  thousands  of  stupid  tactical  blun- 
ders that  have  swelled  the  pension  rolls  of  all  our 
wars.  These  things  were  not  due  to  military  forces, 
but  to  their  absence.  Hence,  their  cost  is  an  im- 
proper charge  to  our  military  arm. 

Permit  us  to  quote  Henry  C.  Emery,  Professor 
of  Economics  at  Yale  University: 

I  still  recall  vividly  the  first  lecture  which  I  heard  at  the 
University  of  Berlin  when  studying  political  economy  as 
a  young  man  at  that  institution.  I  had  myself  been  brought 
up  under  the  influence  of  the  classical  political  economy, 
and  rather  accepted  it  at  that  time  as  an  axiom  that  mili- 
tary expenditures,  although  perhaps  necessary  in  some  meas- 
ure, were  wasteful  and  regrettable,  and  should  be  reduced 
to  the  lowest  terms.  The  first  lecture  I  heard  was  in  a 
course  on  public  finance  by  Professor  Wagner,  recognized 
as  the  greatest  authority  on  that  subject  in  the  world.  The 
day  of  my  arrival  he  was  lecturing  on  military  expenditures, 
and  I  shall  never  forget  my  revulsion  of  feeling  as  I  heard 
him  contrast  the  policy  of  Germany  with  the  policy  of  the 
United  States.  Vigorously  and  skillfully  he  contrasted  our 
policy  in  the  days  before  the  Civil  War  with  the  policy 
of  Prussia  in  the  years  preceding  the  Austrian  and  French 
wars,  and  then  showed  the  economic  results  of  the  two 
policies.  We  who  had  complacently  congratulated  our- 


14  Peace  Insurance 

selves  on  saving  our  money  were  plunged  into  a  stupendous 
conflict  at  a  cost  till  that  time  unheard  of,  while  Prussia 
annihilated  Austria  in  a  few  weeks,  and  in  a  few  months 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  the  Ger- 
mans had  every  French  army  subdued  or  bottled  up  beyond 
the  possibility  of  escape,  and  then  was  able  to  secure  a  huge 
indemnity  to  serve  as  the  necessary  capitalistic  basis  of  the 
forward  march  of  German  industry.* 

The  second  question  for  decision  is  as  to  whether 
or  not  the  amount  expended  on  military  forces  is 
out  of  proportion  with  our  other  expenditures.  This 
question  has  called  forth  a  large  number  of  remark- 
ably false  statements  from  those  who  attempt  to 
show  that  our  military  forces  are  a  useless  burden. 

No  matter  how  low  the  rate  of  insurance  be, 
should  a  business  house  find  that  its  insurance  pre- 
miums were  out  of  proportion  with  all  other  expendi- 
tures, it  would  be  deemed  necessary  at  least  to 
investigate  for  the  purpose  of  determining  whether 
or  not  these  expenditures  were  becoming  burden- 
some and  injurious  to  the  welfare  of  the  business. 
Thus,  though  we  have  shown  that  our  present  mili- 
tary expenditures  give  us  a  remarkably  low  rate  of 
insurance,  if  we  are  paying  a  sum  out  of  proportion 
to  our  expenditures  for  other  purposes,  the  matter 
will  stand  investigation. 

One  of  the  most  absurd  and  favored  expressions 

*Some  Economic  Aspects  of  War,  Henry  C.  Emery,  U.  S.  War 
Department. 


Is  the  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden?          15 

of  the  peace  fanatic  is  that  the  United  States  spends 
three-fourths  of  its  revenue  on  military  forces.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  the  United  States,  according  to  the 
annual  appropriation  acts,  and  other  Governmental 
documents,  spends  about  one-quarter  of  the  Federal 
Government's  revenue  for  military  forces,  at  the 
utmost.  This,  however,  is  beyond  the  question,  for 
there  is  no  just  basis  for  comparison  in  these  figures. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  the  $240,000,000  spent 
annually  by  the  Federal  Government  plus  about 
$5,000,000  expended  annually  on  the  National 
Guard  by  the  various  states,  is  the  entire  expendi- 
ture of  this  nation  for  military  forces.  The  balance 
of  the  billion  of  dollars  which  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment expends  annually  is  only  a  part  of  that  spent 
for  other  governmental  purposes.  Every  state, 
county,  city,  and  town  has  its  own  source  of  revenue, 
and  combined  they  appropriate  vast  sums  for  govern- 
mental necessities  of  every  kind,  but  none  for  mili- 
tary forces.  Our  military  forces  cost  but  a  trifling 
fraction  of  the  amount  spent  by  the  city,  county, 
state,  and  national  governments  for  their  govern- 
mental needs:  and  considering  expenditures  by  pri- 
vate citizens  for  sidewalks  and  similar  public  pur- 
poses, the  military  sum  becomes  infinitesimal.  The 
anti-militarist  is  fond  of  stunning  his  hearers  with 
the  stupendous  cost  of  military  forces  as  compared 
with  the  sums  of  money  with  which  the  average  man 
is  familiar.  He  neglects  to  point  out  the  fact  that 


1 6  Peace  Insurance 

Governments  are  stupendous  organizations,  spend- 
ing stupendous  amounts  of  money  to  accomplish 
stupendous  ends.  It  is  thus  that  the  sum  spent  on 
military  forces  must  be  considered,  and  not  in  com- 
parison with  one's  own  annual  income. 

As  an  example,  we  may  quote  the  socialistic,  or 
rather  anarchistic,  publication  War  —  What  For,* 
which  in  this  case  gives  an  excellent  example  of  the 
comparisons  which  are  favorite  arguments  with  such 
men  as  Dr.  David  Starr  Jordan,  ex-President  of 
Leland  Stanford  University: 

One  new  type  "  Dreadnaught "  of  the  sort  now  being 
constructed  for  the  British  Navy  (which  is  to  be  practically 
duplicated  by  all  other  great  powers),  one  of  these  mon- 
sters will  cost  three  times  as  much  as  all  of  the  noble  buildings 
of  the  University  of  Chicago  erected  up  to  June  30,  1905; 
that  is,  three  times  as  much  as  all  the  beautiful  halls  con- 
structed during  the  University's  past  thirteen  years  of 
unparalleled  activity  in  building. 

Five  per  cent  interest  on  the  cost  of  one  "  Dreadnaught  " 
would  pay  the  combined  salaries  of  1,500  country  school 
teachers  at  $500  a  year,  or  the  combined  salary  of  750 
country  preachers  at  $1,000  a  year. 

These  are  interesting  statements,  no  doubt.  Until 
we  begin  to  think  them  over  they  seem  to  show  an 
appalling  waste.  The  comparisons,  however,  are 
about  as  just  as  it  would  be  to  compare  the  cost  of 

*  War—  What  For?  George  R.  Kirkpatrick,  West  LaFayette, 
Ohio. 


Is  the  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden?          17 

your  house  with  the  cost  of  an  egg.  We  are  unused 
to  thinking  in  the  vast  sums  spent  by  our  nation, 
but  it  is  with  these  sums  that  we  must  compare  the 
cost  of  our  army  and  navy,  not  with  the  salary  of 
a  school  teacher. 

Using  some  interesting  statistics  presented  by 
Vernon  M.  Cady  in  an  illustrated  lecture  in  connec- 
tion with  the  International  Congress  on  Hygiene 
and  Demography,  we  find  that  the  American  people 
spend  annually  $2,000,000,000  on  intoxicating 
liquor,  and  $1,200,000,000  on  tobacco.  The  com- 
bined cost  of  these  two  items  alone  is  $3,200,000,- 
ooo,  or  about  thirteen  times  the  amount  spent  annu- 
ally on  all  of  our  military  forces.  Thus  by  curtailing 
these  semi-vices  one-thirteenth  (which  would  be  a 
great  benefit  to  the  nation),  we  could  pay  for  our 
entire  military  establishment ! 

Other  annual  expenditures  of  the  American  peo- 
ple are  $3,000,000,000  for  the  social  evil  and  dis- 
eases of  vice  (this  not  including  the  cost  of  the  care 
of  the  sick,  blind,  insane,  paralytics,  or  the  expenses 
of  infant  funerals  which  Mr.  Cady  attributes  to 
immorality).  Jewelry  and  ornaments  cost  $800,- 
000,000,  automobiles  $500,000,000,  confectionery, 
and  soft  drinks,  etc.,  $452,000,000.  All  of  these 
are  equal  or  greater  than  the  cost  of  our  military 
forces.  Comparing  the  cost  of  our  army  and  navy 
with  these  expenditures  we  find  that  what  was  at 
first  a  titanic  sum  becomes  lilliputian  in  comparison. 


Peace  Insurance 


All  of  these  (mostly  vices)  cost  more  annually  than 
the  insurance  of  our  total  wealth  against  war. 
Surely  while  a  nation  expends  these  amounts  for 
pleasure  and  for  evil  we  have  greater  fields  for  econ- 
omy and  for  conserving  our  resources  than  is  pre- 
sented by  the  cost  of  our  military  protection 
(Plate  2). 

Another  favorite  and  misleading  claim  of  those 
opposed  to  military  forces,  is  that  we  expend  more 
for  the  army  and  navy  than  for  education.  By 
referring  to  the  annual  appropriation  acts  of  the 
United  States  Government,  and  adding  the  amount 
expended  on  the  National  Guard,  it  will  be  found 
that  the  military  expenditures  are  very  much  less 
than  half  of  the  sum  expended  by  this  nation  for 
education,  the  latter  amount  being  secured  from  the 
report  of  the  United  States  Commissioner  of  Edu- 
cation. The  educational  sum,  moreover,  is  probably 
underestimated,  as  some  of  the  cities  and  schools 
are  not  coverecl.  Thus  is  another  slander  of  mili- 
tary force  disposed  of. 

It  is  because  the  Federal  Government  appro- 
priates in  one  sum,  for  military  force,  while  other 
expenditures  are  divided  among  states,  municipali- 
ties or  individuals  that  so  many  have  fallen  into 
the  error  of  these  false  comparisons.  Suppose,  for 
instance,  the  Government  purchased,  controlled  and 
distributed  tobacco  and  liquor  —  an  appropriation 
of  $3,200,000,000,  three  times  the  total  Federal 


Ill 

X 


o 

u 

_l 

Q. 
O 
U 

a. 

U 


Q.  LU 


0)  H 
UJ  0) 


s" 

II 

DL 
X 
hi 


D 
Z 
Z 
< 

LI 
2 

O 
0) 


1 

V 


Is  the  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden?          19 

appropriation  for  all  purposes.  Suppose  the  Fed- 
eral Government  appropriated  the  hundreds  of  mil- 
lions expended  by  state  and  municipal  governments. 
This  would  cause  no  change  in  the  cost  to  the  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States.  It  would,  however,  place 
military  expenditures  in  their  relative  place  and  their 
seeming  enormity  would  disappear. 

Still  another  favorite  argument  of  the  anti-mili- 
tarist is  that  the  nation  loses  much  because  the  sol- 
dier is  a  non-producer.  This  argument,  however,  is 
no  sounder  than  is  that  of  the  "  burden  "  of  military 
expenditure.  "  Non-producer  "  is  a  much  abused 
term.  If  it  means  all  those  who  are  not  actually 
growing  or  manufacturing  some  article,  then  we  must 
include  ministers,  teachers,  lawyers,  bankers,  mer- 
chants, and  certainly  those  engaged  in  all  sorts  of 
insurance,  in  which  case  the  fact  that  a  soldier  does 
not  continually  manufacture  or  grow  things  himself 
is  no  reproach.  He  is  but  one  of  many  useful  men 
who  do  not  actually  produce,  but  who  play  an  im- 
portant —  nay,  necessary  —  part  in  national  affairs. 
Furthermore,  the  soldier  does  produce,  to  some 
extent,  in  his  arsenals,  his  engineering  triumphs,  his 
scientific  discoveries,  etc.  Finally,  if  we  include  those 
other  men  as  producers,  then  the  soldier  is  a  pro- 
ducer also. 

Furthermore,  the  soldier,  as  we  show  in  more 
detail  later,  is  being  educated  to  the  advantage  of 
the  community.  Says  Professor  Emery: 


2O  Peace  Insurance 

Much  is  frequently  said  regarding  the  economic  waste 
which  is  involved  in  peace  armaments,  due  to  the  fact  that 
so  large  a  number  of  adult  young  men  are  taken  out  of 
the  ranks  of  industry  year  by  year,  thereby  reducing  the 
productive  capacity  of  the  community,  since  they  might 
otherwise  be  employed  in  increasing  the  national  wealth. 
The  argument  hardly  applies  in  any  serious  way  to  an  army 
such  as  ours,  which  is  so  small  in  proportion  to  our  great 
population,  but  it  is  very  questionable  whether  it  even  applies 
in  a  case  like  Germany,  with  its  half  million  or  more  of  men 
continuously  under  arms. 

The  same  argument  might  easily  be  made  regarding  the 
number  of  able-bodied  young  people  in  our  high  schools, 
technical  schools,  and  colleges.  A  few  narrow-minded  peo- 
ple deny  the  advantages  of  education  altogether,  and  a  still 
larger  number  are  inclined  to  think  that  from  the  economic 
point  of  view  education  beyond  the  grammar  school  at 
least  is  a  net  loss  to  the  community,  and  that  the  produc- 
tivity of  labor  is  not  increased  by  education  of  this  kind. 
I  hope  that  education  will  still  be  advocated,  even  if  it 
cannot  be  defended  on  purely  economic  ground,  but  I  think 
that  most  intelligent  people  of  the  present  day  believe  that 
in  the  long  run  the  productivity  of  the  people  is  increased 
by  education,  and  that  the  growth  of  wealth  is  increased 
rather  than  decreased  by  education  through  our  schools. 

If  the  military  training  has  educational  results  of  the 
same  kind,  compulsory  army  service  is  nothing  more  than 
compulsory  education.  I  think  it  is  now  the  opinion  of 
the  most  careful  observers  of  German  conditions  that 
the  military  service  of  so  many  of  her  young  men  for  two 
years  acts  exactly  in  this  way.  Youngsters  are  taken  from 


Is  the  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden?          21 

the  quiescent  life  of  the  farm,  or  from  the  somewhat  dan- 
gerous life  of  factory  communities  and  are  trained  in  prompt- 
ness, diligence,  obedience,  cleanliness,  and  fidelity  to  duty. 
Furthermore,  they  are  given  actual  instruction  in  various 
lines  in  the  way  of  increasing  their  general  intelligence, 
and  they  of  necessity  become  in  some  measure  familiar  with 
the  intricate  mechanism  of  military  weapons,  which  in  itself 
gives  a  certain  training  in  the  knowledge  of  machinery.* 

Germany's  proportion  of  population  in  actual 
military  service  in  time  of  peace  is  but  one  and  one- 
tenth  per  cent.  Her  total  trained  strength,  includ- 
ing all  classes  of  reserves,  is  but  six  per  cent  of  the 
total  number  of  people,  and  even  today,  during  the 
greatest  of  wars,  it  is  most  unlikely  that  the  number 
of  men  in  military  service  approaches  ten  per  cent. 
In  the  United  States  only  about  eighty-five  one- 
thousandths  of  one  per  cent  (.00085)  are  m  tne 
Regular  Army,  and  only  thirteen  one-hundredths 
of  one  per  cent  (.0013)  in  the  army  and  navy 
combined. 

The  anti-militarist,  defeated  in  his  attempts  to 
show  that  the  cost  of  armament  in  America  is  exces- 
sive, turns  naturally  to  the  greater  armaments  of 
Europe.  We  are  concerned  principally  with  the 
United  States,  yet  what  today  affects  Europe  may 
tomorrow  affect  this  country,  and,  therefore,  in  order 
to  meet  those  who  cry  out  against  the  military  bur- 
dens upon  their  own  ground,  we  may  consider  the 

*  Some  Economic  Aspects  of  War. 


22  Peace  Insurance 

foreign  nations.    This  perhaps  may  be  best  done  by 
further  quotation  from  Emery: 

Certainly  Bloch  *  is  not  likely  to  minimize  the  extent  of 
such  expenditures,  as  he  has  been  one  of  the  leading  writers 
to  show  the  immensity  of  this  burden,  and  yet  he  himself 
states  that  the  military  expenditures  of  different  European 
countries  yary  from  2  per  cent  to  3.8  per  cent  of  the  total 
income.  Even  Germany,  with  her  great  organization,  takes 
less  than  3  per  cent  of  the  actual  income  for  its  maintenance, 
both  of  army  and  navy;  and  when  we  think  of  the  expendi- 
tures for  luxuries,  many  of  them  harmful  in  themselves,  the 
extent  of  military  expenditures  appears  even  less.  In  Ger- 
many, for  instance,  three  times  as  much  is  spent  for  intoxi- 
cating drinks  as  for  the  support  of  military  and  naval  estab- 
lishments. One-third  less  consumption  of  beer  and  liquor  on 
the  part  of  the  German  people  would  take  care  of  this  part 
of  the  budget  altogether.! 

If  we  can  accept  the  standard  reports  and  other 
publications  of  governments  and  of  authorities  of 
high  repute,  the  figures  in  the  foregoing  chapter  are 
in  all  essentials  correct. 

In  the  face  of  such  clear  and  numerous  state- 
ments only  prejudice  or  ignorance,  or  a  deliberate 
desire  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  populace  by 
an  outcry  against  military  forces  can  be  responsible 
for  the  attitude  of  a  person  who  claims  that  our 
military  establishment  in  time  of  peace  is  an  ex- 

*  Future  of  War,  Jean  de  Bloch,  World  Peace  Foundation,  Boston, 
t  Some  Economic  Aspects  of  War. 


Is  the  Army  and  Navy  a  Burden?          23 

pense    disproportionate    with    the    wealth    of    our 
nation. 

We  may  conclude  that,  as  long  as  wars  are  prob- 
able, military  forces  are  a  reasonable  insurance. 


CHAPTER  II 

A  LESS  EXPENSIVE  SUBSTITUTE  FOR  TRAINED  FORCES 

TN  THE  foregoing  chapter  it  has  been  assumed  that 
wars  are  still  possible,  if  not  probable.  For  the 
present  we  will  continue  the  assumption  that  nations 
will  continue  to  resort  to  force  from  time  to  time,  as 
occasion  may  offer  or  seem  to  offer  a  sufficient  casus 
belli.  The  correctness  of  this  assumption  will  be  dis- 
cussed in  full  in  a  further  chapter.  We  have  seen 
that  under  the  above  assumption  military  force  is 
a  comparatively  inexpensive  protection  for  the  na- 
tion. To  return,  however,  to  our  business  compari- 
son, our  fourth  point  for  determination  is,  in  effect, 
Is  there  a  cheaper  protection  that  would  be  just  as 
effective?  In  other  words,  can  we  find  a  less  expen- 
sive but  equally  good  insurance  against  defeat  in 
war? 

It  is  true  that  the  cost  of  military  force  is  small 
compared  with  other  expenditures  of  the  American 
nation.  Yet  this  is  no  reason  for  spending  even  a 
comparatively  small  sum  if  we  can  attain  the  same 
results  at  less  cost. 

The  favorite  substitute  for  trained  military 
forces,  in  so  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 

24 


A  Less  Expensive  Substitute  25 

is  an  "  aroused  citizenship  " —  the  substitution  of 
an  army  of  untrained  and  inexperienced  volunteers 
for  the  trained  soldier.  If  this  substitution  is  "  just 
as  good,"  then,  as  it  is  admittedly  cheaper  during 
peace,  it  is  the  more  desirable  form  of  defense. 

The  United  States  has,  throughout  its  history, 
always  experimented  with  the  volunteer  army,  or 
its  equivalent,  the  untrained  militia.  This  country, 
better  than  any  other,  affords  proof  that  the  sub- 
stitution of  citizens  en  masse  for  a  trained  soldier 
is  not  an  economy  but  a  tremendous  expense.  The 
school  boy  —  and  the  man  growing  from  such  a 
boy  —  would  state  that  the  successes  of  this  country 
are  conclusive  proof  of  the  practicability  of  the  vol- 
unteer system.  Such  has  been  the  American  citizens' 
interpretation  of  the  wars  of  the  United  States,  their 
battles  and  the  results  thereof,  as  these  things  are 
shown  in  the  historical  textbooks  used  in  our  schools 
and  colleges.  It  is  thus  that  the  American  citizen, 
attributing  false  efficiency  to  the  volunteer  of  the 
past,  becomes  converted  to  a  belief  that  even  the 
present  small  army,  navy,  and  national  guard  are  an 
unnecessary  expense,  and  might  well  be  greatly 
reduced,  if  not  abolished.  History,  they  believe,  has 
shown  the  practical  efficiency  of  the  volunteer. 

It  is  not  our  purpose  to  discuss  the  military  needs 
of  the  United  States  at  this  point.  We  merely 
desire  to  show  that  the  conclusions  of  those  who  be- 
lieve in  the  efficiency  of  the  volunteer  are  formed 


26  Peace  Insurance 

on  a  totally  erroneous  presentation  of  the  facts  of 
history  concerned. 

At  one  time,  it  is  true,  armies  fought  with  the  same 
weapons  with  which  the  members  thereof  hunted, 
worked,  and  secured  their  dinner.  Every  man  was 
familiar  with  the  soldier's  weapon,  and  there  were 
as  many,  and  more,  of  such  weapons  as  there  were 
men  in  the  land.  Even  then,  however,  those  who 
fought  as  unorganized  individuals  were  no  match 
for  those  who  were  organized,  disciplined,  and,  to 
some  extent,  trained.  Gradually  as  civilization 
progressed,  the  art  of  war,  like  all  other  arts  and 
sciences,  became  one  of  specialization.  Less  and 
less  did  the  weapon  of  the  soldier  resemble  the  tools 
or  the  arms  of  the  civilian,  until  today  the  soldier's 
weapons  are  strange  implements  to  all  other  trades 
and  professions.  Witness  the  early  club,  the  battle 
axe,  the  bow  and  arrow,  useful  and  used  alike  in 
domestic  affairs  and  war.  Witness  the  muzzle  load- 
ing flint  locks  of  the  Colonial  Wars  and  the  Revolu- 
tion —  an  implement  hanging  on  every  man's  wall, 
used  in  the  protection  of  the  home  against  beast  and 
man,  for  support  and  for  subsistence  —  and  witness 
the  modern  United  States  magazine  rifle,  model 
1903,  a  high-powered  weapon  throwing  a  bullet 
over  three  miles,  but  with  which  the  average  civilian 
can  hardly  hit  a  six  foot  target  200  yards  off. 
Again,  witness  the  complex  modern  three-inch  field 
piece  of  our  field  artillery,  or  the  big  caliber 


A  Less  Expensive  Substitute  27 

rifles  of  our  coast  artillery  and  navy,  both  requir- 
ing the  most  skillful  preparation  in  various  sciences 
and  in  the  art  of  their  use.  No  civilian  can  learn 
to  use  these  weapons  in  a  short  time,  and  no  un- 
trained mob  as  a  mass  of  such  civilians  would  be, 
can  compete  with  any  army  previously  trained,  dis- 
ciplined, and  practiced  in  the  use  of  modern  imple- 
ments of  war. 

Not  only  have  the  weapons  of  the  modern  soldier 
progressed  in  a  manner  which  makes  their  effective 
use  by  civilians  impossible,  but  the  entire  science  of 
warfare  has  advanced  to  a  degree  that  makes  a  life- 
time of  study  insufficient  for  a  complete  mastery. 
No  modern  soldier  will  seriously  claim  that  he  has 
mastered  the  intricacies  of  this  most  complex  science. 
Yet  an  officer  of  the  United  States  Army  studies 
four  years  at  the  United  States  Military  Academy 
at  West  Point;  graduating  he  joins  his  regiment  and 
studies  at  the  Garrison  Schools ;  presumably,  he  con- 
tinues his  study  in  order  to  pass  the  examinations  re- 
quired for  each  promotion,  and  probably  he  is 
detailed  at  one  of  the  Service  Schools,  including  The 
Army  School  of  the  Line,  The  Army  Staff  College, 
The  Army  Signal  School,  The  Army  Field  Engineer 
School  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  The  Coast  Artillery 
School  at  Fort  Monroe,  The  Engineer  School, 
Washington  Barracks,  D.  C.,  The  Army  Medical 
School  at  Washington,  D.  C.,  The  School  of  Fire 
for  Field  Artillery,  or  the  School  of  Musketry  at 


28  Peace  Insurance 

Fort  Sill,  Okla.,  The  Mounted  Service  School  at 
Fort  Riley,  Kansas,  or  the  Signal  Corps  Aviation 
School  at  San  Diego,  Cal.  For  enlisted  men  there 
are  at  every  post  schools  of  instruction.  There 
are  two  schools  for  bakers  and  cooks  at  Washing- 
ton Barracks  and  at  San  Francisco,  and  numerous 
other  temporary  provisions  for  the  education  of 
the  military  man.  An  officer  also  usually  joins  the 
Infantry,  Cavalry,  or  Artillery  Associations,  the 
Military  Service  Institution  of  the  United  States, 
and  similar  organizations  —  all  being  associations 
for  the  purpose  of  increasing  military  knowledge. 
Finally,  those  who  are  fortunate  and  skillful  enough 
are  detailed  to  the  Army  War  College  at  Wash- 
ington. In  the  navy  the  science  of  war  is  equally 
complex,  the  officers  study  equally  hard.  Yet,  none 
will  claim  that  they  have  mastered  this  science. 

It  is  thus  that  the  officers  of  all  foreign  armies  are 
trained,  in  similar  schools  and  colleges  —  similar, 
but  more  complete.  Foreign  nations  train  sufficient 
men  to  completely  officer  the  largest  army  that  they 
would  probably  place  in  the  field,  but  the  United 
States,  at  present  and  in  the  past,  has  relied  on  the 
untrained  citizen,  not  only  as  enlisted  men  but,  as 
officers,  to  take  the  great  responsibility  of  training 
and  leading  other  men  in  war. 

Not  only  is  it  impossible  for  the  civilian  to  use 
the  weapons  of  the  modern  soldier  with  effect,  but, 
more  important,  it  is  impossible  for  the  civilian  to 


A  Less  Expensive  Substitute  29 

assume  the  functions  of  the  officer  —  the  brains  of 
an  army  —  with  success.  Even  an  army  of  trained 
soldiers,  lead  by  untrained  officers,  is  doomed  to 
defeat.  And  again,  mere  drill  and  mere  knowledge 
of  the  use  of  the  weapons  and  the  tactics  do  not 
make  an  army;  nor  does  the  mere  skill  in  tactics  and 
mastery  of  the  science  of  war  make  an  efficient 
officer.  It  is  the  training  which  is  necessary,  and  the 
training  includes  all  these  things  and  more.  An 
army  must  be  trained  to  work  with  the  smoothness 
of  a  machine,  with  the  skill  and  cunning  of  the 
greatest  human  minds,  and  with  the  firmness  of  the 
ever  undismayed. 

The  psychology  of  war  is  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant of  the  studies  of  the  modern  officer,  and  it  is 
found  that  the  behavior  of  the  ordinary  human 
being  on  the  battle  field  is  one  of  the  strangest  and 
most  indeterminable  of  matters.  It  is  only  when 
the  civilian  has  been  trained  to  the  soldier  and  when 
the  officers,  with  the  aid  of  the  training  which  the 
men  have  received,  have  mastered  the  art  of  com- 
manding the  natural  impulses  of  the  men,  that  an 
army  can  obtain  "  the  firmness  requisite  for 
the  real  business  of  fighting."  Thus  it  is  that  the 
infantryman,  whom  the  average  American  believes 
can  be  made  in  a  few  months,  requires,  rather,  years 
of  careful  training. 

Our  statements,  moreover,  need  not  be  left  as 
such.  Although  the  advances  of  the  science  of  war 


30  Peace  Insurance 


have  tremendously  strengthened  the  truths  which  we 
have  stated,  these  were,  nevertheless,  established  in 
our  early  history.  They  are  truths  which  are  by 
no  means  new,  but  which  have  merely  become  more 
and  more  evident  with  the  lapse  of  time. 

In  a  subsequent  chapter  on  the  history  of  our  wars 
we  shall  show  that  in  each  of  these  wars  we  have 
been  compelled  to  use  a  large  number  of  raw  troops 
against  an  enemy  numerically  much  inferior.  This, 
of  course,  is  a  source  of  much  expense.  We  shall 
also  demonstrate  that  all  of  these  wars  were  unduly 
prolonged,  due  to  the  inability  of  the  untrained 
troops  to  stand  against  the  trained  enemy,  until, 
through  time  and  experience,  the  citizen  finally  be- 
came a  soldier.  These  facts  have  many  times  in- 
creased the  cost  of  every  war  in  which  the  United 
States  has  participated. 

The  volunteer,  in  the  United  States,  is  but  a  citi- 
zen without  training.  The  militiaman,  in  the  true 
sense  of  the  word,  is  the  same;  the  legal  militia  con- 
sisting of  all  able-bodied  males  between  eighteen  and 
forty-five  years  of  age.  When  one  of  the  citizens 
between  these  ages  volunteers  it  is  but  a  change  of 
name,  for  the  act  of  enlisting  is  not  a  training  and 
cannot  make  a  soldier.  Only  after  the  war  is  pro- 
longed owing  to  their  inability  to  defeat  the  trained 
enemy,  does  either  volunteer  or  militiaman  become 
a  finished  soldier.  The  words  of  Washington  apply 
equally  to  both  kinds  of  untrained  troops: 


A  Less  Expensive  Substitute  31 

Regular  troops  alone  are  equal  to  the  exigencies  of  mod- 
ern war,  as  well  for  defense  as  offence,  and  when  a  substitute 
is  attempted  it  must  prove  illusory  and  ruinous.  No  militia 
will  ever  acquire  the  habits  necessary  to  resist  a  regular  force. 
.  .  .  The  firmness  requisite  for  the  real  business  of  fight- 
ing is  only  to  be  attained  by  a  constant  course  of  discipline 
and  service.  I  have  never  yet  been  witness  to  a  single 
instance  that  can  justify  a  different  opinion,  and  it  is  most 
earnestly  to  be  wished  that  the  liberties  of  America  may  no 
longer  be  trusted,  in  any  material  degree,  to  so  precarious 
a  dependence. 

Again, 

If  I  were  called  upon  to  declare  under  oath  whether  the 
militia  had  been  most  serviceable  or  most  harmful,  upon 
the  whole,  I  should  subscribe  to  the  latter. 

These  utterances  by  the  immortal  Washington, 
if  altered  slightly  in  form,  become  axioms.  A  care- 
ful study  of  our  military  history  leaves  no  doubt  of 
their  truth.  The  United  States  Infantry  Journal 
quotes  Professor  Charles  S.  Spooner,  President  of 
the  Vermont  Peace  Society,  and  one  of  its  active 
founders,  as  having  made  the  following  statement  in 
this  respect: 

It  is  absolutely  true  that  had  enough  been  spent  on  our 
military  establishment  to  make  it  an  effective  force  in  1860 
—  only  a  moiety  of  the  cost  of  the  war  —  there  would  have 
been  no  war.  ...  It  still  remains  that  the  cost  was  and 
is  far  greater  than  necessary  if  proper  expenditures  had 


32  Peace  Insurance 

been  made  before  the  fact  instead  of  during  and  after  it. 
Insurance  of  life  and  property,  by  preventing  the  loss  thereof, 
is  worth  all  the  "  premiums  "  expended  in  that  prevention. 

In  1860  we  relied,  to  all  practical  purposes,  on 
the  rise  of  the  citizens  en  masse.  The  regular  army 
numbered  only  17,000  men.  The  balance  were 
militia  or  volunteers,  and  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run 
is  an  example  of  their  effectiveness  —  an  example 
of  an  attempt  to  substitute  the  citizen,  en  masse,  for 
the  trained  soldier. 

Fortunate  indeed  it  was  that  the  South  itself 
was  only  slightly  better  prepared;  that  it  had  not  a 
trained  army  such  as  Germany,  France,  or  Japan 
have  today. 

R.  M.  Johnston,  Assistant  Professor  of  History 
at  Harvard  University,  and  the  chairman  of  the 
Military  History  Committee  of  the  American  His- 
torical Association,  has  recently  published  some  ex- 
cellent articles  in  this  connection,  from  one  of  which 
we  take  the  liberty  of  quoting  at  length,  by  Pro- 
fessor Johnston's  permission: 

The  United  States  have  never  suffered  one  of  those  great 
military  reverses,  like  Jena  or  Sedan,  that  shake  the  founda- 
tions of  national  existence,  that  modify  national  thought, 
and  that  generations  later  still  bring  a  blush  to  the  face 
and  a  qualm  to  the  heart  of  the  lover  of  his  country.  Bull 
Run  has  been,  as  yet,  our  nearest  approach  to  anything  of 
the  kind.  It  was  more  discreditable  to  us  than  Jena  was 


A  Less  Expensive  Substitute  33 

to  Prussia,  than  Sedan  was  to  France,  and  it  revealed  dan- 
gers commensurate  with  those  which  those  two  disasters 
revealed ;  but  it  was  a  family  affair,  it  was  an  incident  in  a 
political  program,  and  it  did  not  bring  ruin  to  the  state. 
Steadily  minimized  by  all  who  were  responsible  for  it,  and 
not  understood  by  the  general  public,  it  was  quickly  set  aside 
as  one  of  the  disagreeable  occurrences  about  which  the  least 
said  is  the  soonest  mended. 

But  to  turn  over  once  more  to  the  reports  of  those  who 
fought  there,  to  jog  along  the  Warrenton  turnpike  where 
the  fugitives  scurried  in  mad  retreat  under  the  spur  of 
Kemper's  shells,  to  reconnoiter  the  ford  of  that  ditch-like 
stream  that  cost  McDowell  so  many  efforts  to  cross,  all 
this  makes  one's  mind  vividly  alive  to  the  hideous  mistakes, 
the  wanton  throwing  away  of  human  life,  all  the  military 
inefficiency  and  political  inaptitude  that  marked  the  first 
battle  of  the  Civil  War.  Let  us  see  how  its  significance 
may  fairly  be  estimated  as  we  look  back  upon  it  at  the  pres- 
ent day. 

What  in  military  terms  was  the  value  of  those  two  armies 
of  30,000  men  each  that  met  at  Bull  Run:  as  to  mobility; 
the  higher  command ;  staff ;  organization ;  discipline  and  co- 
hesion; material;  tactics?  The  percentage  of  efficiency 
under  each  one  of  these  heads  was  extraordinarily  low, 
under  some  of  them  almost  nil.  In  other  words,  a  small 
force,  properly  efficient  in  every  respect,  say  one  brigade 
with  one  battery,  under  a  general  trained  to  maneuver  a 
brigade,  could  have  done  almost  anything  it  pleased  on  the 
field  of  Bull  Run.  Such,  at  all  events,  is  the  impression 
that  a  study  of  the  battle  creates. 

Assuming  this  or  something  like  to  have  been  the  case,  an 


34  Peace  Insurance 


important  deduction  inevitably  follows.  When  the  Civil 
War  broke  out,  the  so-called  army  of  the  United  States 
amounted  to  less  than  17,000  men.  These  troops  were 
dispersed,  a  company  here  and  a  company  there,  mostly 
in  the  western  territories,  holding  distant  outposts  against 
the  Indians  and  policing  the  plains.  In  fact,  for  purposes 
of  war,  there  was  then,  very  much  as  today,  no  army;  all 
the  regular  infantry  that  could  be  scraped  together  for 
McDowell,  on  three  months'  notice,  amounting  to  two 
battalions  only.  Of  these  one  consisted  of  three  hundred 
marines  who  were  enlisted  on  the  1st  of  July  and  sent 
into  battle  twenty  days  later.  Napoleon  in  his  most  furious 
moments  would  have  hesitated  at  spilling  blood  and  spoiling 
regiments  in  such  a  way  as  that ! 

Have  we  ever  sufficiently  considered  what  would  have 
happened  in  1861  had  the  United  States  possessed  not  a 
bloated  military  establishment  but  a  little  army  in  the  real 
sense  of  the  word,  say  60,000  to  100,000  men?  In  the 
latter  case  it  is  clear  that  we  would  have  possessed  a  safe 
and  cheap  insurance  against  a  civil  war,  against  the  loss  of 
hundreds  of  millions  of  property,  against  economic  depres- 
sion, almost  bankruptcy,  against  what  some  modern  writers 
argue  was  an  actual  reduction  of  the  national  vitality.  For 
with  100,000  men  enrolled,  it  is  probable  that  from  25,000 
to  30,000  regulars  could  have  been  collected  with  some 
promptness  and  sent  to  Richmond,  to  New  Orleans,  and  to 
such  other  southern  cities  where  conditions  seemed  more 
dangerous.  Any  seditious  tendencies  would  have  been 
stamped  out  long  before  effective  military  resistance  could 
have  been  organized.  With  a  total  of  no  more  than  60,000 
men,  this  might  not  have  been  possible,  but  at  all  events 


A  Less  Expensive  Substitute  35 

the  administration  would  have  been  able  to  give  McDowell 
a  division  of  8,000  to  10,000  regulars;  and  that  might  have 
made  of  Bull  Run  and  of  the  Civil  War  a  very  different 
story.* 

General  Chittenden,  referring  to  this,  takes  the 
ground  that  Bull  Run  affords  no  proof  of  our  con- 
tention owing  to  the  fact  that,  had  there  been  a 
larger,  efficient  regular  army,  it  would  have  divided 
between  North  and  South.  The  general,  however, 
points  out  the  fallacy  of  his  own  argument  when  he 
says: 

The  North  at  this  time  was  backward  and  irresolute,  for 
it  dreaded  the  irrevocable  step  of  coercion  and  sought  recon- 
ciliation until  the  rupture  actually  came.  It  carefully 
avoided  even  the  appearance  of  a  purpose  to  use  force.f 

If  we  ask  why  the  North  "  dreaded  coercion  " 
we  see  the  effect  of  lack  of  military  power.  The 
North  realized  that  it  was  weak  —  and  therefore 
hesitated.  The  South,  realizing  the  National  Gov- 
ernment's weakness,  was  encouraged  and  became 
resolute.  The  Government,  moreover,  accepted, 
almost  with  haste,  every  resignation  from  an  officer 
which  was  offered,  knowing  full  well  that  these  men 
were  retiring  to  enter  service  with  the  South.  It 
almost  encouraged  such  resignations. 

*  The  Significance   of  Bull  Run,  The   U.   S.   Infantry  Journal, 
Sept,-Oct,   1913. 
t  War  or  Peace. 


36  Peace  Insurance 


General  Emory  Upton,  in  his  book  The  Military 
Policy  of  the  United  States  (U.  S.  War  Depart- 
ment), says: 

This  unfortunate  policy  deprived  many  officers  of  their 
last  plea  for  remaining  true  to  their  country.  Beset  by  the 
importunities  of  their  kindred,  reproached  for  forsaking 
them,  left  alone  to  decide  the  momentous  question,  whether 
it  was  to  their  states  or  to  the  Union  that  they  owned  a  para- 
mount allegiance,  many  at  last  with  bitter  regret  cast  in 
their  lot  with  secession. 

The  responsibility  for  accepting  the  resignations  rests 
with  no  particular  individual.  The  policy  was  begun  by  a 
Secretary  of  War  notoriously  disloyal,  but  was  continued 
by  his  successors,  with  the  sanction  presumably  of  two  presi- 
dents and  their  cabinets. 

General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  who  was  Quarter- 
master General  of  the  United  States  Army,  before 
resigning  to  become  a  general  officer  of  the  Con- 
federacy, shows  Upton's  theories  to  be  correct, 
saying : 

An  officer  is  bound  *  by  that  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
United  States  and  obedience  to  the  officers  they  may  set 
over  him.  When  the  contract  between  the  Government 
and  himself  is  dissolved  by  mutual  consent,  as  in  the  cases  in 
question,  he  is  no  more  bound  under  his  oath  to  allegiance 
to  the  Government  than  to  obedience  to  his  former  com- 
mander. These  two  obligations  are  in  force  only  during 
tenure  of  office.  The  individual  who  was  an  officer  has, 

*  Italics   are  ours. 


A  Less  Expensive  Substitute  37 

when  he  becomes  a  citizen,  exactly  the  same  obligations  to 
the  United  States  as  other  citizens.* 

Even,  however,  with  this  lack  of  foresight,  which 
is  to  be  expected  in  a  government,  which  prepares 
so  illy  for  war,  Upton's  statistics  show  that  seventy- 
seven  per  cent  of  the  graduates  of  the  United  States 
Military  Academy  remained  loyal,  including  fifty 
per  cent  of  those  of  southern  birth.  Only  twenty- 
six  enlisted  men  of  the  United  States  Army  are 
known  to  have  joined  the  South,  and  out  of  an  aggre- 
gate of  16,367  officers  and  enlisted  men  in  the  Regu- 
lar Army,  only  339,  or  less  than  three  per  cent  were 
shown  to  have  been  disloyal.  This  hardly  indicates 
that  a  larger  trained  force  would  have  divided. 

Moreover,  had  General  Chittenden's  contention, 
that  a  larger  army  would  have  benefited  the  South 
and  North  equally,  been  a  sound  one,  it  would,  in 
no  sense,  affect  our  main  argument.  We  do  not 
anticipate  another  Civil  War  —  though  it  is  not 
impossible  —  but  we  consider  a  foreign  war  more 
likely.  It  is  against  such  a  possibility  that  we  are 
warning,  and  we  but  use  Bull  Run  as  an  illustration. 
We  could  easily  discard  Bull  Run  and  place  a  highly 
trained  German  or  French  or  Japanese  Army  on  the 
one  side,  and  an  army  composed  of  a  few  Regulars, 
a  few  Guardsmen,  and  a  host  of  raw  volunteers  on 

*  Narrative  of  Military  Operations,  J.  E.  Johnston,  D.  Appleton 
&  Company. 


38  Peace  Insurance 

the  other.  Such  a  condition  would  afford  us  a  much 
more  convincing,  if  more  horrible,  example  —  which 
we  can  but  pray  God  will  never  come. 

Citizens  en  masse  are  not  soldiers.  Courageous 
and  hardy  though  they  be,  they  cannot  afford  the 
same  protection  as  a  trained  military  force,  and 
hence  do  not  afford  an  equally  good  insurance 
against  war. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  LIKELIHOOD  OF  WAR  TODAY 

T_T  AVING  assumed  that  wars  are  probable  in  order 
to  reach  our  conclusion  that  military  force  is 
but  a  proper  insurance,  it  becomes  desirable  to  prove 
our  assumption.  We  have  two  great  classes  of  men 
who  feel  that  war  can  be  abolished,  both  dreamers 
varying  rather  more  in  methods  than  in  their  danger 
to  the  nation,  and  both  classes  having  certain  ele- 
mental truths  as  a  foundation  upon  which  they  base 
widely-distorted  theories;  theories  as  different  as  are 
the  entirely  opposite  classes  of  men  belonging  to  each 
school.  We  refer  to  the  socialists  and  the  pacifists. 
Many  writers  ignore  the  doctrine  of  the  socialist 
as  ridiculous  anarchistic  rot,  which  is  the  proper 
designation  of  the  most  widely  circulated  publica- 
tions of  this  class.  Yet  these  are  writings  whose 
effect  is  too  great  to  permit  their  being  entirely 
ignored  by  those  who  have  the  interests  of  their  na- 
tion at  heart.  It  is  not  because  the  arguments  of 
the  socialist  will  bear  investigation  and  thought,  but 
because  their  writings  are  circulated  among  men  who 
are  sufficiently  well  educated  to  read,  but  not  learned 
enough  to  refute  the  incorrect  statements  or  to 

39 


4O  Peace  Insurance 

discern  the  fallacies  which  the  socialist  sets  forth. 
Thus  the  socialist  parasite  lives  by  distributing  his 
skillfully  worded  writings  among  those  sufficiently 
ignorant  to  purchase  and  read  the  work,  but  unable 
to  comprehend  the  viciousness  of  the  thought. 

The  socialist  argues  that  war  is  for  capital  alone; 
that  the  working  man  does  the  fighting,  bears  the 
brunt  of  the  loss,  and  gains  nothing;  while  the  capi- 
talist does  no  fighting,  suffers  no  loss,  but  gains  all 
that  is  gained  in  the  war.  As  a  means  of  preventing 
the  wars  which  they  oppose  so  bitterly,  the  socialist 
suggests  that  the  working  man  refuse  to  fight  at  what 
they  term,  the  "  bid  of  their  superiors."  Many 
wars,  however,  are  due  to  the  outcry  of  the  public. 
Many  of  them  are  for  the  benefit  of  labor;  and 
labor,  which  the  socialist  doctrine  counts  upon  for 
its  strength,  is  oftentimes  the  first  to  demand  war. 
Nor  are  these  mere  arbitrary  statements,  as  we  will 
shortly  demonstrate.  It  is  because  of  this  fact  that 
the  socialist's  hopes  of  persuading  the  "  common 
people  "  to  refuse  to  fight  are  vain.  They  will  not 
refuse  it;  they  will  rather  demand  the  armed  strug- 
gle in  protection  of  their  interests. 

The  pacifists  may  be  divided  into  two  main  classes 
—  those  who  favor  arbitration  as  a  settlement,  and 
the  few  who  cry  for  peace  at  any  price.  A  third 
class  growing  in  number  and  presenting  the  most 
conservative,  reasonable,  and  forceful  arguments, 
are  those  who  are  of  the  school  of  Norman  Angell, 


Likelihood  of  War  Today  41 

the  author  of  The  Great  Illusion.  This  school 
studies  the  question  from  a  strictly  economic,  busi- 
nesslike viewpoint,  and  the  errors  and  omissions  are 
few,  though  important.  Their  arguments  are  well 
summed  up  in  the  following  illustrative  questions 
which  Mr.  Angell  asks,  and  in  one  sentence,  answers : 

Is  it  true  that  the  wealth,  prosperity  and  welfare  of  a 
nation  depend  upon  its  military  power,  or  have  necessarily 
anything  whatever  to  do  therewith? 

Can  one  civilized  nation  gain  moral  or  material  advantage 
by  the  military  conquest  of  another? 

Does  conquered  territory  add  to  the  wealth  of  the  con- 
quering nation? 

Is  it  possible  for  a  nation  to  "  own  "  the  territory  of  an- 
other in  the  way  that  a  person  or  corporation  would  "  own  " 
an  estate? 

Could  Germany  "  take  "  English  trade  and  colonies  by 
military  force? 

Could  she  turn  English  colonies  into  German  ones,  and 
win  an  overseas  empire  by  the  sword  as  England  won  hers 
in  the  past? 

Does  a  modern  nation  need  to  expand  its  political  bound- 
aries in  order  to  provide  for  increasing  population  ? 

If  England  could  conquer  Germany  tomorrow,  completely 
conquer  her,  reduce  her  nationality  to  so  much  dust,  would 
the  ordinary  British  subject  be  the  better  for  it? 

If  Germany  could  conquer  England  would  any  ordinary 
German  subject  be  the  better  for  it? 

The  fact  that  all  these  questions  have  to  be  answered  in 
the  negative  and  that  a  negative  answer  seems  to  outrage 


42  Peace  Insurance 

common  sense,  shows  how  much  our  political  axioms  are 
in  need  of  revision.* 

The  one  great  fact,  that  which  all  of  these  schools 
(with  the  partial  exception  of  Mr.  Angell)  either 
overlook  or  minimize,  is  that  there  are  questions 
arising  which  involve  absolutely  vital  interests,  and 
yet  which  are  so  finely  balanced  that  each  party 
may  be  absolutely  sincere  and,  in  his  own  mind, 
positive  in  the  belief  that  his  is  the  side  of  right. 
Under  these  conditions,  each  party  believing  that 
there  is  nothing  questionable  in  the  case,  will  refuse 
to  risk  what  it  holds  to  be  a  vital  point  in  arbitration 
or  otherwise. 

Should  it  ever  occur  that  the  total  wealth,  or  the 
sweetheart,  or  the  wife  of  a  giant  be  claimed 
by  a  man  of  much  smaller  stature  and  inferior 
strength;  should  both  men  appeal  to  an  arbiter  who 
had  no  means  of  enforcing  his  decision,  and  should 
it  be  that  the  giant  would  willingly  give  up  his  all 
—  the  possessions  beyond  price  —  merely  at  the 
word  of  the  third  party;  should  this  be  the  attitude 
of  all  human  beings;  should  all  human  beings  be 
so  constituted  morally  and  intellectually  that  they 
will  in  this  manner  surrender  their  own  absolute  con- 
victions, and  thereby  their  most  prized  earthly  pos- 
sessions and  attachments  willingly  and  without  force, 
at  the  mere  statement  of  some  tribunal  that  they  are 

*  The  Great  Illusion,  Norman  Angell,  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  New 
York. 


Likelihood  of  War   Today  43 

in  the  wrong,  then  it  may  be  that  nations  will  do  like- 
wise, but  until  this  be  so,  it  will  require  force  to 
compel  any  nation  to  surrender  in  vital  questions  of 
this  kind. 

Neither  are  the  majority  of  arbitrationists,  some 
socialists,  or  the  pacifists  of  Mr.  AngelTs  school 
either  fools  or  ignoramuses.  Neither  do  the  ma- 
jority or  the  true  leaders  of  these  movements  sup- 
port the  absurd  theories  that  the  day  of  war  is  past, 
though,  as  has  apparently  always  been  the  case,  there 
are  those  impractical  men  who  will  support  any  the- 
ory. Hence  we  hear  today  the  statement  "  This  is 
the  last  war."  It  has  been  said  that  the  earliest  his- 
tories show  that  there  were  those  who  clung  to  the 
belief  that  the  dawn  of  the  era  of  peace  was  at  hand. 
Surrounded  by  strife  and  war  both  actual  and  threat- 
ened, these  men  saw  only  peace.  Certain  it  is  that 
just  before  our  Civil  War  members  of  the  United 
States  Senate  asserted  with  conviction  that  there 
would  never  be  another  great  war,  and  a  bill  was 
introduced  in  Congress  to  abolish  the  navy.  In  his 
History  of  Civilization  Buckle  made  the  same  claim. 
Yet  while  Buckle  was  writing  his  book  the  Crimean 
struggle  was  at  its  height. 

A  few  months  ago  Dr.  David  Starr  Jordan,  ex- 
President  of  Leland  Stanford  University,  took  the 
same  point  of  view  when  he  said:  "It  is  appar- 
ently not  possible  for  another  real  war  among  the 
nations  of  Europe  to  take  place." 


44  Peace  Insurance 


So  will  men  continue  to  dream  until  the  end  of 
time,  and  likewise,  no  doubt,  wars  will  come  regu- 
larly in  so  far  as  any  who  read  this  book  may 
be  on  earth  to  witness.  Since  the  prophecies  of  such 
men  that  war  was  at  an  end,  we  have  had  some  of 
the  greatest  international  struggles  in  the  history 
of  the  world,  as  examples  of  which  we  need  only 
give  the  more  modern,  such  as  the  present  European 
War,  the  American  Civil,  Franco-Prussian,  Chino- 
Japanese,  Russo-Japanese,  Anglo-Boer,  Spanish- 
American,  Turko-Italian,  Balkan  wars,  and  revolu- 
tions and  minor  struggles  too  numerous  for  us  to 
mention.  Those  alive  today  have  seen  sufficient  of 
these  struggles  to  at  least  discredit  somewhat  these 
dreamers  both  in  the  past  and  in  the  present. 

No  doubt  Doctor  Jordan  is  in  many  subjects  a 
most  learned  man.  His  views  on  the  possibilities 
of  a  war  in  which  the  United  States  would  be  a  par- 
ticipant as  written  in  letters  to  The  Army  and  Navy 
Journal,  dated  August  25,  and  October  24,  1912, 
are  in  part  as  follows : 

If  it  be  true  that  "  Army  experts  of  the  highest  standing 
have  asserted  that  one  Oriental  Power  could  land  a  large 
army  on  our  Pacific  coast  before  we  could  properly  make 
arrangements  for  the  defense  of  a  single  big  California 
seaport  if  we  did  not  hear  of  the  proposed  movement  of  the 
invading  troops  until  they  had  really  embarked,"  then  Army 
experts  are  indulging  in  flights  of  fancy  at  our  expense. 
They  speak  from  "  the  military  point  of  view,"  and  in  this 


Likelihood  of  War  Today  45 

case  the  "  military  point  of  view,"  has  little  in  common  with 
reality. 

There  is  not  "  one  Oriental  Power  "  which  would  send 
an  army  against  us  if  it  could.  The  interests  of  Oriental 
Powers  all  lie  in  Asia.  There  is  not  one  Oriental  Power 
which  could  send  "  a  large  army  "  against  us  if  it  would. 
The  war  with  Russia  has  exhausted  the  financial  resources 
of  Japan,  both  as  to  possible  borrowing  and  as  to  possible 
taxation.  Wars  today  must  mostly  be  fought  with  money,  a 
weapon  which  great  armaments  rapidly  exhausts.  The  war 
in  Manchuria  cost  Japan  a  million  and  a  half  a  day  for 
nearly  a  year  and  a  half.  There  are  no  more  millions  and 
a  half  to  be  had  from  her  loyal,  patient,  but  debt-crushed 
people. 

As  to  the  predicament  of  having  violated  a  treaty,  if  such 
a  thing  has  really  occurred,  we  are  reasonable  enough  to 
mend  our  ways  or  rich  enough  to  bluff  it  through  without 
the  use  of  the  Navy. 

And  again: 

The  nation  is  in  no  danger  whatever  from  any  quarter 
by  land  or  by  sea.  There  is  not  a  conceivable  enemy  unless 
we  create  it  by  direct  attack;  not  a  nation  which  would 
fight  us  if  it  could,  not  one  which  could  fight  us  if  it  would, 
for  the  sinews  of  war  are  not  soldiers,  nor  warships.  They 
consist  of  reserves  of  money,  of  commerce  and  of  friend- 
ships. This  is  the  only  great  nation  that  possesses  such 
reserves. 

In  this  we  find  that  Doctor  Jordan  is  apparently 
better  acquainted  with  the  military  possibilities  of 


46  Peace  Insurance 

various  nations  than  are  the  men  who,  as  profes- 
sional soldiers,  make  these  matters  their  life  study. 
He  takes  the  attitude  that  they  cannot  fight  us  — 
that  no  nation  has  the  power,  the  strength,  the  re- 
sources. To  him,  it  means  nothing  that  our  War 
College,  all  our  various  secretaries  of  war,  all  army 
officers,  as  well  as  all  civilians  who  have  studied  the 
question  express  exactly  the  opposite  view.  Doctor 
Jordan  would  perhaps  resent  as  impertinent  a  sol- 
dier's essay  on  the  proper  way  to  conduct  Leland 
Stanford  University,  and  the  probable  usefulness  of 
the  money  expended  thereon.  He  would  do  so 
rightly,  for  it  is  probable  that  the  soldier  would  be 
entirely  ignorant  of  his  subject.  We  will  assume 
that  our  inference  in  this  case  is  obvious. 

To  make  statements  of  this  kind  when  one  must, 
or,  at  least,  should  know  that  there  are  three  great 
nations  with  practically  equal  or  greater  navies  than 
our  own,  and  other  nations  whose  navies  have  stra- 
tegical advantages,  that  every  one  of  the  great  for- 
eign powers  has  a  land  force  from  five  to  twenty 
times  more  powerful,  and  when  (as  we  will  later 
prove)  the  majority  of  these  countries  have  at  least 
the  necessary  wealth  and  resources  or  borrowing 
power  to  carry  on  a  war,  is  to  invite  the  ridicule 
which  Doctor  Jordan  has  met  in  many  quarters.  To 
continue  such  statements  in  the  face  of  the  European 
War  is  incomprehensible. 

We  have  stated,  however,  that  the  greater  num- 


Likelihood  of  War   Today  47 

her  of  those  in  favor  of  peace  are  in  no  sense 
ignoramuses.  We  have  previously  quoted  the  Presi- 
dent of  Norwich  University,  an  ardent  peace  advo- 
cate. Another  peace  advocate  who  has  taken  the 
trouble  to  study  his  subject  and  thereby  reach  an  in- 
telligent conclusion  as  to  the  present  possibility  of 
war,  is  Dr.  Charles  W.  Eliot,  president  emeritus 
of  Harvard  University,  and  trustee  of  the  Carnegie 
Peace  Foundation.  The  Army  and  Navy  Journal 
quotes  Doctor  Eliot  as  having  said: 

I  would  not  be  willing  to  come  out  and  state  broadly 
that  the  nations  are  taking  seriously  the  idea  of  universal 
peace.  There  is  a  strong  sentiment  for  it  everywhere,  of 
course,  but  such  a  sentiment  is  as  old  as  the  hills  and  has 
been  found  more  or  less  in  all  times  and  climes. 

I  regret  to  say  that  international  or  national  disarmament 
is  not  taken  seriously  by  the  leaders  and  thinking  men  of  the 
more  important  peoples,  and  I  fear  that  for  one  reason 
or  another  neither  the  classes  nor  the  masses  have  much  ad- 
miration for  the  idea  or  would  be  willing  to  do  their  share 
to  bring  it  about. 

But  I  cannot  honestly  say  that  I  found  evidences  of  sincere 
governmental  desire  for  widespread  peace.  Some  of  the 
leaders  in  various  countries  are  sincerely  devoted  to  the 
splendid  principle  of  arbitration  and  are  opposed  to  war  on 
various  unselfish  grounds,  but  I  fear  that  the  time  is  not 
yet  here  when  the  truly  strong  men  —  the  men  who  are  in 
power  or  who  may  be  in  power  tomorrow  —  are  unequivo- 
cally on  the  side  of  reason  and  humanity  as  opposed  to  the 
sword  and  savagery. 


48  Peace  Insurance 


Probably  the  most  conservative,  accurate  and  ad- 
vanced thought  in  the  subject  of  present  day  arma- 
ment comes  from  one  whom  no  one  can  charge  with 
prejudice  in  favor  of  military  force.  Angell,  in  his 
anti-war  book,  makes  the  following  statement, 
which  at  once  eliminates  all  of  the  excellent  argu- 
ments of  his  own  work,  The  Great  Illusion,  as  far 
as  peace  in  the  present  day  is  concerned: 

I  do  not  expose  the  folly  of  "  defense  in  nations."  I  do 
not  object  to  spending  money  on  armament  at  this  juncture. 
On  the  contrary,  I  am  particularly  emphatic  in  declaring 
that  while  the  present  philosophy  is  what  it  is*  we  are  bound 
to  maintain  our  relative  position  with  other  powers. 
What  I  do  attempt  to  make  plain  is  that  the  necessity  for 
defense  measures  (which  I  completely  recognize  and  emphat- 
ically counsel)  implies  on  the  part  of  some  one  a  motive  for 
aggression,  and  the  motive  arises  from  the  (at  present) 
universal  belief  in  the  social  and  economic  advantage  accru- 
ing from  successful  conquests. 

Sentiments  of  this  kind  expressed  by  a  peace  ad- 
vocate in  his  writings,  cause  a  soldier  to  wish  the 
publication  a  wide  circulation.  They  are  reasonable, 
conservative,  and  true. 

Thus  it  is.  Casting  aside  for  the  present  all  ques- 
tion as  to  the  possible  feasibility  of  abolishing  war 
at  some  future  day,  it  remains  a  fact  that  wars  are 
not  only  possible  but  probable  at  the  present  time. 

*  The  italics  are  ours. 


Likelihood  of  War  Today  49 

The  United  States  far  from  being  so  situated  that 
it  is  likely  to  avoid  all  international  complications, 
is  equally  if  not  more  apt,  to  find  itself  embroiled 
with  other  powers  than  are  many  of  the  nations 
of  Europe.  Almost  all  writers  agree  that  our  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  if  maintained  at  all,  may  be  regarded 
as  having  the  greatest  possibilities  for  war  of  any 
policy  of  a  modern  nation.  Not  only  do  we  protect 
our  own  nation,  but  also  almost  the  entire  Western 
Hemisphere.  Whenever  any  of  the  vast  foreign 
interests  in  this  territory,  or  the  desire  of  a  foreign 
nation  to  acquire  greater  interests,  cause  contro- 
versy, then  does  a  complication  arise  that  may  cause 
war.  Venezuela,  Nicaragua,  Columbia,  Mexico, 
Honduras  and  other  South  American  nations  have 
afforded  many  examples  of  this  fact.  Not  only  in 
the  grave  matter  of  foreign  colonization  in  America, 
but  in  the  protection  of  foreign  capital,  foreign  sub- 
jects and  their  interests  on  this  hemisphere,  do  ques- 
tions involving  possible  war  arise.  The  essentials 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  read: 

The  occasion  has  been  deemed  proper  for  asserting,  as  a 
principle  in  which  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States 
are  involved,  that  the  American  continents,  by  the  free 
and  independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed  and 
maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects 
for  future  colonization  by  any  European  power. 
We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the  amicable  rela- 
tions existing  between  the  United  States  and  those  powers 


50  Peace  Insurance 


to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on  their 
part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere 
as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing 
colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  power  we  have 
not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with  the  gov- 
ernments who  have  declared  their  independence  and  main- 
tain it,  and  whose  independence  we  have,  on  great  considera- 
tion and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not 
view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them 
or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny  by  any 
European  power  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation 
of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United  States. 

How  is  this  extension  of  systems  that  is  consid- 
ered "  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety  "  to  be 
prevented  ?  Obviously  by  military  force  or  by  threat- 
ened military  force.  Hence  we  have  a  cause  for 
possible  war  whenever  a  foreign  nation,  knowing  its 
superior  military  strength,  may  consider  that  the 
advantages  of  colonization  in  America  outweigh  the 
possible  disadvantages  of  the  war. 

Homer  Lea's  The  Valor  of  Ignorance,  in  many 
respects  one  of  the  most  remarkable  of  politico- 
military  writings,  is  correct  in  all  absolute  essentials, 
and  the  most  frequent  criticism,  that  of  exaggeration, 
can  only  be  held  true  in  regard  to  details  or  figures 
which  in  no  way  affect  the  general  excellence  of  the 
work,  as  a  presentation  of  the  militarist's  case  for 
war.  In  regard  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  General 
Lea  says: 


Likelihood  of  War   Today  51 

How  unreasonable  it  is,  therefore,  to  expect  that  the  com- 
bined nations  of  Europe,  with  all  their  military  strength, 
shall  remain  restricted  to  one-twelfth  of  this  world's  land, 
burrowed  into  and  hewn  over  for  the  last  thousand  years, 
while  this  Republic,  without  armies,  shall  maintain  dominion 
over  one-half  the  unexploited  lands  of  the  world!  Or  that 
Japan,  possessed  of  two- thirds  the  population  of  this  nation 
and  a  military  organization  fifty-fold  greater,  shall  con- 
tinue to  exist  on  her  rocky  isles  that  are,  inclusive  of  Korea, 
but  one-two-hundred-and-fiftieth  of  the  earth's  lands,  while 
an  undefended  one-half  lies  under  the  guns  of  her  battleships! 

What  prevents  the  occupation  of  this  vast  and  rich  con- 
tinent by  powers  having  military  capacity?  The  defensive 
ability  of  the  Latin  republic  is,  proportionately,  no  greater 
against  European  or  future  Asiatic  military  aggression  than 
was  the  defensive  capacity  of  the  aborigines  against  the  first 
European  conquerors.  Ordinarily,  it  is  believed  that  the 
dictum  of  this  Republic,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  has  been 
responsible  for  their  immunity  against  foreign  aggressions. 
Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth. 

There  have  been  five  separate  causes  productive  of  Mexi- 
can, Central  and  South  American  exemption  from  foreign 
conquest : 

(1)  Inadequacy  of  transportation  and  communication. 

(2)  Adjustment  of  European  political  conditions. 

(3)  Duration    of    the    pre-inventive    or    non-mechanical 
period. 

(4)  A  correspondingly  low  demand  for  natural  resources. 

( 5 )  The  seclusion  of  the  Oriental  races. 

One  by  one  we  have  seen  these  sources  of  immunity 
vanish  and  antithetic  conditions  imperceptibly  take  their 


52  Peace  Insurance 


place,  increasing  each  year  in  cumulative  intensity.  Herein 
lies  the  inevitability  of  war  between  this  Republic  and 
European  as  well  as  Asiatic  nations,  or  a  complete  repudia- 
tion of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  the  history  of  mankind 
never  before  has  one  nation  attempted  to  support  so  com- 
prehensive a  doctrine  as  to  extend  its  political  suzerainty 
over  two  continents  comprising  a  fourth  of  the  habitable 
earth  and  one-half  of  its  unexploited  wealth,  in  direct  defi- 
ance of  the  whole  world,  and  without  the  slightest  semblance 
of  military  power,  nor  possessing  any  right  to  regulate  the 
domestic  or  foreign  policy  of  numerous  and  irresponsible 
political  entities  that  simmer  and  sweat  within  two-thirds 
of  its  suzerainty. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  Promethean  in  conception,  but 
not  so  in  execution.  It  was  proclaimed  in  order  to  avoid 
wars:  now  it  invites  them.* 

During  the  debates  on  the  fortification  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  and  upon  the  tolls  question,  numerous 
issues,  which  may  some  day  bring  on  war,  were 
shown  to  exist.  This  canal,  furthermore,  will  cause 
questions  to  arise  in  the  future,  possibly  of  a  much 
graver  nature  and  still  more  provocative  of  war. 
Making  as  we  will  the  regulations  under  which  much 
of  the  maritime  commerce  between  the  Atlantic  and 
the  Pacific  will  pass,  we  will  find  the  flag  of  every  na- 
tion passing  through  that  canal,  and  the  controversies 
that  can  arise  therefrom  are  innumerable.  A  nation 
taking  a  responsibility  of  this  kind  and  bringing  itself 

•  The  Valor  of  Ignorance,  Homer  Lea,  Harper  &  Brothers,  New 
York. 


Likelihood  of  War  Today  53 

into  the  most  intimate  relations  with  all  other  powers 
of  the  world  is  surely  liable  to  find  itself  involved  in 
war  as  long  as  wars  continue  upon  this  earth. 

Referring  to  the  canal,  Lewis  Nixon,  one  of  the 
greatest  marine  authorities,  says: 

We  shall  have  to  fight  some  day  for  the  canal,  unless  we 
are  willing  to  give  up  most  of  our  rights  in  it  without  fight- 
ing, and  adopt  the  policy  of  acquiring  property,  developing 
it,  and  giving  it  away  to  foreigners.* 

Furthermore,  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States  there  are  numerous  and  serious  questions 
which  will  not  be  decided  for  years  to  come,  unless  it 
be  by  force  of  arms.  All  of  these  are  matters  so 
delicate  as  to  be  classed  among  those  questions  most 
provocative  of  war.  Large  among  these  looms  the 
question  of  the  relations  with  Japanese  emigrants 
in  the  United  States,  and,  in  addition,  those  desirous 
of  coming  to  this  country.  These  persons  acquire 
land,  they  underbid  American  labor,  and  secure  the 
positions  of  American  laborers;  they  secure  white 
mistresses,  their  male  adults  demand  admission  to 
American  public  schools.  The  American  looks  upon 
the  proud  Japanese  as  of  an  inferior  race;  he  does 
not  want  him  as  a  neighbor;  he  is  jealous  of  the  posi- 
tions which  the  Japanese  may  secure;  he  will  not 
have  his  child-daughter  brought  up  with  a  Japanese 
male  adult.  These  controversies,  due  to  difference 

*  New  York  Herald. 


54  Peace  Insurance 


of  race,  religion,  characteristics,  and  morals,  as  well 
as  to  agricultural  and  commercial  rivalry,  are  the 
kind  that  arouse  the  passions  of  man.  Hatred, 
jealousy,  fear,  pride,  contempt,  all  powerful  agencies 
indeed,  are  stirred  up  by  these  matters,  and  these  are 
the  agencies  that  may  at  any  time  precipitate  conflict 
between  nations. 

Only  a  few  years  ago,  an  incident  reported  widely 
in  the  press  of  both  countries  occurred  at  Pasadena, 
California.  The  accounts  stated  that  a  certain  hotel 
had  planned  a  grand  ball  in  honor  of  Admiral 
Yashiro  and  his  officers  —  a  Japanese  squadron  at 
that  time  being  nearby.  American  society  girls,  how- 
ever, remarked  that  they  would  "  just  as  soon  dance 
with  niggers,"  and  in  consequence  the  ball  was  post- 
poned. Said  the  New  York  Herald,  shortly  after: 

When  the  school  children  of  North  Beach,  in  their  best 
bib  and  tucker,  accepting  what  was  supposed  to  be  an  invita- 
tion to  go  aboard  the  Japanese  war  ships,  were  about  to 
take  the  cars  for  San  Pedro  a  curt  telegram  from  Rear 
Admiral  Yashiro  informed  them  that  they  would  not  be 
received. 

True  or  not,  that  is  a  question  which  makes  no 
difference.  The  fact  that  the  dispatches  telling  of 
this  seemingly  trivial  incident  were  published  all 
through  the  United  States  and  Japan  is  what  counts. 
Americans  have  forgotten  the  incident,  but  do  you 
think  that  the  Japanese  have  done  so?  Would 


Likelihood  of  War  Today  55 

America  have  forgotten  had  the  insult  or  fancied 
insult  been  reversed?  It  was  perhaps  too  trivial  to 
warrant  an  official  explanation,  but  it  is  the  kind  of 
thing  that  rankles  in  the  breast  of  the  patriotic  citizen 
of  any  country.  These  little  incidents  occurring  fre- 
quently in  our  western  states  are  brooders  for  the 
passions  that  can  bring  on  war. 

Nor  can  financial  and  commercial  consideration  act 
as  a  strong  preventive  of  war,  either  now  or  in  the 
future,  Doctor  Jordan  excepting.  This  we  shall  con- 
sider at  length  in  a  succeeding  chapter.  General 
Chittenden,  the  pacifist,  sees  and  admits  all  these 
possible  war  causes  in  his  work  War  or  Peace,  as  do 
all  other  careful  students  of  our  international  rela- 
tions. 

Surely,  as  eminent  peace  advocates  state,  the  era 
of  universal  peace  is  not  yet  at  hand.  Certainly  the 
United  States  enjoys  no  special  dispensation  which 
will  excuse  it  from  the  wars  which  are  common  to  all 
nations. 


CHAPTER  IV 

WILL  WAR  EVER  BE  ABOLISHED? 

"1T7HETHER  or  not  arbitration,  disarmament, 
socialism,  finance,  commerce,  new  economic 
theories  or  some  hitherto  unknown  agency  may  some 
day  entirely  abolish  war,  we  cannot  pretend  to  state. 
Certain  it  is  that  but  little  progress  has  as  yet  been 
made  toward  that  end ;  and  equally  certain  is  it  that 
neither  history  of  the  past,  present  day  facts,  or 
arguments  of  the  pacifists  afford  much  encourage- 
ment for  the  future.  It  is  too  much,  however,  for 
one  to  state  that  facts,  convincing  though  they  be 
today,  will  not  be  altered  with  the  passing  of  time. 
We  cannot  foresee  accurately  the  world  of  the  future 
because  one  unforeseen  change  may  upset  all  calcula- 
tions. We  can,  however,  consider  facts  both  past 
and  present  and  determine  what  the  future  must  be 
until  the  present  essential  facts  or  laws  are  changed. 
Thus  it  is  that  we  are  limited  in  considering  the 
probability  of  perpetual  peace  in  future  years.  We 
can  determine  its  possibilities  under  existing  laws  of 
nature,  but  none  is  so  wise  as  to  know  positively  that 
these  laws  may  not  some  day  change.  We  cannot 
foresee  these  changes  —  to  our  human  mind  they 

56 


Will  War  Ever  be  Abolished?  57 

seem  impossible  —  and  we  must,  therefore,  apply 
laws  and  facts  as  they  exist  today.  By  so  doing  we 
will  find  that  neither  arbitration,  socialism,  economy, 
or  philosophy  are  likely  to  bring  peace  —  that  dis- 
armament or  limitation  of  armament  appear  to  be  as 
far  off  as  ever,  and  that  wars  will  probably  continue 
till  the  end  of  mankind.  The  arbitrationist  hopes  to 
end  war  by  a  tribunal  of  justice;  the  socialist  by  con- 
vincing the  masses  that  it  is  in  their  interest  not  to 
fight;  the  school  of  Angell  by  convincing  the  world 
that  the  victor  gains  nought  through  war;  disarm- 
amists  (feeling  that  military  force  causes  war)  by 
doing  away  with  that  force. 

For  the  purpose  of  illustration  of  the  imprac- 
ticability of  any  qf  these  methods  under  the  laws  of 
nature  as  they  are  today,  we  will  present  an  imagi- 
nary situation  arising  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan,  and  attempt  to  apply  the  various  methods  for 
peace  thereto.  We  do  not  say  that  such  a  situation 
will  ever  arise,  yet  it  is  one  that  is  by  no  means  im- 
probable. We  are  not  desirous  of  selecting  any  na- 
tion as  our  probable  enemy  and,  therefore,  we  do  not 
express,  herein,  our  opinions  as  to  the  imminence  of 
the  Japanese  question;  merely  do  we  present  an 
imaginary  condition  of  affairs  which  might  well  be 
the  outgrowth  of  matters  as  they  now  stand. 

Let  us  assume  that  Japan  with  a  population  of 
sixty-seven  million,  or  two-thirds  of  that  of  the 
United  States,  and  an  area  only  one-third  larger  than 


58  Peace  Insurance 

our  state  of  California,  shall  find  it  absolutely  nec- 
essary to  secure  additional  territory.  Let  us  assume 
that  the  Japanese  —  not  as  a  nation  perhaps,  but  as 
individuals  —  shall  turn  their  eyes  towards  America ; 
that  it  is  America  that  offers  the  greatest  advantages. 
Assume  that  because  of  this,  Japanese  population  in 
the  United  States  shall  increase,  and  as  has  been 
found  the  case,  the  Japanese  through  cheap  labor, 
low  necessities,  and  thriftiness,  shall  oust  the  white 
man  from  positions;  from  ownership  of  farms,  and 
so  on  indefinitely. 

It  will  be  said  that  such  a  matter  is  not  pressing; 
that  the  Japanese  could  go  elsewhere.  Possibly,  but 
possibly  they  would  not  be  welcome  elsewhere.  Pos- 
sibly at  some  time  in  the  future  the  yellow  races  may 
find  all  their  territory  so  crowded  that  they  must  ex- 
pand on  territory  occupied  by  the  white  man.  Pos- 
sibly it  will  be  that  conditions  Oriental  will  be  such 
as  to  make  imperative  their  emigration  to  the  Occi- 
dent. We  must  remember  that  we  are  considering 
the  possibility  of  absolutely  abolishing  war.  Hence, 
we  are  justified  in  considering  these  possible  condi- 
tions in  order  to  determine  whether  or  not  all  ques- 
tions may  in  the  future  be  settled  without  recurring 
to  arms. 

Mr.  Angell,  whom  we  have  said  to  be  the  most 
practical  of  pacifists,  maintains  that  neither  van- 
quished nor  victor  as  nations  nor  as  individuals  gain 
by  war.  He  would,  if  we  understand  his  theories, 


War  Ever  be  Abolished?  59 


urge  the  admission  of  the  yellow  man.  Suppose  we 
do  so.  The  white  man  is  underbid  in  labor,  is  forced 
from  his  ownership  of  land,  etc.,  at  this  day  in  our 
Pacific  coast  states.  Should  the  yellow  population  in- 
crease and  spread  throughout  this  country,  what 
would  the  result  be?  Would  not  these  conditions 
increase  on  our  Pacific  coast?  Would  they  not  spread 
throughout  the  country?  And  from  thence  would  it 
not  be  but  a  step  to  finding  the  yellow  man  in  actual 
control  of  the  nation? 

We  can  see  today  the  remnant  of  a  once  mighty 
race  herded  like  cattle  on  reservations,  wards  of  the 
nation,  mere  traces  of  the  vast  Indian  tribes  that 
once  roamed  the  North  American  continent,  mere 
degenerates  of  the  strong  characters  which  belonged 
to  the  red  men  of  the  fifteenth  century.  What  Indian 
Chief  of  four  hundred  years  ago  would  have  ac- 
knowledged the  possibility  of  such  conditions?  What 
man  of  today,  knowing  the  intelligence,  the  skill,  the 
craftiness,  the  thriftiness,  the  strength  and  the  endur- 
ance of  the  wiry  Japanese  —  knowing  the  manner 
in  which  they  have  already  commenced  to  supplant 
the  white  man  on  the  Pacific  coast  —  would  say  that 
actual  Asiatic  domination  is  impossible  in  case  unlim- 
ited yellow  immigration  should  be  permitted?  The 
Japanese  are  not  an  inferior  race,  but  they  are  a  vast- 
ly different  one,  and  their  peopling  the  same  country 
with  Americans  is  a  matter  which  will  not  stand  the 
test  of  time.  Nor  can  the  nation  retain  its  glory 


60  Peace  Insurance 

which  attempts  to  assimilate  such  a  characteristically 
different  people.  Mexico  and  other  South  American 
countries  afford  an  excellent  example  of  nations  peo- 
pled by  mixed  bloods  of  this  character.  Their  kind 
are  those  who  retard  their  nation. 

No  American  expects  that  the  yellow  man  will 
ever  control  this  country,  no  American  expects  to  see 
the  country  peopled  by  a  mixture  of  the  yellow  and 
the  white  blood.  This  for  the  simple  reason  that  as 
long  as  may  be  necessary  we  expect  to  see  that  yellow 
immigration  is  stopped,  whether  it  be  by  the  so-called 
"  gentleman's  agreement  "  of  the  present,  by  com- 
pliance with  future  American  laws,  or  by  military 
force. 

Can  it  be  that  nothing  would  be  gained  by  Ameri- 
can citizens  in  a  successful  war  to  prevent  such  incur- 
sions of  foreigners  of  such  an  aggressive  but  different 
race?  And  can  it  be  that  there  are  those  who  cannot 
see  that  in  the  future  as  in  the  past  nations  will  find 
it  necessary  to  secure  new  territory  for  their  surplus 
population?  And  it  cannot  be,  we  are  sure,  that 
there  are  men  who  will  maintain  that  individual  Jap- 
anese citizens,  as  well  as  the  Japanese  nation,  would 
gain  nothing  were  their  crowded  conditions  relieved 
and  their  citizens  permitted  to  gain  such  a  foothold 
in  a  new  and  rich  country. 

Thus  it  is  that  any  nation  finding  its  territory  and 
national  resources  insufficient  for  its  natural  growth 
of  population  may  be  compelled  to  insist  that  its 


War  Ever  be  Abolished?  61 


citizens  be  permitted  to  emigrate.  Thus  it  is  that 
any  nation  may  find  it  necessary  to  go  to  war  to 
secure  the  necessary  relief.  Thus  it  is  that  any 
nation  may  gain  materially  by  a  war,  which  gives  it 
at  the  same  time  relief  from  its  crowded  conditions 
and  the  control  of  a  vast  new  territory.  Here  at 
least  is  a  case  where,  Mr.  Angell  to  the  contrary,  a 
nation  may  gain  by  war.  There  are  still  other  simi- 
lar conditions  ;  we  have  selected  but  one  almost  self- 
evident  example.  Not  always  do  we  find  the  element 
of  radical  racial  difference,  but  in  a  lesser  degree  the 
same  is  true  whenever  one  nation  comes  in  conflict 
with  another. 

Shall  we  submit  a  question  of  this  kind  to  arbitra- 
tion ?  Would  America  do  so  ?  Would  Japan  do  so  ? 
If  so,  to  whom?  America,  feeling  that  its  national 
existence  was  threatened,  would  certainly  never  con- 
sent to  a  tribunal  predominated  by  the  Orient. 
Japan,  knowing  that  new  territory  and  new  resources 
were  essential  as  an  outlet  for  her  increasing  popula- 
tion, would  not  consent  to  a  tribunal  predominated 
by  the  Occident.  Equality  would  mean  a  deadlock. 

Assuming,  however,  that  either  government  were 
unwise  enough  to  submit  such  a  question  to  arbitra- 
tion, assuming  that  a  decision  were  reached,  could 
the  tribunal,  even  if  supported  by  the  American  gov- 
ernment, enforce  an  adverse  decision  on  the  Ameri- 
can people?  Could  arbitration,  even  if  supported  by 
the  Japanese  government,  confine  the  yellow  man  to 


6z  Peace  Insurance 


the  area  that  had  been  found  cramped  and  incapable 
of  supporting  the  population?  Not  in  either  case 
without  civil  war.  Nor  in  either  case  would  it  be 
attempted. 

It  is  thus  in  determining  the  fallacy  of  arbitration 
as  a  preventive  for  war  under  such  conditions  that 
we  find  the  fallacy  of  the  socialist  propaganda  for  the 
education  of  the  masses  to  refuse  to  fight.  From 
whence  would  come  the  demand  for  war  to  exclude 
the  yellow  man  under  the  conditions  which  we  have 
quoted?  From  whom,  among  the  crowded  yellow 
race,  would  come  the  demand  to  fight  for  the  priv- 
ilege of  expansion?  From  the  masses  in  both  cases. 
They  as  the  sufferers  would  be  the  first  to  cry  for 
war,  and  no  amount  of  socialist  literature  could  con- 
vince them  that  it  was  capital  that  was  forcing  the 
struggle.  In  this  and  in  most  other  cases  it  will  be 
the  masses  that  will  cry  for  war,  and  even  the  con- 
verted socialist  will  cry  "  but  this  is  different !  " 

That  finance  and  commerce  can  prevent  war,  and 
that  the  United  States  in  particular  through  financial 
and  commercial  power  is,  therefore,  supreme,  is  one 
of  the  most  easily  disposed  of  arguments  of  the 
pacifist.  We  could  quote  history  at  length  to  show 
the  fallacy  of  these  contentions,  but  it  is  unnecessary, 
for  within  the  memory  of  living  men  there  is  suffi- 
cient proof. 

There  are  two  ways  in  which  finance  is  supposed 
to  prevent  war.  First,  through  the  inability  of  nations 


Will  War  Ever  be  Abolished?  63 

to  borrow  the  money  to  carry  on  the  conflict,  and, 
second,  by  the  financial  interdependence  of  the  vari- 
ous nations.  As  for  the  first,  we  saw  General  Huerta 
losing  steadily.  We  read  daily  dispatches  from 
Washington  to  the  effect  that  he  was  bankrupt  and 
could  hold  out  no  longer,  and  still  we  saw  his  fight- 
ing capacity  diminished  only  by  defeat  and  not  by 
lack  of  money.  We  have  seen  the  Balkan  allies  — 
probably  the  poorest  nations  on  earth  —  finance 
a  modern  war  which  cannot  be  classed  as  small,  and 
we  have  seen  the  poorest  of  South  American  Repub- 
lics constantly  financing  wars  and  revolutions.  If 
we  care  to  glance  into  history,  we  would  find  that 
never  has  there  been  a  war,  no  matter  how  unequal 
the  struggle  at  its  incipiency,  but  that  both  sides  were 
able  to  secure  money  at  the  start.  This  has  been 
so  with  nations  where  victory  seemed  impossible. 

The  nation  most  often  pointed  out  as  one  which 
could  not  again  make  war  on  account  of  its  poverty, 
is  Japan.  Yet  Japan,  not  as  well  prepared  financially 
as  Russia  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  was  victorious. 
When  money  was  desired  for  this  war,  recourse  was 
made  to  loans,  the  first  being  an  inner  loan  of  $50,- 
000,000,  five  per  cent,  at  95.  This  loan  was  four 
times  oversubscribed.  The  second  loan,  an  outer 
loan  of  $50,000,000,  six  per  cent,  at  93^,  repayable 
at  par  in  1911,  was  oversubscribed  thirty  times. 
Next  an  inner  loan  of  seven-year  treasury  bonds  at 
92  was  issued,  also  for  $50,000,000,  this  being  three 


64  Peace  Insurance 


times  oversubscribed,  and  shortly  after,  a  similar 
issue  of  $40,000,000  of  these  bonds  was  two  and 
one-half  times  oversubscribed.  Just  before  the  con- 
clusion of  the  war,  another  inner  loan  of  $150,000,- 
ooo  was  oversubscribed.  In  fact,  a  complete  story  of 
Japan's  finances  throughout  the  war  would  be  but  a 
repetition  of  facts  similar  to  the  above.  The  Jap- 
anese war  loans  caused  the  national  debt  to  be  in- 
creased by  only  twenty-two  per  cent,  and  there  is  no 
reason  why  an  increase  of  less  than  one-quarter  in 
the  national  debt  should  destroy  the  great  capacity 
which  Japan  showed  for  raising  money.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  Japan,  since  the  Russian  War,  has  been 
spending  money  on  military  establishments  in  a  man- 
ner that  is  in  itself  no  trifle  and  which  indicates  that 
her  future  expenses  in  war  will  be  at  a  minimum, 
owing  to  much  of  the  preparation  having  previously 
been  made  (Plate  3). 

How  absurd,  then,  to  suppose  that  Japan,  with 
everything  pointing  to  victory,  with  the  possible  ex- 
ception of  money,  could  not  borrow  the  funds  for 
the  war  with  the  United  States.  By  no  means  is  the 
United  States  so  sure  of  its  position  that  it  could 
count  on  foreign  friendship,  and,  in  fact,  such  friend- 
ship plays  but  little  part  in  such  loans.  It  would  be 
logical  for  financiers  to  reason  as  follows :  Japan,  at 
present,  has  the  naval  strategical  advantage  on  the 
Pacific  Ocean;  Japan  has  many  times  more  powerful 
and  efficient  an  army;  Japan  lacks  nought  but  money; 


Q  (H  in  i  Z 

5  <:D  o^ 

<  no:  ncn 

uj  S0  w 

W    U.  uJE  UJo) 

Z  M  z?  Q< 


War  Ever  be  Abolished?  65 


that  supplied  and  Japan  will  win.  When  one  looks 
at  the  unequal  struggles  that  have  been  financed  in 
the  past,  such  a  reasoning  seems  comparatively 
sound.  It  has  always  been  only  when  a  nation  was 
facing  final  and  hopeless  defeat  that  it  became  abso- 
lutely impossible  to  raise  funds,  and  many  nations,  in 
the  midst  of  war,  when  the  outlook  seemed  darkest, 
have  been  able  to  secure  finances  for  a  last  attempt, 
in  some  almost  unaccountable  manner. 

Hamilton-Grace  in  his  book  Finance  and  War  con- 
cludes : 

That  no  nation  will  be  stopped  from  plunging  into  war 
by  dearth  of  money.  War  loans  contracted  by  a  people 
who  are  thoroughly  prepared  for  war  are  a  sound  national 
investment  (vide  1870). 

That  loans  will  always  be  forthcoming  to  provide  the 
sinews  of  war.* 

Not  only  is  this  so,  but  the  expense  of  war  is  not 
the  same  in  different  nations.  Japan,  for  instance, 
subsists  her  soldiers  at  much  less  cost  than  does  the 
United  States,  and  Japan  pays  them  but  a  fraction  of 
the  pay  of  the  United  States  soldier.  This  is  also 
true  of  Germany,  of  England,  France,  and  other 
European  nations.  Exactly  as  Japanese  laborers  can 
underbid  the  American  laborer  in  California,  so  can 
a  Japanese  soldier  serve  his  nation  for  much  less 
than  can  an  American  soldier  serve  the  United 

*  Finance  and  War,  Hamilton-Grace,  Hugh  Rees,  Ltd.,  London. 


66  Peace  Insurance 

States.  It  is  an  easily  discernible  fact  that  practically 
all  the  foreign  armies  are  supported  at  a  cost  per 
soldier  much  less  than  that  of  the  United  States. 
Thus,  including  every  possible  cost,  the  United 
States  expends  about  $800  per  soldier  per  year.  In 
England,  the  soldier  costs  about  $500  annually;  in 
Germany,  $300;  in  France,  $250;  in  Japan,  $240; 
in  Russia,  $230.  For  this  reason  it  would  naturally 
cost  the  United  States  a  great  deal  more  to  place  a 
force  in  the  field  than  it  would  any  of  the  other 
nations. 

One  of  the  chief  sources  of  additional  expense  to 
the  United  States  would  be  our  immensely  expensive 
volunteer  and  militia  system.  This,  as  is  shown  else- 
where in  this  work,  has  been  a  source  of  tremendous 
expense  in  every  war,  and  has  many  times  almost  cost 
us  our  nation.  Lea,  in  his  The  Valor  of  Ignorance, 
states  that  if  the  United  States  should  be  compelled 
to  place  an  army  of  the  same  size  in  the  field  for  the 
same  length  of  time  as  did  Japan  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  the  salaries  alone  of  our  army  would 
nearly  equal  the  entire  expense  of  the  Japanese, 
"  while  the  total  expense  would  equal  a  sum  as  pro- 
portionately greater  as  is  the  wealth  of  this  Republic 
greater  than  that  of  Japan."  On  this  basis,  it  would 
be  no  greater  financial  strain  for  Japan  to  carry  on 
a  war  than  it  would  be  for  the  United  States  to 
oppose  it. 

As  for  financial  interdependence,  that  may,  on  oc- 


Will  War  Ever  be  Abolished?  67 

casion,  prevent  a  war  for  which  there  was  never  any 
need;  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  cause  a  war  which 
would  not  otherwise  occur.  This  —  assuming  that 
the  pacifist  is  correct  when  he  says  that  the  financiers 
control  war  —  would  depend  entirely  on  the  interests 
of  the  particular  group  of  financiers  in  control  of  the 
nation  concerned.  Just  as  financiers  frequently  de- 
sire a  "  bear  "  stock  market  for  their  own  interest 
and  their  business  opponents'  ruin,  so  may  a  group  of 
financiers,  feeling  that  they  are  well  prepared  per- 
sonally, be  not  averse  to  a  temporary  financial  strin- 
gency. Moreover,  Hamilton-Grace  shows  that  war 
does  not  necessarily  cause  money  to  become  "  very 
dear,"  and  that,  while  the  stock  market  will  rise  and 
fall  with  victory  and  defeat  in  the  field,  money  after 
a  few  weeks  finds  its  proper  level. 

However,  financiers  are  greatly  overestimated  by 
those  who  give  them  the  making  and  preventing  of 
war  and  the  building  or  ruin  of  nations.  Some  of  the 
greatest  of  wars  have  been  in  spite  of  financial  and 
economic  efforts.  When  the  New  York  Stock  Ex- 
change was  closed  we  did  not  notice  that  Wall  Street 
seemed  pleased  at  the  prospect  of  European  war, 
but  that  fact  influenced  the  great  powers  in  no 
way.  A  government  may  so  inflame  the  public  as 
to  make  a  governmentally-desired  war  popular 
among  the  people,  but  neither  a  government  nor 
financiers  can  prevent  an  aroused  populace  from 
bringing  on  a  war  in  defense  of  what  they  believe  to 


68  Peace  Insurance 


be  their  essential  interests.  No  amount  of  financial 
pressure  will  ever  induce  the  American  people  to 
permit  the  yellow  man  to  overrun  this  continent.  In 
spite  of  all  that  is  said  by  the  pacifist,  moreover, 
wars  are  continuing,  and  finance,  suffer  though  it 
may,  does  not  prevent  them  in  any  case  where  there 
is  any  real  underlying  cause  for  the  contest. 

The  same  is  true  of  commerce.  Commerce, 
through  rivalry,  may  cause  war;  it  cannot  prevent  it. 
For  example,  no  nation  is  dependent,  today,  upon 
the  exports  of  the  United  States,  and  if  it  were,  such 
a  nation  would  receive  them  throughout  the  struggle 
with  this  country.  Should  we,  for  instance,  be  en- 
gaged in  a  war  with  Germany,  it  might  possibly  be 
that  direct  exportation  to  Germany  would  entirely 
cease;  but  we  would  still  export  to  England  and 
France,  and  the  markets  of  those  nations  would  still 
be  open  to  the  German  buyers.  Only  after  one 
nation  should  completely  surround  the  other  with 
ships  or  men  or  both,  would  commerce  cease,  and 
at  present  no  nation  has  the  military  force  to  effectu- 
ally blockade  even  the  insular  kingdoms  of  England 
and  Japan  in  that  manner. 

Thus  do  we  find  that  there  are  cases  when  the 
logician  and  philosopher,  the  arbiter  and  the  social- 
ist, the  commercialist  and  financier,  fail  utterly  to 
afford  either  present  or  future  hopes  for  the  elimina- 
tion of  war.  In  fact,  it  is  with  the  accumulation  of 
years  that  conditions  of  which  we  have  given  an  ex- 


War  Ever  be  Abolished?  69 


ample  become  extremely  probable,  and  in  conse- 
quence, the  likelihood  of  such  a  war  increases  in  the 
future. 

As  for  disarmament  or  limitation  of  armament 
these  are  impractical  as  long  as  it  is  admitted  that 
wars  may  come.  To  expect  a  nation  to  admit  the 
possibility  of  war  over  some  vital  question,  and  yet 
to  agree  that  it  will  limit  its  armament  —  limit  its 
power  to  protect  itself  —  and  so  afford  the  other  and 
possibly  weaker  nation  an  equal  chance  for  victory, 
is  ridiculous.  So  much  for  limitation  of  armament. 

There  are  those  who  believe  that  the  present  Eu- 
ropean War,  especially  if  Germany  is  defeated,  will 
mean  a  general  reduction  of  armament.  In  the 
United  States  there  is  considerable  belief  that  Ger- 
man defeat  will  permit  us  to  still  further  reduce  our 
military  preparation.  We  cannot  understand  such 
reasoning.  What  effect  can  German  defeat,  or  even 
German  annihilation  have,  while  Russia  retains  a 
standing  army  of  over  1,200,000  men,  and  a  total 
trained  force  of  almost  six  million;  while  England 
retains  its  great  navy;  while  France  and  Italy  retain 
their  large  armies  and  their  powerful  navies.  We 
will  shortly  show  that  Germany  is  by  no  means  the 
"  most  military  "  in  many  respects,  for  Germany  has 
not  the  largest  army  or  navy,  the  largest  total  of 
trained  men  or  the  largest  percentage  of  population 
under  arms.  We  can  not  charge  Germany  with  forc- 
ing the  other  great  nations  to  arm,  when  we  know 


7O  Peace  Insurance 


that  Germany  has  had  smaller  land  and  naval  forces, 
and  merely  challenged  the  other  powers'  lead.  Rus- 
sia, England,  Italy,  and  France  are  leaders  in  certain 
kinds  of  militarism  and  are  by  no  means  so  closely 
bound  together  that  they  will  cease  to  look  upon  one 
another  as  possible  enemies.  No  one  nation  will  be 
the  leader  in  a  reduction  of  military  force,  and  should 
it  be  that  the  greater  number  did  reduce  their  armies 
and  navies,  there  would  surely  be  at  least  one  Euro- 
pean power  which  would  take  advantage  of  that  fact 
by  an  increase.  Moreover,  neither  Europe,  nor 
America,  can  afford  to  make  a  reduction  of  their  de- 
fensive powers  while  Japan  retains  its  efficient  land 
force  of  almost  a  million  and  a  quarter  men,  and  con- 
tinues to  improve  its  already  powerful  navy.  The 
history  of  Japan  is  one  of  gain  by  aggression,  and  it 
is  unlikely  that  that  nation  will  relinquish  its  growing 
power.  Already  many  great  statesmen  see  in  the 
antagonism  of  the  yellow  and  the  white  race  the  next 
great  world  war. 

Disarmament  means  a  return  to  the  day  when 
every  man  was  a  soldier.  The  abolishing  of  the 
comparatively  small  trained  force  of  the  nation 
means  that  it  must  be  replaced  by  numbers.  It  would 
mean  that  the  victory  would  go  to  the  nation  with 
the  greatest  available  male  population,  not  to 
strength  and  power.  Thus  would  such  a  nation  as 
China  become  mistress  of  the  world. 

Would  the  United  States  agree  to  limit  the  forces 


Will  War  Ever  be  Abolished?  71 

to  be  used  to  prevent  the  yellow  immigration? 
Would  they  abolish  armed  force  and  place  their  one 
hundred  million  of  disarmed  population  against  the 
five  hundred  million  of  China  and  Japan?  Certainly 
not !  Both  Chittenden  and  Angell,  the  pacifists,  urge 
adequate  armament  for  their  respective  nations. 

Not  only  do  all  of  these  visionary  schemes  of 
peace  by  the  reduction  or  limitation  of  armament  fail 
of  practicability  today,  but  according  to  all  laws  of 
nature  our  great-great-grandchildren  will  find  them 
increasingly  improbable  and  absurd. 


CHAPTER  V 

UNDERLYING  CAUSES  OF   WAR 

/TpHERE  are  various  schools  of  economists,  but 
*-     all  agree  that  society  consists  of  the  struggle  of 
one  element  versus  another.     Some  believe  that  it  is 
a  struggle  of  individual  against  individual,  the  social- 
ist maintains  that  it  is  class  against  class;  while  others 
argue  that  it  is  nation  against  nation. 
Says  Professor  Emery: 

I  shall  start  far  from  the  immediate  subject  by  suggesting 
to  you  that,  disregarding  the  theories  of  individual  philoso- 
phers, there  are  three,  and  only  three,  general  theories  of 
society,  or  theories  of  historical  development,  which  have 
been  held  in  modern  times  by  large  numbers  of  men,  and 
which  have  directly  influenced  the  policies  of  nations.  These 
I  shall  call  individualism,  socialism,  and  nationalism.  To 
the  individualist  the  activities  of  the  present  day  and  the 
whole  course  of  history  are  to  be  interpreted  as  a  struggle 
between  individuals,  each  seeking  his  own  welfare  under 
the  guidance  of  enlightened  self-interest.  To  the  socialist 
the  history  of  mankind  presents  itself  as  primarily  a  struggle 
between  classes  within  a  given  society,  each  class  attempting 
to  secure  for  itself  privileges,  prerogatives,  and  the  lion's 
share  of  power  and  material  comfort,  and  each  class  in 
turn  being  overthrown  through  the  rise  of  a  new  and  more 

72 


Underlying  Causes  of  War  73 

powerful  class.  Finally,  the  nationalist  reads  history  as  a 
record  of  struggle  between  political  groups,  races,  or  nations, 
and  looks  upon  the  problem  of  national  survival,  expansion, 
and  supremacy  as  the  vital  concern  of  mankind. 

All  of  these  theories  have  an  element  of  truth  and  each 
in  turn  is  likely  to  be  disregardful  of  the  significance  of  the 
others ! * 

In  the  same  manner,  we  have  various  schools 
attributing  widely  different  causes  of  war:  We  have 
the  school  which  places  conquest  and  gain  as  the  chief 
cause ;  the  socialist  who  lays  all  wars  to  the  desire  of 
capital  to  amass  greater  wealth;  the  anti-militarist 
who  charges  that  the  soldier  is  responsible;  the 
moralist,  claiming  all  wars  are  due  to  the  desire  of 
nations  to  enforce  the  right,  or  a  similar  inclination 
toward  the  wrong;  the  commercialist  who  attributes 
all  wars  to  commerce,  and  so  on  almost  indefinitely. 

Many  of  these  men,  wrapped  largely  in  their  own 
theories,  fail  to  admit  that  as  the  struggles  between 
men  are  not  individual,  class,  or  national  struggles 
alone,  but  a  combination  of  all,  so  are  wars  caused 
not  alone  by  desire  for  conquest,  by  commercial 
rivalry,  to  enforce  right  or  wrong,  by  selfish  capital, 
or  by  popular  passion,  but  by  a  combination  of  sev- 
eral or  all  of  these  various  causes. 

These  questions  are  closely  related;  wars  being  the 
outcome  of  the  struggle  of  individual,  class,  and 
nation  for  existence.  Individuals  struggle  against 

*  Some  Economic  Aspects  of  War. 


74  Peace  Insurance 


each  other  and  combine  in  the  family,  families  strug- 
gle and  combine  as  classes  and  parties,  classes  and 
parties  struggle  but  combine  as  nations.  It  is  the 
socialistic  and  anarchistic  parties  alone  that  attempt 
a  world-wide  party,  and  even  here  occasions  arise 
where  they  find  that  in  spite  of  themselves  they  are 
divided  as  nations.  For  instance,  witness  our  recent 
example  of  the  yellow  versus  the  white  man;  witness 
the  present  European  War. 

The  struggles  of  individuals  or  of  families  are  of 
too  little  import  to  be  called  wars;  they  are  restricted 
by  governments.  The  struggles  of  classes  or  parties 
when  intensified  become  civil  wars,  but  these  in  turn 
are  restricted  by  governments.  The  struggles  of 
nations  become  wars  uncontrolled  by  any  higher 
organizations. 

Each  of  these  units  assumes  part  of  the  obligations 
of  the  smaller,  protecting  it  and  forwarding  its  ends. 
Thus  states  are  brought  to  war  through  either  indi- 
vidual, class,  or  national  questions,  and  all  weak- 
nesses, all  passions,  and  all  misunderstandings  of 
individual  beings  play  their  part  in  bringing  about 
the  struggles  of  nations. 

The  anti-militarists  urge  that  military  force,  or 
"  militarism,"  is  the  cause  of  war.  They  point  to 
the  present  European  conflict  as  an  example.  The 
contention  of  the  anti-militarists  that  armaments 
cause  war  has  never  been  sustained  in  argument.  It 
is  admitted  that  there  may  be  occasions  when  a  war 


Underlying  Causes  of  War  75 

is  hastened  by  the  fact  that  some  power's  military 
strength  has  encouraged  it  in  ambition,  but  that  fact 
goes  back  of  military  strength  and  must  be  charged  to 
weakness  in  human  nature.  Were  there  to  be  no  mili- 
tary forces  among  the  nations,  it  would  merely  mean 
that  the  nation  with  the  greatest  number  of  available 
males  would  be  encouraged  in  its  desires  by  its  supe- 
rior numbers,  and  the  resulting  conflict  would  be  the 
same. 

In  their  reasoning,  those  who  attribute  the  Euro- 
pean War  to  militarism,  couple  the  words  "  militar- 
ism "  and  "  Germany  "  in  a  way  that  would  indicate 
that  Germany  is  the  sole  advocate  of  strong  military 
force.  No  explanation  is  given  of  just  what  is  meant 
by  militarism,  and  it  is,  therefore,  interesting  to  at- 
tempt to  determine  just  what  militarism  is.  If  mili- 
tarism means  having  the  largest  standing  army,  we 
must  take  Russia  as  our  example,  for  Russia's  regu- 
lar land  force  consists  of  about  1,200,000  men,  to 
about  634,000  in  the  next  largest,  that  of  Germany. 
If  militarism  means  maintaining  the  fighting  force 
farthest  in  advance  of  all  others,  we  must  turn  to 
England,  whose  navy  is  so  much  greater  than  the 
next  largest  that  a  "  two-power  standard,"  i.  e.,  a 
force  equal  to  any  other  two  combined,  has  been  one 
of  the  nation's  ambitions  and  policies.  Should  mili- 
tarism mean  having  the  largest  proportion  of  popu- 
lation trained  for  military  service,  we  find  that 
France,  with  a  population  of  39,600,500,  has  avail- 


76  Peace  Insurance 


able  about  3,000,000  trained  men,  while  Germany, 
with  a  population  of  64,925,993  has  but  between 
4,000,000  and  4,610,000  trained  soldiers,  including 
all  reserves.  Thus  France  has  a  trained  force  of 
about  ten  per  cent  of  the  population,  while  Ger- 
many's force  amounts  to  only  about  six  or  seven  per 
cent.  If  by  militarism,  we  mean  the  largest  total 
number  of  trained  men  in  land  forces,  we  must  again 
turn  to  Russia,  with  about  5,000,000  as  the  latest 
estimate  of  the  American  General  Staff.  If  we  mean 
the  nations  which  fight  the  most  wars,  we  may  take 
almost  any  power,  excepting  Germany,  which  has 
enjoyed  forty  odd  years  of  peace.  If  we  mean  the 
nation  of  the  most  belligerent,  boastful  and  aggres- 
sive policies,  we  are  justified  in  taking  the  United 
States. 

Should  militarism  be  indicated  by  compulsory  mil- 
itary service,  we  may  take  any  great  power  in  the 
world,  excepting  the  United  States  and  Great  Brit- 
ain. If  the  term  means  rapid  preparation  for  war 
in  recent  years,  Russia  has  made  by  far  the  greatest 
efforts  and  improvement  since  the  Japanese  war.  If 
the  greatest  sacrifices  for  military  purposes  are 
meant,  we  may  well  take  Japan  as  our  example.  If, 
however,  militarism  means  having  the  land  forces 
which  come  nearest  to  the  perfection  which  all  Eu- 
rope seeks  to  obtain,  then  Germany  is  apparently 
guilty. 

We  are  not  maintaining  the  neutral  attitude  which 


Underlying  Causes  of  War  77 

the  President  of  the  United  States  has  requested  if 
we  fail  to  recognize  that  in  many  respects  Germany 
is  not  the  most  military  nation.  We  cannot  be  neu- 
tral if  we  are  unjust,  and  to  be  just  we  must  admit 
that  Germany  has  not  the  largest  standing  army, 
has  not  the  largest  navy,  has  not  the  largest  total  of 
trained  men,  has  not  the  largest  percentage  of  popu- 
lation trained,  but  has  had  the  longest  peace. 
England,  and  Germany,  for  instance,  are  differ- 
ently situated.  One  needs  a  good  navy,  the  other 
a  good  army.  Each  has  what  its  people  have  needed. 
Were  the  locations,  and  colonial  conditions  reversed, 
so  would  be  the  military  forces. 

On  a  careful  examination  it  becomes  quite  appar- 
ent that  "  militarism  "  is  too  indefinite  a  term  to  be 
charged  with  this,  or  any  other  war.  Furthermore, 
history  will  not  admit  of  such  reasoning.  If  mili- 
tarism is  the  cause  of  war,  how  can  we  account  for 
the  fact  that  that  foremost  example  of  a  non-military 
nation,  the  United  States,  has  had  its  full  share  of 
conflict,  while  the  so-called  "  military  "  nation,  Ger- 
many, presents  the  example  of  the  state  enjoying  the 
longest  peace? 

Lea,  in  his  The  Valor  of  Ignorance,  truly  states 
the  laws  which  are  responsible  for  the  class  of  war 
to  which  the  European  conflict  belongs  —  a  class 
which  cannot  be  removed  until  human  nature  shall 
eliminate  all  self-interest,  all  jealousy,  all  hatred,  all 
pride,  all  weakness  —  until  the  standards,  morals 


7  8  Peace  Insurance 


and  customs  of  all  men  shall  be  alike,  until  good  only 
shall  dominate  all  human  beings : 

Investigation  shows  that  whenever  two  nations  have  be- 
come engaged  in  warfare  they  have  been  for  decades,  and 
perhaps  centuries,  advancing  on  converging  lines  of  self- 
interest  and  aggrandizement.  When  the  contact  takes 
place,  the  struggle  for  supremacy,  or  even  survival,  is  at 
hand.  As  these  lines  approach  one  another,  difficulties  due 
to  increasing  proximity  of  interests  arise  between  the  coun- 
tries and  result  in  disagreements,  the  seriousness  and  fre- 
quency of  which  stand  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  distance  at 
which  they  take  place  from  the  point  of  contact.  When 
these  lines  meet,  war  ensues.  This  inevitable  hour  is  approxi- 
mately fixed  and  determined  by  the  angles  of  convergence 
plus  the  sum  of  the  relative  speed  by  which  the  nations 
are  moving  along  their  respective  lines.  Thus  it  is  that, 
when  the  angle  of  convergence  of  both  or  even  one  of  the 
nations  is  acute  and  the  speed  of  progress  along  one  or 
both  of  the  converging  lines  correspondingly  great,  war 
results  in  a  few  years  or  decades.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
angles  of  convergence  are  obtuse  and  the  speed  correspond- 
ingly slow,  centuries  may  pass  before  the  nations  are  involved 
in  a  struggle  for  domination  or  survival. 

No  two  nations  or  tribes  of  men  move  on  parallel  lines, 
though  they  may  for  centuries  have  the  appearance  of  so 
doing.* 

When  this  meeting  between  nations  occurs,  not 
only  is  it  commercial  rivalry  that  causes  wars  but 

*  The  Valor  of  Ignorance. 


Underlying  Causes  of  War  79 

racial  or  national  antipathy,  pride,  hatred,  and  all 
other  passions  common  to  all  mankind.  It  is  not 
sufficient  to  point  out  that  the  victor  may  gain  noth- 
ing in  dollars  and  cents  by  his  conquest.  For,  though 
convergence  of  economic  and  political  interests  may 
be  the  underlying  cause,  and  the  passions  of  man  but 
the  symptoms  of  the  disease,  yet  at  the  time  that  war 
is  near,  the  symptoms  reach  an  acuteness  that  over- 
shadows the  real  cause.  At  this  time  the  nations  will 
repudiate  with  scorn  the  element  of  gain  or  loss,  and 
will  fight  on  a  principle,  for  what  they  believe  to  be 
right  versus  wrong. 

Mr.  Angell  scoffs  at  the  militarists  because  one 
attributes  wars  to  commercialism,  while  another  at- 
tributes them  to  moral  motives.  Actually,  however, 
either  or  both  may  be  foremost  among  the  symptoms 
of  the  approaching  conflict.  When  two  radically 
different  nations  have  reached  a  point  of  convergence 
they  are  in  conflict  commercially  and  morally,  and 
both  are  elements  which  may  precipitate  the  contest. 

Mr.  Angell  bases  his  book  on  the  ground  that  as 
the  conqueror  loses,  economically,  in  all  wars  there  is 
no  advantage  in  such  struggles.  Commenting  upon 
this,  Professor  R.  M.  Johnston  of  Yale  says: 

Doubtless  the  reason  for  the  welcome  the  book  received 
in  pacifist  quarters  is  its  uncompromisingly  materialistic  ar- 
gument: War  doesn't  pay,  war  is  constantly  becoming  more 
expensive,  therefore  war  is  futile,  and  must  soon  be  ended 
by  general  consent ;  the  theory  is  a  conveniently  easy  one  for 


8o  Peace  Insurance 


the  unreflecting  to  grasp.  As  a  problem  of  arithmetic,  it 
may  be  admitted  that  the  thesis  is  irreproachable,  yet  it 
could  not  be  sustained  for  five  minutes  before  an  audience  of 
schoolboys.  A  schoolboy  would  perhaps  not  be  able  to  dem- 
onstrate to  Mr.  "  Angell  "  that  some  of  the  greatest  and  most 
justified  wars  have  been  waged  in  spite  of  economic  consid- 
erations; he  might  be  unable  to  foresee  that  in  the  future, 
while  great  and  complex  modern  communities  will  feel  the 
military  burden  more  and  more  intensely,  smaller  and  less 
civilized  communities  will  not,  and  will  continue  to  wage 
war  just  as  in  the  past  unless  they  are  prevented  by  force  of 
arms  —  which  brings  us  back  to  the  same  thing;  but  he  could 
tell  Mr.  "  Angell,"  with  vigorous  schoolboy  emphasis  and 
scorn,  that  profit  or  loss  is  not  the  sole  test  of  conduct,  that 
to  fight  in  spite  of  loss,  to  value  generosity  beyond  cash,  cour- 
age beyond  profit,  has  always  and  will  always  win  the  hearts 
of  nineteen  well  constituted  boys  [or  men,  R.  S.]  out  of 
twenty.  He  could  dismiss  Mr.  "  Angell's  "  ultra-economic 
thesis  if  not  as  childish,  certainly  as  middle-aged.* 

Not  only  do  we  have  to  consider  the  fact  that  both 
commercial  and  moral  conflicts  precipitate  war,  but 
as  Mr.  Angell  himself  sums  up  the  case: 

The  whole  case  may  be  summarized  thus : 

1.  Nations  fight  for  opposing  conceptions  of  right;  it  is  the 
moral  conflict  of  men. 

2.  They  fight  from  non-rational  causes  of  a  lower  kind: 
from  vanity,  rivalry,  pride  of  place,  the  desire  to  occupy  a 
great  situation  in  the  world,  or  from  sheer  hostility  to  dis- 
similar people  —  the  blind  strife  of  mutually  hating  men. 

*  The  United  Slates  Infantry  Journal,  Jan.-Feb.,  1914. 


Underlying  Causes  of  War  81 

3.  These  causes  justify  war,  or  render  it  inevitable.  The 
first  is  admirable  in  itself,  the  second  is  inevitable.* 

To  which  we  must  add  in  justice  to  our  cause: 
4.  Nations  fight  for  their  existence  as  nations. 

The  theory  that  we  can  prevent  wars  by  showing 
the  victor  that  nought  is  gained  through  victory;  by 
making  defense  unnecessary  through  removing  ag- 
gression is  condensed  in  the  following  extract  from 
Mr.  Angell's  book: 

This  does  not  imply,  as  some  critics  allege,  the  conclusion 
that  an  Englishman  is  to  say:  "  Since  I  might  be  just  as  well 
off  under  the  Germans,  let  them  come  ";  but  that  the  Ger- 
man will  say:  "  Since  I  shall  be  no  better  off  for  the  going, 
I  will  not  go." 

Indeed,  the  case  of  the  authorities  cited  in  the  preceding 
chapter  is  marked  by  a  false  form  of  statement.  Those  who 
plead  for  war  on  moral  grounds  say:  "  War  will  go  on  be- 
cause men  will  defend  their  ideals,  moral,  political,  social,  and 
religious."  It  should  be  stated  thus:  "  War  will  go  on  be- 
cause men  will  always  attack  the  spiritual  possessions  of  other 
men,"  because,  of  course,  the  necessity  for  defense  arises 
from  the  fact  that  these  possessions  are  in  danger  of  attack. 

Put  in  the  second  form,  however,  the  case  breaks  down 
almost  of  itself.  The  least  informed  of  us  realizes  that  the 
whole  trend  of  history  is  against  the  tendency  for  men  to 
attack  the  ideals  and  the  beliefs  of  other  men.  In  the  re- 
ligious domain  that  tendency  is  plain,  so  much  so  that  the 
imposition  of  religious  ideals  or  beliefs  by  force  has  prac- 

*  The  Great  Illusion. 


82  Peace  Insurance 


tically  been  abandoned  in  Europe,  and  the  causes  which  have 
wrought  this  change  of  attitude  in  the  European  mind  are 
just  as  operative  in  the  field  of  politics.* 

Here,  as  in  all  his  writings,  Mr.  Angell  seems  to 
take  the  attitude  that  it  is  by  war  alone  that  one 
nation  or  race  can  conquer  another.  It  is  upon  this 
fallacy  that  this  writer  has  based  all  his  theories. 
When  he  says  that  the  Germans  say:  "  Since  I  will 
be  no  better  off  for  the  going,  I  will  go  "  he  refers 
to  the  military  invasion  of  England  by  Germany, 
not  to  an  industrial  invasion.  When  he  says  that 
men  have  ceased  to  force  their  religious  ideas  upon 
others,  he  refers  to  actual  physical  force,  not  to  the 
persistent,  non-physical  inroads  by  which  the  Chris- 
tian forces  his  theories  upon  the  worshippers  of 
other  gods.  We  have  said  that  not  alone  national 
acts,  but  individual  or  class  actions  may  bring  on  war. 
As  the  nations  converge,  the  individual  German  may 
see  the  gain  by  emigrating  to  England  or  to  Eng- 
land's possessions,  or  the  individual  Japanese  the 
gain  that  would  be  had  by  emigrating  to  the  United 
States  or  its  possessions.  Especially  is  this  true 
should  conditions  in  their  home  countries  be  such  that 
men  of  their  class  would  not  have  the  same  oppor- 
tunities as  are  afforded  in  the  country  selected  as  their 
new  field. 

This  kind  of  an  invasion,  more  even  than  war,  can 

*  The  Great  lllution. 


Underlying  Causes  of  War  83 

quietly  destroy  a  state;  grasp  control  from  its  citi- 
zens; seal  the  eventual  doom  of  the  original  inhabi- 
tants as  a  nation.  The  Indians  of  North  America 
have  declined  more  rapidly  in  peace  than  in  war,  and 
afford  a  striking  modern  example  of  this  fact.  There 
is  no  need  to  turn  to  the  numerous  examples  of  his- 
tory to  bear  us  out. 

Such  an  invasion,  commencing  peacefully,  will  re- 
sult in  war  whenever  the  invader  is  of  a  nation  suffi- 
ciently intelligent  and  thrifty  to  oust  inhabitants  from 
their  ordinary  occupations,  and  sufficiently  different 
in  characteristics  to  emphasize  the  inroads  on  the 
native  population.  It  will  at  first  be  marked  by  per- 
sonal encounter  —  pride,  jealousy,  hatred  and  simi- 
lar passions  —  and  finally  by  the  attempted  forceful 
expulsion  of  the  invaders.  Should  the  invaders  have 
retained  citizenship  in  their  own  country,  the  war  will 
be  an  international  one.  Should  they  have  been 
abandoned  by  their  native  land,  it  might  be  civil. 
Certain  it  is,  however,  that  these  conditions  bring 
on  war. 

Here  we  find  man  protecting  his  right  without  the 
necessity  of  the  deliberate  military  aggression,  which 
Angell  assumes  to  be  the  forerunner  of  all  wars  for 
the  defense  of  "  ideals,  moral,  political,  social,  and 
religious." 

Frequently  it  is  not  a  case  of  the  German  saying: 
"  I  shall  not  go,"  but  it  is  the  case  of  the  oppressor, 
or  otherwise  undesirable  alien  being  already  there. 


84  Peace  Insurance 


Mr.  Angell  goes  further;  saying  in  illustration  of 
his  view: 

If  Russia  does  England  an  injury  —  sinks  a  fishing  fleet 
in  time  of  peace,  for  instance  —  it  is  no  satisfaction  to  Eng- 
lishmen to  go  out  and  kill  a  lot  of  Frenchmen  or  Irishmen. 
They  want  to  kill  Russians.  If,  however,  they  knew  a  little 
less  geography  —  if,  for  instance,  they  were  Chinese  Boxers 
—  it  would  not  matter  in  the  least  which  they  killed,  be- 
cause to  the  Chinaman  all  alike  are  "foreign  devils";  his 
knowledge  of  the  case  does  not  enable  him  to  differentiate 
between  the  various  nationalities  of  Europeans.  In  the  case 
of  a  wronged  negro  in  the  Congo  the  collective  responsibility 
is  still  wider ;  for  a  wrong  inflicted  by  one  white  man  he  will 
avenge  himself  on  any  other  —  American,  German,  English, 
French,  Dutch,  Belgian,  or  Chinese.  As  our  knowledge 
increases,  our  sense  of  the  collective  responsibility  of  outside 
groups  narrows.  But  immediately  we  start  on  this  differ- 
entiation there  is  no  stoppage.  The  English  yokel  is  satisfied 
if  he  can  "  get  a  whack  at  them  foreigners  "  —  Germans  will 
do  if  Russians  are  not  available.  The  more  educated  man 
wants  Russians;  but  if  he  stops  a  moment  longer,  he  will 
see  that  in  killing  Russian  peasants  he  might  as  well  be 
killing  so  many  Hindoos,  for  all  they  had  to  do  with  the 
matter.  He  then  wants  to  get  at  the  Russian  Government. 
But  so  do  a  great  many  Russians  —  Liberals,  Reformers,  etc. 
He  then  sees  that  the  real  conflict  is  not  English  against 
Russians  at  all,  but  the  interest  of  all  law-abiding  folk  — 
Russian  and  English  alike  —  against  oppression,  corruption, 
and  incompetance.* 

*  The  Great  Illusion. 


Underlying  Causes  of  War  85 

We  were  not  aware  that  the  desire  of  Englishmen 
in  such  cases  was  "  to  kill  Russians."  But  if  such 
instances  are  repeated  and  if  they  have  the  support 
of  the  majority  of  Russians;  if  Russia  as  a  nation 
does  nothing  to  prevent  such  matters  then  it  is  time 
for  England  to  take  a  hand. 

Mr.  Angell  would  have  this  done  by  giving  assist- 
ance to  the  Russian  party  out  of  power,  to  enable  the 
Russian  Liberals  to  hang  a  few  Russian  admirals 
and  establish  a  Russian  Liberal  Government.  How 
is  this  to  be  done?  By  war  in  assisting  the  Russian 
Liberals?  "  Oh  No !  "  says  Mr.  Angell;  "  by  tak- 
ing every  means  which  the  social  and  economic 
relationship  of  the  two  states  afford!  "  It  would  be 
found,  however,  that  these  means  were  slow  and  un- 
satisfactory, and  that  while  the  English  Government 
was  thus  "  watchfully  waiting,"  the  occurrences  could 
be  repeated.  Also  the  Russian  party  in  power,  if  it 
believed  that  its  existence  was  threatened,  would  soon 
go  to  war  to  prevent  England's  "  economic  and 
social  "  assistance  to  the  Liberals,  and  (here  is  the 
human  nature  element)  the  public  of  England  would 
grow  impatient  of  the  slow  results  of  the  "  economic 
and  social  "  annihilation  of  the  Russian  Government, 
and  would  demand  war  if  Russia  did  not.  Further- 
more (here  we  have  the  human  element  again)  it  is 
extremely  likely  that  the  Russian  Liberal  Party  would 
resent  most  heartily  England's  intrusion,  and  would 
join  those  in  power  in  an  attempt  to  teach  England 


86  Peace  Insurance 


to  "  mind  her  own  business,  and  not  interfere  with  a 
sovereign  nation." 

Still  another  source  of  war  which  no  pacifist  has 
yet  been  able  to  argue  away,  lies  in  the  fact  that  some 
nations  are  far  inferior  to  others,  either  morally, 
intellectually  or  both.  Thus  nations,  like  indi- 
viduals, cannot  be  relied  upon  to  keep  their  promise 
to  abide  by  arbitration;  to  refrain  from  evil.  Angell 
sees  this  changing.  He  says : 

With  very  great  courtesy,  one  is  impelled  to  ask  those  who 
argue  that  human  nature  in  all  its  manifestations  must 
remain  unchanged,  how  they  interpret  history.  We  have 
seen  man  progress  from  the  mere  animal  fighting  with  other 
animals,  seizing  his  food  by  force,  seizing  also  by  force  his 
females,  eating  his  own  kind,  the  sons  of  the  family  strug- 
gling with  the  father  for  the  possession  of  the  father's  wives  ; 
we  have  seen  this  incoherent  welter  of  animal  struggle  at 
least  partly  surviving  as  a  more  organized  tribal  warfare  or 
a  more  ordered  pillaging,  like  that  of  the  Vikings  and  the 
Huns;  we  have  seen  even  these  pillagers  abandon  in  part 
their  pillaging  for  ordered  industry,  and  in  part  for  the  more 
ceremonial  conflict  of  feudal  struggle;  we  have  seen  even  the 
feudal  conflict  abandoned  in  favor  of  dynastic  and  religious 
and  territorial  conflict,  and  then  dynastic  and  religious  con- 
flict abandoned.  There  remains  now  only  the  conflict  of 
states,  and  that,  too,  at  a  time  wrhen  the  character  and  con- 
ception of  the  state  are  being  profoundly  modified. 

Human  nature  may  not  change,  whatever  that  vague 
phrase  may  mean ;  but  human  nature  is  a  complex  factor. 
It  includes  numberless  motives,  many  of  which  are  modified 


Underlying  Causes  of  War  87 

in  relation  to  the  rest  as  circumstances  change;  so  that  the 
manifestations  of  human  nature  change  out  of  all  recogni- 
tion. Do  we  mean  by  the  phrase  that  "  human  nature  does 
not  change  "  that  the  feelings  of  the  paleolithic  man  who  ate 
the  bodies  of  his  enemies  and  of  his  own  children  are  the 
same  as  those  of  a  Herbert  Spencer,  or  even  of  the  modern 
New  Yorker  who  catches  his  subway  train  to  business  in  the 
morning?  If  human  nature  does  not  change,  may  we  there- 
fore expect  the  city  clerk  to  brain  his  mother  and  serve  her 
up  for  dinner,  or  suppose  that  Lord  Roberts  or  Lord  Kitch- 
ener is  in  the  habit,  while  on  campaign,  of  catching  the  babies 
of  his  enemies  on  spear-heads,  or  driving  his  motor-car  over 
the  bodies  of  young  girls,  like  the  leaders  of  the  old  Northmen 
in  the  ox-wagons. 

What  do  these  phrases  mean  ?  These,  and  many  like  them, 
are  repeated  in  a  knowing  way  with  an  air  of  great  wisdom 
and  profundity  by  journalists  and  writers  of  repute,  and 
one  may  find  them  blatant  any  day  in  our  newspapers  and 
reviews ;  yet  the  most  cursory  examination  proves  them  to  be 
neither  wise  nor  profound,  but  simply  parrot-like  catch- 
phrases  which  lack  common  sense,  and  fly  in  the  face  of  facts 
of  everyday  experience.* 

The  fallacy  of  all  this,  however,  is  that  there  are 
no  really  good  men  compared  with  the  ideal  man, 
Jesus  Christ.  There  are  no  nations  which  can  com- 
pare with  the  Kingdom  of  God.  As  some  men,  more 
than  others,  attempt  to  pattern  their  lives  after  that 
of  Christ,  so  do  some  nations  become  better  morally 
than  others;  and  as  no  man  has  reached  perfection, 

*  The.  Great  Illusion. 


Peace  Insurance 


and  as  all  men  at  times  fall  from  grace,  so  will 
nations  from  time  to  time  do  evil.  Not  a  single 
power  exists  today  free  from  a  comparatively  recent 
charge  of  oppression  of  a  weaker  state.  As  long  as 
evil  remains  in  man,  and  as  long  as  there  is  indi- 
vidual conflict  (for  we  must  refute  Mr.  Angell's 
statement  that  "  there  remains  now  only  the  conflict 
of  states  "),  so  long  will  there  be  national  conflict. 
We  do  not  state  that  there  is  not  some  refinement  in 
the  methods  of  the  human  being.  That,  however,  is 
vastly  different  from  an  actual  change  of  nature,  and 
it  is  a  more  difficult  question  to  determine  whether  it 
is  a  change  of  nature  or  a  change  of  methods  that  is 
taking  place.  May  it  not  be  merely  that  science  and 
education  have  replaced  brute  force  with  cunning? 
Admitting,  moreover,  and  hoping,  that  human  na- 
ture is  changing  for  the  better,  the  fact  remains  that 
the  change  is  so  slow  that  no  reader  of  this  work 
will  live  to  see  the  day  when  man,  convinced  of  the 
righteousness  of  an  important  cause,  will  surrender 
without  compulsion.  Mr.  Angell  neglects  to  remind 
us  that  no  inconsiderable  period  has  elapsed  between 
the  "  paleolithic  man  who  ate  the  bodies  of  his 
enemies  and  of  his  own  children  "  and  his  modern 
example  "  a  Herbert  Spencer."  He  neglects  to  state 
that,  in  spite  of  the  passing  of  these  ages,  cannibal- 
ism is  not  yet  entirely  extinct,  and  that  the  human 
being  still  varies  from  the  cannibal,  through  the  less 
barbarous  and  semi-civilized  tribes  and  nations, 


Underlying  Causes  of  War  89 

through  the  modern  New  York  gunmen,  the  rapist, 
the  common  murderer,  the  burglar,  the  sneak  thief, 
the  embezzler,  the  cheat,  the  grafting  politician,  the 
usurer,  the  drunkard,  and  the  ordinary  business  man, 
until  at  last  it  reaches  the  best  living  type  of  "  New 
Yorker  "  or  "  Herbert  Spencer,"  who  would  admit 
his  sinfulness  and  weakness,  though  he  be  at  the  top 
rung  of  the  ladder  of  mankind. 

Lea,  in  his  The  Valor  of  Ignorance,  says: 

Only  when  arbitration  is  able  to  unravel  the  tangled 
skein  of  crime  and  hypocrisy  among  individuals  can  it  be 
extended  to  communities  and  nations.  Thence  will  inter- 
national arbitration  come  of  its  own  accord  as  the  natural 
outgrowth  of  national  evolution  through  the  individual. 
As  nations  are  only  man  in  the  aggregate,  they  are  the  aggre- 
gate of  his  crimes  and  deception  and  depravity,  and  so  long 
as  these  constitute  the  basis  of  individual  impulse,  so  long 
will  they  control  the  acts  of  nations. 

When,  therefore,  the  merchant  arbitrates  with  the  cus- 
tomer he  is  about  to  cheat;  when  trusts  arbitrate  with  the 
people  they  are  about  to  fleece,  ...  or  the  murderer 
with  his  victim,  and  so  on  throughout  the  category  of  crime, 
then  will  communities  be  able  to  dispense  with  laws,  and 
international  thievery  and  deception,  shearing  and  murder, 
and  resort  to  arbitration. 

As  we  have  continually  sinful  men,  so  we  have  con- 
tinually sinful  nations.  As  good  men  occasionally 
sin,  so  will  good  nations.  Only  with  the  far  off  per- 
fection of  all  mankind  will  these  things  stop. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  COST  OF  WAR  AND  ITS  HORRORS 

TN  SPITE  of  the  fact  that  we  can  see  no  prob- 
ability  of  universal  peace  either  now  or  within 
the  time  of  our  immediate  descendants,  we  have  no 
desire  to  hinder  in  any  way  sane  efforts  toward  that 
end.  There  is  no  desire  to  combat  the  pacifist,  who 
confines  his  efforts  toward  peace  in  the  future,  and, 
who,  for  the  present,  says  with  Angell : 

I  am  particularly  emphatic  in  declaring  that  while  the 
present  philosophy  is  what  it  is,  we  are  bound  to  maintain 
our  relative  positions  with  other  powers. 

We  encourage  men  like  Angell  in  so  far  as  they 
are  merely  attempting  to  bring  about  that  perfect 
condition  of  man  morally  and  intellectually  which 
will  be  reflected  in  the  perfect  nations,  and  thereby 
eliminate  all  strife.  We  do,  however,  oppose  the 
misstatements  which  appear  in  every  pacifist  book, 
the  slandering  of  military  men,  exaggerations  of  the 
cost  and  horror  of  war,  and  minimization  of  equiva- 
lent conditions  of  peace.  While,  as  we  have  shown 
in  our  preceding  chapter,  we  believe  that  the  day  of 
peace  is  far  off,  we  are  eager  to  welcome  it,  and  we 

90 


Cost  of  War  and  its  Horrors  91 

do  not  say  positively  that  there  may  not  be  the  un- 
foreseen change  in  the  laws  of  nature  and  of  human 
character  that  will  make  peace  possible.  What  we 
do  insist  upon  is  that  today  wars  are  both  possible 
and  probable  to  any  nation  on  earth  and  that  we  must 
be  prepared  to  meet  them. 

We  have  shown  this  to  be  so.  We  have  shown 
that  preparation  for  possible  and  probable  wars  is 
but  a  cheap  insurance,  that  the  armament  of  nations 
during  peace  is  not  an  economic  burden,  as  the  pa- 
cifist would  have  us  believe,  and  we  have  shown  that 
both  a  nation  and  the  individual  citizens  thereof  may 
gain  what  is  priceless  to  man  through  war. 

"  But  the  cost  of  the  war!  "  says  the  pacifist,  "  its 
horrors,  its  destruction!  "  Said  Professor  William 
James  in  McC lure's  Magazine: 

The  military  party  denies  neither  the  bestiality,  nor  the 
horror,  nor  the  expense;  it  only  says  that  these  things  tell 
but  half  the  story.  It  only  says  that  war  is  worth  these 
things;  that,  taking  human  nature  as  a  whole,  war  is  its 
best  protection  against  its  weaker  and  more  cowardly  self, 
and  that  mankind  cannot  afford  to  adopt  a  peace  economy. 

We  do,  however,  deny  the  bestiality,  the  horror 
and  the  expense.  At  least  we  deny  its  existence  to 
the  extent  that  the  pacifist  proclaims  and  exag- 
gerates. That  there  is  some  bestiality,  some  horror, 
some  expense,  may  be  true;  that  in  some  wars  they 
may  outweigh  the  good  is  undeniable.  In  many 


92  Peace  Insurance 

cases,  however,  the  good  far  outweighs  the  bad,  and 
in  many  cases,  the  bestiality,  the  horror,  and  the  ex- 
pense of  peace  is  even  greater  than  that  of  war. 

The  horror  of  death  is  a  strong  card  of  the  paci- 
fist. He  plays  upon  one's  imagination  by  figures 
showing  the  dead  in  war.  He  tells  us  that  the  nation 
never  recovers  from  the  blow  struck  when  thousands 
of  its  men  die  upon  the  battlefield;  that  this  results 
in  the  lowering  of  the  race;  in  tremendous  economic 
loss.  He  dwells  upon  the  sorrowing  family  at  home, 
the  sweetheart,  the  wife,  the  mother,  who,  he  tells 
us,  are  the  real  sufferers  of  the  war.  Because  war 
is  something  of  which  the  average  man  knows  little, 
the  pacifist  is  believed.  Because  the  ends  of  war 
admittedly  necessitate  deaths,  the  horror  is  seem- 
ingly incomparable,  and  the  average  man  knows  of 
nothing  with  which  to  compare  it  excepting  hell. 
Says  the  socialist,  G.  R.  Kirkpatrick,  in  his  book 
War  —  What  For? 

What  is  war  ? 

They  say  "  War  is  Hell." 

Well,  then,  let  those  who  want  hell,  go  to  hell 

We  need  not,  however,  go  to  hell  to  find  a  com- 
parison for  war.  The  pacifist  and  the  socialist, 
though  on  different  planes,  understand  neither  the 
conditions  of  war  nor  of  hell,  and  consequently,  se- 
lecting two  things  of  which  they  know  little,  they 
compare  these  two.  A  more  proper  comparison, 


Cost  of  War  and  its  Horrors  93 

however,  is  war  and  peace.  If  war  is  hell,  what  shall 
we  say  of  peace,  taking  a  few  of  the  facts  given  below 
into  account? 

To  avoid  exaggeration  we  shall  quote  first  Mr. 
Kirkpatrick,  who  attempts  to  show  the  horrors  of 
war  in  his  book,  War  —  What  For?  by  extracts 
from  the  New  York  Independent  of  March  14, 
1907: 

It  is  the  common  consensus  of  opinion  among  investigators 
that  industrial  casualties  in  this  nation  number  more  than 
500,000  yearly.  Dr.  Josiah  Strong  estimates  the  number  at 
564,000.  As  there  are  525,600  minutes  in  a  year,  it  may 
readily  be  seen  that  every  minute  (day  and  night)  our  indus- 
trial system  sends  to  the  graveyard  or  to  the  hospital  a  human 
being,  the  victim  of  some  accident  inseparable  from  his  toil. 
We  cry  out  against  the  horrors  of  war.  .  .  .  But  the 
ravages  ...  of  industrial  warfare  are  far  greater  than 
those  of  armed  conflict.  The  number  of  killed  or  mortally 
wounded  (including  deaths  from  accidents,  suicides  and 
murders,  but  excluding  deaths  from  disease)  in  the  Philippine 
War  from  February  4,  1899,  to  April  30,  1902,  was  1,573. 
These  fatal  casualties  were  spread  over  a  period  of  three 
years  and  three  months.  But  one  coal  mine  alone  in  one 
year  furnishes  a  mortality  more  than  38  per  cent  in  excess 
of  this. 

The  Japanese  War  is  commonly  looked  upon  as  the 
bloodiest  of  modern  wars.  According  to  the  official  state- 
ment of  the  Japanese  Government,  46,180  Japanese  were 
killed,  and  10,970  died  of  wounds.  Our  industrial  war 
shows  a  greater  mortality  year  by  year. 


94  Peace  Insurance 

But  we  are  all  of  us  more  familiar  with  the  Civil  War, 
and  we  know  what  frightful  devastation  it  caused  in  house- 
holds North  and  South.  It  was,  however,  but  a  tame  conflict 
compared  with  that  which  rages  today,  and  which  we  call 
"  peace."  The  slaughter  of  its  greatest  battles  are  thrown  in 
the  shade  by  the  slaughter  which  particular  industries  inflict 
today.  Ask  any  schoolboy  to  name  three  of  the  bloodiest 
battles  of  that  war,  and  he  will  probably  name  Gettysburg, 
Chancellorsville,  and  Chickamauga.  The  loss  on  both  sides 
was: 

Killed.  Wounded. 

Gettysburg 5,662  27,203 

Chancellorsville , 3.271  18,843 

Chickamauga   3,924  23,362 


Total    12,857         69,408 

But  our  railroads,  state  and  interstate,  and  our  trolleys  in 
one  year  equal  this  record  in  the  number  of  killings  and 
double  it  in  the  number  of  woundings. 

Said  Dr.  Josiah  Strong  in  the  North  American  Re- 
view for  November,  1906: 

We  might  carry  on  a  half  dozen  Philippine  wars  for  three- 
quarters  of  a  century  with  no  larger  number  of  total  casual- 
ties than  take  place  yearly  in  our  peaceful  industries. 

Taking  the  lowest  of  our  three  estimates  of  industrial 
accidents,  the  total  number  of  casualties  suffered  by  our 
industrial  army  in  one  year  is  equal  to  the  average  annual 
casualties  of  our  Civil  War,  plus  those  of  the  Philippine 
War,  plus  those  of  the  Russian-Japanese  War, 


Cost  of  War  and  its  Horrors  95 

Think  of  carrying  on  three  wars  at  the  same  time,  world 
without  end. 

Said  President  Roosevelt  in  his  Annual  Message 
for  1907 : 

Industry  in  the  United  States  now  exacts  ...  a 
far  heavier  toll  of  death  than  all  of  our  wars  put  together. 
.  .  .  The  number  of  deaths  in  battle  in  all  the  foreign 
wars  put  together  for  the  last  century  and  a  quarter,  aggre- 
gate considerably  less  than  one  year's  death  record  for  our 
industries. 

Glancing  over  these  comparisons  between  war  and 
peace,  we  find  that  much  of  the  horror  of  war 
dwindles  away.  Comparing  those  actually  killed  in 
industry  and  accident  with  those  killed  or  dying  from 
wounds  in  various  wars,  we  find  that  the  annual  peace 
rate  is  approximately  two  and  a  half  times  that  of 
the  average  annual  Japanese  loss,  three  times  that 
of  the  Union  loss  in  the  Civil  War,  five  times  the 
Russian  loss  in  the  Japanese  War,  six  times  the  Con- 
federate loss  in  the  Civil  War,  twenty-eight  times  the 
English  loss  in  the  Anglo-Boer  War  and  ninety  times 
the  American  loss  in  the  Spanish  War.  In  other 
words,  it  would  take  the  average  annual  deaths  of 
the  English  and  French  in  the  Crimea,  the  Americans 
in  the  Mexican  War,  the  North  in  the  Civil  War, 
the  Americans  in  the  Spanish  War,  the  English  in  the 
Boer  War,  and  the  Japanese  in  the  Russian  War  to 
approach  the  annual  United  States  peace  rate 


Peace  Insurance 


(Plate  4).  Assuming  the  burden  of  all  these  wars, 
at  once,  and  without  ceasing,  would  be  no  more  a 
drain  than  our  peace  death  rate  !  Need  we  say  more 
as  to  the  cost  in  lives,  as  to  the  sorrowing  mother, 
sweetheart  and  wife?  Think  of  these  things.  Where 
now  is  the  bestiality  and  horror?  Does  it  belong 
more  to  war  where  comparatively  few  die  for  their 
country  willingly  and  nobly,  or  to  peace  where  the 
multitudes  die  for  sordid  gain  —  for  dollars  and 
cents  ?  Would  it  not  be  meet  for  the  pacifists,  assum- 
ing that  they  have  the  best  interest  of  the  country  at 
heart,  to  turn  first  to  the  horrors  of  peace,  and  lastly 
to  the  horrors  of  war? 

No  satisfactory  answer  can  be  made  to  this.  Gen- 
eral Chittenden,  in  his  War  or  Peace,  makes  the  best 
effort  to  tear  down  these  facts.  He  starts  by  his 
statement  that  "  more  definitely,  we  know  that  since 
Napoleon  began  his  campaign  fourteen  million  peo- 
ple have  died  as  a  result  of  war."  Here  we  have  an- 
other effort  to  stun  the  reader  by  stupendous  figures 
—  without  proper  comparisons.  Less  horrible  may 
seem  the  facts  as  given  by  General  Chittenden  when 
we  consider  that  Napoleon's  campaigns  began  in 
1795,  or  one  hundred  and  nineteen  years  ago,  and 
that  the  General  is  including  both  deaths  through 
action  and  by  disease.  In  one  hundred  and  nineteen 
years  almost  the  same  number  would  be  killed  in  the 
United  States  alone,  not  including  disease,  at  our 
present  industrial  and  accident  death  rate. 


AVERAGE  ANNUAL  NUMBER 

KILLED  OR  DYING  FROM  WOUNDS  IN  WAR-VS 
NUMBER  KILLED  IN  PEACE  ACCIDENTS  IN  THE 
UNITED  STATES. 


U.  S.  Loss — Spanish  War — 862         ...H 

U.  S.  Loss — Mexican  War — 725 | 

|  English  Loss  Crimea 
2,387 

I  French  Loss  Crimea 
....I  8>160 

I    English  Loss — Boer  War 
2,990 


Average  Annual  Union  Loss 

.a 


Civil  War 


27,518 


Average  Annual  Japanese  Loss 

Russian  War 

33,340 


It  would  take  the  killed  and  dying  from  wounds  in  all 

these  seven  wars  to  equal  our  annual  peace 

rate  in  accidents. 


PLATE   NO.   4 


Cost  of  War  and  its  Horrors  97 

The  present  great  war  will  undoubtedly  cause 
thousands  of  deaths.  We  must,  however,  be  con- 
servative in  accepting  figures  in  the  newspapers. 
Those  who  remember  the  Spanish-American  battles 
with  "  thousands  killed,"  and  those  who  noticed  the 
recent  Mexican  battles  where  armies  "  lost " 
more  than  were  present,  will  realize  the  desirability 
of  pointing  off  a  few  decimal  places  in  the  state- 
ments of  the  number  killed  in  this  greatest  war  of 
history.  It  is  useless  to  estimate  the  death  rate  at 
this  time.  That  can  be  done  only  when  the  war  is 
over. 

When  we  consider,  carefully,  disease  in  war,  we 
find  the  older  records  are  not  so  favorable  compared 
with  modern  ideas.  In  the  past  wars,  however,  but 
little  was  known  of  sanitation  —  nor  was  much 
known  of  it  in  civil  life.  Today  our  wars  will  see 
much  less  loss  from  disease.  The  Japanese,  for  in- 
stance, in  the  Russo-Japanese  War  lost  27,142  men 
from  disease;  a  death  rate  of  25  per  1,000.  The 
United  States  lost  5,438  men  from  disease  in  the 
Spanish-American  War;  a  death  rate  of  25  per 
1,000.  Had  these  armies  suffered  the  regular  death 
rate  of  the  City  of  New  Orleans  for  the  years  from 
1900  to  1909,  the  Japanese  would  have  lost  17,550, 
and  the  Americans  4,522  men.  The  official  Russian 
figures  for  the  Japanese  War  show  a  loss  of  12,198, 
or  a  rate  of  13.5  per  1,000.  Had  the  Russians  suf- 
fered the  New  Orleans  rate,  they  would  hurve  lost 


98  Peace  Insurance 


14,500  men,  or  1,302  more  than  their  official  figures 
show.  Thus  it  is  that  the  death  rate  from  disease  in 
modern  war  is  only  slightly  more  than  the  death  rate 
in  our  cities.  It  is  certainly  no  greater  than  is  the 
death  rate  in  many  occupations  which  place  men  in 
circumstances  similar  to  those  of  men  in  the  field. 
General  Chittenden  continues : 

It  is  impossible  to  make  a  rational  comparison  of  the 
suffering  from  loss  of  life  in  war  with  that  in  peace.  The 
situations  are  totally  different.  Death  in  the  one  case  ordi- 
narily comes  in  the  midst  of  friends  with  such  solacement 
as  love  and  kindness  can  bestow ;  in  the  other  it  comes  in  the 
depths  of  bestial  strife,  in  noisome  camp  or  foul  prison,  in 
the  absence  of  all  that  the  heart  craves  in  the  hour  of  its 
extremity.  The  sacrifice  of  life  in  war  involves  every  detail 
of  cruelty,  misery,  and  suffering  that  the  mind  of  man  can 
conceive.  It  is  needless  to  depict  its  oft  described  horrors. 
No  description,  no  portrayal  can  do  justice  to  the  reality —  a 
reality  so  terrible  that  even  the  great  masters  of  war  have 
been  loudest  in  its  denunciation.* 

Is  this  a  fact?  Do  those  killed  in  industrial  ac- 
tion "  die  in  the  midst  of  friends  "  ?  Does  the  miner 
trapped  hundreds  of  feet  under  ground?  Does  the 
railway  passenger  packed  between  blazing  timbers  or 
twisted  steel?  Does  the  girl  machine  operator  drawn 
into  life-crushing  machinery?  Does  the  track 
laborer,  hurled  through  the  air  by  tons  of  onrushing 

*  War  or  Peace. 


Cost  of  War  and  its  Horrors  99 

iron  and  steel  ?  Did  the  men  of  the  Titanic  who  had 
sent  their  loved  ones  on  to  safety?  Did  the  girls  of 
the  Triangle  Shirt  Factory  who  perished  miserably 
in  flames,  or  jumped  from  the  inferno  only  to  be 
horribly  mangled  on  the  hard  pavements  below? 
We  may  be  pardoned  for  quoting  Angell,  the  peace 
advocate,  in  this  respect : 

The  virile  man  doubts  whether  he  ought  to  be  moved  by 
the  plea  of  the  "  inhumanity  "  of  war.  The  masculine  mind 
accepts  suffering,  death  itself,  as  a  risk  which  we  are  all  pre- 
pared to  run  even  in  the  most  unheroic  forms  of  money- 
making;  none  of  us  refuses  to  use  the  railway  train  because 
of  the  occasional  smash,  to  travel  because  of  the  occasional 
shipwreck,  and  so  on.  Indeed,  peaceful  industry  demands  a 
heavier  toll  even  in  blood  than  does  a  war,  a  fact  which  the 
casualty  statistics  in  railroading,  fishing,  mining  and  seaman- 
ship, eloquently  attest;  while  such  peaceful  industries  as 
fishing  and  shipping  are  the  cause  of  as  much  brutality.  The 
peaceful  administration  of  the  tropics  takes  as  heavy  a  toll 
in  the  health  and  lives  of  good  men,  and  much  of  it,  as  in  the 
west  of  Africa,  involves,  unhappily,  a  moral  deterioration 
of  human  character  as  great  as  that  which  can  be  put  to  the 
account  of  war. 

Besides  these  peace  sacrifices  the  "  price  of  war  "  is  trivial, 
and  it  is  felt  that  the  trustees  of  a  nation's  interests  ought  not 
to  shrink  from  paying  that  price  should  the  efficient  protec- 
tion of  those  interests  demand  it.  If  the  common  man  is 
prepared,  as  we  know  he  is,  to  risk  his  life  in  a  dozen  danger- 
ous trades  and  professions  for  no  object  higher  than  that  of 
improving  his  position  or  increasing  his  income,  why  should 


ioo  Peace  Insurance 


the  statesman  shrink  from  such  sacrifices  as  the  average  war 
demands,  if  thereby  the  great  interests  which  have  been  con- 
fided to  him  can  be  advanced?  If  it  be  true,  as  even  the 
pacifist  admits  that  it  may  be  true,  that  the  tangible  material 
interests  of  a  nation  can  be  advanced  by  warfare ;  if,  in  other 
words,  warfare  can  play  some  large  part  in  the  protection 
of  the  interests  of  humanity,  the  rulers  of  a  courageous  peo- 
ple are  justified  in  disregarding  the  suffering  and  the  sacrifice 
that  it  may  involve.  [And  add  also  Mr.  Angell's  footnote.] 
The  Matin,  newspaper,  recently  made  a  series  of  revela- 
tions, in  which  it  was  shown  that  the  master  of  a  French  cod- 
fishing  vessel  had,  for  some  trivial  insubordination,  disem- 
bowelled his  cabin-boy  alive,  and  put  salt  into  the  intestines, 
and  then  thrown  the  quivering  body  into  the  hold  with  the 
cod-fish.  So  inured  were  the  crew  to  brutality  that  they  did 
not  effectively  protest,  and  the  incident  was  only  brought  to 
light  months  later  by  wine-shop  chatter.  The  Matin  quotes 
this  as  the  sort  of  brutality  that  marks  the  Newfoundland 
cod-fishing  industry  in  French  ships.* 

Without  the  slightest  desire  to  minimize  the 
heroes  of  industrial  disasters  —  of  train  wrecks, 
mine  horrors,  or  the  super-heroes  of  Titanic  dis- 
asters —  we  ask  in  which  is  the  nobler  death,  in 
peace  or  war?  Compared  with  the  number  dying 
in  peace,  the  number  having  an  opportunity  to  die 
an  heroic  death  (note,  we  do  not  say  that  the  num- 
ber of  those  who  are  made  of  hero-stuff  are  less,  but, 
the  number  who  have  the  opportunity  to  die  a  hero's 
death)  are  few.  Those  who  die  on  Titanics  are  the 

«  The  Great  Illusion. 


Cost  of  War  and  its  Horrors  101 

exception.  More  often  is  the  peace  death  the  sudden 
snapping  off  of  the  thread  of  life  in  some  filthy, 
health-destroying  mill,  or  the  snuffing  of  life's  flame 
suddenly  and  without  warning  on  some  railroad. 
Again,  in  industrial  strife  we  see  women,  mothers, 
children,  dying  through  the  criminal  carelessness  of 
some  dollar-crazed  employer. 

On  the  battlefield  we  see  men  cry  out,  fall,  and 
lie  moaning  or  mangled  in  death,  and  we  see  their 
fellows  advancing  willingly  to  the  same  possibilities 
for  the  sake  of  their  country.  Not  that  these  sol- 
diers do  not  fear  the  horrors  of  death,  not  that  they 
do  not  pity  the  dying,  not  that  they  do  not  themselves 
fear  a  similar  fate;  but  because  they  set  aside  these 
things  and,  trusting  in  God,  do  their  duty. 

Which  is  the  more  horrible,  the  death  of  the  sol- 
dier, a  strong  man  dying  for  his  country,  in  battle  or 
in  foul  prison,  or  the  death  of  the  poor  girls  dying  in 
flames,  or  crushed  and  mangled  on  hard  pavements, 
for  the  greed  of  some  soulless  employer,  who  fails 
to  provide  common  safety  for  his  toilers? 

General  Chittenden's  final  argument  is  that  "  the 
losses  from  peaceful  occupations  are  far  less  than 
those  of  war  compared  with  the  number  and  length 
of  time  engaged." 

As  for  the  time  engaged,  we  have  shown  that  were 
the  Civil  War  to  be  continuous  and  its  average  death 
rate  continued,  still  it  would  be  only  one-third  of  our 
annual  industrial  death  rate.  Similarly  the  Russo- 


IO2  Peace  Insurance 


Japanese  War,  if  continued  indefinitely,  would  be 
but  one-third  of  our  annual  rate.  In  fact,  we  find 
that  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  the  Civil,  the 
Russo-Japanese,  and  the  Philippine  Wars,  all  going 
on  at  once,  never  ceasing,  and  take  the  total  losses 
from  both  sides  in  all  these  wars  in  order  to  equal 
our  industrial  death  rate. 

As  for  the  fact  that  lesser  numbers  are  engaged, 
here  General  Chittenden's  arguments  at  first  glance 
seem  stronger,  for  admittedly  there  are  fewer  en- 
gaged; but  a  little  thought  will  convince  us  of  the 
error  of  these  comparisons. 

The  pacifist  in  his  arguments  decries,  first,  the 
loss  to  the  nation  by  the  death  of  her  soldiers;  and, 
second,  the  sorrow  imposed  upon  individual  families 
—  mothers,  wives,  and  sweethearts.  Therefore  the 
number  engaged  does  not  enter  into  the  question. 
In  any  case,  it  is  the  nation  that  sends  out  an  army 
and  it  is  the  nation  that  suffers  the  industrial  death 
rate.  This  is  the  proper  comparison;  it  is  the  way 
we  have  compared  it.  Furthermore,  the  sorrow  of 
mother,  wife,  or  sweetheart  is  not  changed  in  the 
slightest  on  account  of  the  enormity  or  triviality  of 
the  per  cent  dying.  Their  sorrow  is  for  their  own 
dead  —  who  else  dies  matters  little.  The  only  way 
in  which  the  number  engaged  is  properly  considered 
is  in  determining  the  riskiness  of  war  as  a  profession, 
in  which  case  it  should  not  be  compared  with  indus- 
trialism as  a  whole,  but  should  be  compared  with 


Cost  of  War  and  its  Horrors  103 

the  more  risky  professions  and  trades,  such  as  avi- 
ation, daredevil  trick  performers,  railroading,  bridge 
building,  iron  structural  work,  etc.  Then  we  would 
have  an  interesting  and  just  comparison,  but  it  would 
have  no  bearing  whatever  on  the  effect  of  war  losses 
on  the  nation  or  sorrowing  relatives. 

In  all  these  comparisons  we  have  not  considered 
the  losses  sustained  in  industrialism  through  unsani- 
tary conditions,  through  occupational  diseases. 
Should  we  turn  to  those  who  make  matches,  to  the 
glass-blower,  to  those  who  work  in  the  dusty  wire 
drawing  plant,  to  those  who  work  in  unsanitary  mills 
and  factories,  we  would  find  that  here  was  a  condi- 
tion of  peace  which  breaks  down  the  health  of  those 
engaged  therein,  and  that  the  deaths  and  crippling 
of  the  productive  energy  of  the  nation  more  than 
made  up  for  the  diseases  in  war.  Yet  we  have 
omitted  all  this  in  our  comparison,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  the  comparison  of  accidents  in  peace  to 
total  death  rates  in  war  is  so  conclusive  as  to  make 
any  further  effort  entirely  superfluous. 

The  anti-militarist  makes  much  of  the  so-called 
"  atrocities  "  of  war;  particularly  those  of  the  pres- 
ent great  conflict.  These  atrocities,  however, 
largely  originate  in  the  brains  of  correspondents 
who  are  short  of  copy,  through  careless  but  imag- 
inative persons,  or  through  the  repeating  of  the 
story  of  an  occasional  crime  until  it  seems  to  become 
the  rule  rather  than  the  exception.  It  should  be 


IO4  Peace  Insurance 

remembered  that  many  horrible  crimes  are  frequent 
in  a  city  like  New  York  or  London  or  Paris,  where 
inhabitants  are  in  peace,  and  under  control  of  large 
police  forces.  In  the  field  today  there  are  as  many 
men  as  there  are  in  about  eight  such  great  cities, 
each  man  well  armed,  more  or  less  inflamed  with 
the  passions  of  war,  and  clothed  with  varying  de- 
grees of  arbitrary  power.  Occasional  outrages  are 
therefore  to  be  expected,  for  we  cannot  expect 
armies,  under  such  conditions,  to  be  better  than  the 
inhabitants  of  our  great  cities.  It  is  also  to  be 
expected  that  each  side  will  exaggerate  stories  of 
atrocities  committed  by  the  enemy.  The  better 
writers  of  the  day  are  commencing  to  realize  these 
facts,  and  papers  and  magazines  now  frequently 
deplore  the  leeway  which  some  writers  have  given 
their  imagination.  It  is  beginning  to  be  realized 
that  the  striking  fact  is  that  the  atrocities  are  so  few. 
As  for  the  cost  of  war  in  money,  we  have  shown 
that  where  wars  are  prepared  for  in  advance  the 
expense  of  the  war  is  reduced  —  that  it  is  lack  of 
military  force  that  causes  wars  to  be  prolonged.  The 
Civil  War  cost  $6,189,929,908,  till  then,  an  unheard 
of  expense  for  war.  Since  then,  it  has  cost  $4,586,- 
966,346.09  in  pensions.  Pension  administration 
has  cost  over  $125,871,965.  A  total  of  $10,902,- 
768,219.09.  The  war  lasted  four  years,  therefore 
costing  $2,725,642,  054.77  per  year.  But  we  expend 
$3,200,000,000  a  year  for  tobacco  and  liquor  alone, 


Cost  of  War  and  its  Horrors  105 

and  $3,000,000,000  incident  to  the  social  evil.  If 
we  can  expend  these  amounts  on  vice,  then  the  oc- 
casional war,  even  though  it  would  be  as  great  as 
our  Civil  War,  will  not  bankrupt  the  nation. 

The  biggest  and  most  absurd  estimate  of  the  total 
cost  of  the  Civil  War  is  that  of  the  socialist,  Kirk- 
patrick,  who  places  it  at  $31,521,815,321.60.  In 
this,  Mr.  Kirkpatrick  includes  such  items  as  $12,- 
500,000,000,  as  "lost  labor  power  of  1,000,000 
selected  men  for  twenty-five  years."  *  The  total 
killed  or  dying  of  disease  on  both  sides  was  only 
559,928  men,  and  the  real  cost  of  the  war,  including 
pensions  to  date,  is,  as  has  been  stated,  probably 
about  $10,902,768,219.09.  For  argument,  however, 
let  us  take  the  highest  estimate,  that  given  by  the 
socialist.  We  have  found  that  in  one  year  the  United 
States  spends  $2,000,000,000  for  liquor  and 
beer,  $1,200,000,000  for  tobacco,  $3,000,000,000 
through  the  social  evil,  $800,000,000  on  jewelry, 
$500,000,000  on  automobiles,  and  $452,000,000 
on  candy  and  soft  drinks.  A  grand  total  of 
$7,952,000,000  for  one  year  on  a  half-dozen  of  the 
many  pleasures  and  vices  indulged  in  by  the  people 
of  this  country.  The  socialist  estimates  as  given 
above  cover  fifty-three  years  —  four  of  actual  war 
and  forty-nine  of  interest  and  debt,  loss  of  produc- 
tive power  and  pensions.  Thus  the  cost  of  but  six 
of  our  thousands  of  vices  and  pleasures  in  four  years 

*  War  —  What  Tori 


io6  Peace  Insurance 

would  equal  the  absurdly  exaggerated  estimate  of 
the  cost  of  the  Civil  War  during  its  four  years'  dura- 
tion, and  during  the  forty-nine  years  of  pensioning, 
debt  paying,  and  so-called  losing  productive  energy. 

Even  the  present  European  war  —  the  war  of 
wars  —  the  most  stupendous  military  struggle  of  all 
this  world's  history,  does  not  cost  so  much!  Does 
that  sound  like  the  statement  of  a  lunatic?  Perhaps 
so,  yet,  viewed  from  certain  standards,  it  is  un- 
doubtedly true.  It  has  been  estimated  that  the  war 
is  costing  the  nations  involved  $40,000,000  a  day. 
That  would  be  about  $1,200,000,000  a  month,  or 
$14,400,000,000  a  year.  That  vast  sum  does  not 
include  the  damage  to  property  or  the  loss  of  pro- 
ductive energy.  The  latter,  according  to  economists, 
cannot  be  accurately  figured  out,  but  is  not  so  large 
owing  to  the  utilization  of  the  reserve  energy  of  the 
nation.  The  damage  to  property  is  also  difficult  to 
estimate.  No  value  can  be  placed  on  some  objects, 
valuable  for  sentimental  reasons  alone.  It  is  doubt- 
ful, however,  if  the  actual  cash  value  of  the  property 
destroyed  will  average  a  million  dollars  a  day  for 
an  entire  year.  Surely  two  million  dollars  a  day  for 
the  period  of  a  year  is  a  liberal  estimate.  That 
would  amount  to  $730,000,000  per  annum  and  give 
a  total  cost  of  $15,130,000,000. 

This  estimate  of  cost,  which  seems  vast  enough, 
is  for  all  the  nations.  If,  however,  in  order  to  give 
those  who  cry  out  against  "  militarism's  burden  " 


Cost  of  War  and  its  Horrors  107 

every  advantage,  we  divide  the  total  among  only 
the  great  European  nations  —  England,  Germany, 
France,  Russia,  and  Austria  —  the  cost  is  about 
$3,026,000,000  each  per  year.  If  we  averaged  the 
cost  among  Belgium,  Servia,  Montenegro,  Japan 
and  Turkey  in  addition,  the  average  would  of 
course  be  greatly  reduced,  but  as  these  nations  are 
undoubtedly  bearing  the  smaller  part  of  the  cost 
it  is,  perhaps,  just  as  well  to  exclude  them. 

Glancing  back  we  find  that  the  above  is  prac- 
tically the  same  amount  spent  in  the  United  States 
annually  for  liquor  and  tobacco.  If  we  should  con- 
sider the  total  cost  of  liquor,  tobacco,  and  white 
slavery  in  the  United  States  we  would  have  a  sum 
almost  twice  the  average  cost  of  the  war  to  any 
European  nation.  Of  course,  these  are  vague  esti- 
mates of  the  cost  of  the  present  war.  They  are 
probably  not  very  accurate,  but  as  they  are  from 
pacifist  sources  they  are  probably  none  too  small. 

Again  we  find  that  in  comparison  with  other  stu- 
pendous things  war  becomes  lilliputian. 

Furthermore,  though  Mr.  Angell  by  rather  doubt- 
ful reasoning  attempts  to  show  that  when  France  was 
compelled  to  pay  an  indemnity  of  one  billion  dollars 
to  Germany,  France  gained  and  Germany  lost,  it  is 
believed  that  he  will  have  a  hard  time  getting  any 
financier  or  student  of  economy  to  agree  with  him. 
An  indemnity  to  a  victor  may  not  pay  all  the  cost  of 
a  war,  but  it  is  a  great  offset  to  such  cost,  and  a 


io8  Peace  Insurance 

country  which  can  compel  the  payment  of  a  billion 
dollars  from  a  defeated  enemy  will  find  it  a  material 
help.  We  hardly  believe  that  Germans  would  agree 
with  Mr.  Angell,  and  if  victors  in  the  present  war 
would  offer  to  pay  rather  than  receive  indemnity  - 
though  we  are  sure  that  France,  if  defeated,  will  be 
glad  to  adopt  Mr.  Angell's  ideas  and  willingly 
receive,  rather  than  pay.  Says  Hamilton-Grace  in 
his  Finance  and  War: 

The  Germans  have  never  ceased  regretting  that  they  im- 
posed a  war  indemnity  on  France  only  of  £200,000,000 
($1,000,000,000).  It  is  probable  that,  were  the  chance  to 
recur,  this  indemnity  would  be  nearer  £1,000,000,000 
($5,000,000,000). 

Thus,  not  only  is  the  cost  of  war  exaggerated,  but 
a  well  prepared  nation  may  lessen  it  by  an  indemnity. 


CHAPTER  VII 


only  is  military  force  in  peace  a  paying  prop- 
osition and  war  less  of  a  horrible  burden  than 
is  generally  supposed,  but  there  is  actually  much  to 
be  said  in  favor  of  both  military  force  and  of  war. 
It  would  be  unjust  to  the  soldier  and  unjust  to  the 
militarist,  did  we  fail  to  give  these  facts. 

One  of  the  strongest  arguments  of  those  who  state 
that  military  force  during  peace  is  an  advantage,  lies 
in  the  claim  that  the  army  and  navy  form  immense 
educational  institutions,  and  that  the  entire  nation 
benefits  industrially,  commercially,  and  otherwise  by 
the  training  which  its  citizens  receive  as  soldiers. 
Germany  is  given  as  the  great  example  of  this  fact. 
Many  militarists  attribute  much  of  Germany's  suc- 
cess to  the  training  which  her  citizens  receive  in  the 
army.  To  this  General  Chittenden  objects  that  it 
is  in  spite  of,  and  not  because  of,  military  training 
that  Germany  is  successful  commercially;  that  on  the 
contrary  it  is  because  of  the  fact  that  Germany  suc- 
ceeds in  everything  that  her  military  force  is  so  suc- 
cessful. A  reasonable  view  seems  to  be  that  both  of 
these  conditions  may  be  partially  correct.  Certain 

109 


no  Peace  Insurance 

it  is  that  military  training  has  an  important  value 
entirely  apart  from  its  actual  military  value.  This 
is  conclusively  proven  in  the  numerous  military 
schools  of  the  United  States.  The  majority  of  these 
schools  disclaim  any  attempt  to  train  soldiers,  but 
include  military  training  merely  to  make  better  citi- 
zens. They  find  that  the  man  trained  militarily 
learns  obedience,  promptness,  cleanliness,  order- 
liness, coolness,  and  secures  that  priceless  asset  known 
as  executive  ability  —  the  ability  to  make  others  obey. 
Such  schools  form  a  stronger  character  and  make 
better  men. 

If  this  is  true  in  a  military  school,  it  must  be 
equally  so  with  similar  training  received  elsewhere. 
If  thousands  of  parents  pay  from  $500  to  $1,500 
per  year  to  secure  this  training  for  their  boys,  surely 
there  is  some  gain  to  the  nation  in  the  men  who 
receive  this  training  in  the  army.  The  fact  is  too  well 
attested  by  educators  throughout  the  world  to  admit 
of  serious  questioning. 

Recently  a  number  of  officers  were  reviewing  the 
cadets  of  the  John  Wanamaker  Commercial  Insti- 
tute, a  regiment  composed  exclusively  of  boys  and 
young  men  employed  in  the  great  Wanamaker  store 
in  Philadelphia.  These  boys  are  not  trained  as  pro- 
fessional soldiers,  but  are  drilled  and  disciplined. 
They  absorb  through  the  military  drill  the  military 
virtues.  At  this  drill  an  officer  was  heard  to  ask  the 
commandant  of  cadets  why  the  organization  was 


Advantages  of  Military  Force  in 

maintained,  and  why  all  the  boys  of  the  store  were 
compelled  to  take  the  drill.  "  Because,"  said  the 
commandant,  "  when  we  have  trained  a  boy  success- 
fully in  this  military  work  we  find  that  we  have 
trained  a  future  department  head." 
Says  Professor  Emery  of  Yale : 

Personally,  I  believe  that  the  efficiency  of  factory  labor  in 
Germany  has  been  greatly  increased  through  this  military 
education,  and  that  the  young  men  who  have  been  through 
this  training  become  much  more  efficient  in  the  field  of  pro- 
duction in  later  years  than  they  would  have  been  had  they  not 
been  obliged  to  undergo  this  training  at  all.  In  other  words, 
the  compulsory  service  might  be  justified  as  economically 
self-supporting  on  purely  educational  grounds. 

General  Chittenden  objects  to  this,  however, 
largely  on  the  ground  that  camp  and  barrack  life 
is  immoral.  Mr.  Angell  does  so  on  similar  grounds, 
adding  some  satirical  but  ridiculous  comments  by 
George  Bernard  Shaw. 

Armies  are  composed  largely  of  young  men.  The 
ground  for  the  arguments  of  General  Chittenden  and 
Mr.  Angell  are  that  the  association  of  so  many 
unmarried  men  and  the  absence  of  women  has  a 
lowering  tendency.  If  so,  the  same  must  be  true  of 
our  colleges  where  conditions  of  many  men  living 
together  are  similar,  and  at  the  least  responsible 
time  of  life.  Yet  we  have  no  great  outcry  against 
the  value  of  these  educational  institutions  on  that 


ii2  Peace  Insurance 


account.  Probably  neither  barrack,  camp,  nor  cam- 
pus life  do  more  than  attract  attention  to  the  faults 
of  mankind  through  concentration. 

Added  to  this  item  of  education  are  many  great 
national  and  international  benefits  due  to  strategical 
needs,  to  war,  and  often  to  the  actual  work  of  the 
soldier.  The  military  roads  of  Europe  were  the 
great  forerunner  of  modern  road  systems.  The 
Panama  Canal  is  a  result  largely  of  military  need, 
and  has  been  brought  to  perfection,  by  a  soldier, 
in  a  manner  which  is  an  excellent  example  of  military 
efficiency.  Where  others  failed  the  American  sol- 
dier succeeded.  Without  delay  or  confusion  this 
stupendous  feat  was  rapidly  accomplished;  without 
graft,  or  scandal,  surmounting  the  great  difficulties 
of  engineering  and  sanitation.  Those  who  are  ac- 
quainted with  great  works  of  the  kind  will  agree 
that  in  other  hands  the  canal  would  probably  have 
given  rise  to  scandal  and  graft,  cost  more,  and, 
today,  be  far  from  completion. 

Much  other  great  engineering  work  is  being  done 
by  soldiers  as  a  regular  part  of  their  duty.  The 
Army  Medical  Corps  is  largely  responsible  for  the 
great  advances  made  in  the  elimination  and  treat- 
ment of  yellow  fever.  By  the  army  has  the  greatest 
result  been  secured,  and  most  valuable  lessons  been 
given  in  the  prevention  and  treatment  of  typhoid 
fever;  and  so  on,  indefinitely.  Again,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  whatever  that  the  ideal  soldier  presents 


Advantages  of  Military  Force  113 

much  for  the  ordinary  mortal,  be  he  civilian  or  sol- 
dier, to  emulate.  The  deeds  in  battle  are  often 
those  of  noble  men.  The  glory  of  a  nation  in  its 
military  forces  is  a  thing  well  worth  while. 

Said  Professor  James,  whom  we  have  previously 
quoted,  in  reference  to  the  Civil  War: 

Those  ancestors,  those  efforts,  those  memories  and  legends 
are  the  most  ideal  part  of  what  we  now  own  together,  a 
sacred  spiritual  possession  worth  more  than  all  the  blood 
poured  out. 

To  all  of  which,  the  anti-militarist  protests  that 
the  success  against  disease,  the  engineering  feats,  the 
deeds  of  heroism,  the  legends,  and  all  that  the  army 
and  navy  have  given  mankind  would  have  come 
anyhow  sooner  or  later  because  man  is  the  same. 
Here  again  he  is  but  partially  right;  though  man 
is  the  same  in  some  degree,  yet  the  environment 
and  circumstances  in  training  affect  him  greatly. 

Still  another  item  which  may  be  placed  on  the 
credit  side  in  war's  ledger  is  the  rather  astonishing 
fact  that  in  many  ways  it  has  been  proved  actually 
to  be  of  aid  to  industry,  commerce,  and  the  nation  — 
even  sometimes  in  defeat. 

We  have  previously  in  this  work  inferred  that  a 
certain  learned  professor,  in  his  attempt  to  criticize 
armies  and  navies,  was  displaying  the  fact  that  he 
had  ventured  from  his  proper  field.  Hence  we  may 
be  pardoned  if,  to  avoid  a  similar  charge,  we  again 


114  Peace  Insurance 

invoke  the  assistance  of  Henry  C.  Emery,  Professor 
of  Economics  at  Yale  University,  and  quote  him  at 
length  in  support  of  this  rather  radical  statement. 

Professor  Emery  prefaced  his  lecture  before  the 
Army  War  College  at  Washington  with  the  following 
remark: 

Some  joking  remarks  were  made  on  the  assumption  that, 
as  a  political  economist,  I  would  be,  naturally,  opposed  to  any 
program  for  an  increased  military  organization,  which  was 
the  topic  of  conversation.  To  justify  myself  in  such  com- 
pany, I  began  to  give  some  of  the  economic  arguments  in 
favor  of  a  strong  military  organization,  and  some  days  after- 
wards I  was  invited  by  General  Wood  to  address  the 
officers  of  the  military  college. 

I  was  so  flattered  by  the  invitation  that  I  accepted  with- 
out much  thought,  and  now  feel  much  embarrassment  at 
having  done  so.  It  is  hardly  possible  that  there  is  any  prob- 
lem regarding  war  or  military  armaments  with  which  you 
are  not  much  more  familiar  than  I  am  myself,  and  I  am  not 
here  this  morning  with  any  idea  that  I  can  tell  you  anything 
new.  On  the  other  hand,  I  try  to  justify  myself  for  taking 
your  time  in  this  way,  because  it  is  often  interesting  to  have 
familiar  facts  approached  from  a  different  angle,  and  to 
have  one's  own  ideas  in  some  measure  supported  by  an  out- 
sider, who  cannot  be  charged  with  any  personal  or  profes- 
sional prejudice  in  his  expression  of  views. 

He  continued: 

In  the  first  place  it  should  be  stated  that  the  growth  of 
industry  and  trade  does  not  depend  solely  on  the  growth  of 


Ad-vantages  of  Military  Force  115 

capital  and  the  quantity  of  labor,  as  was  commonly  assumed 
by  the  writers  of  the  peace  and  free  trade  era.  Equally  im- 
portant is  the  character  of  leadership  in  the  industrial  field, 
and  by  this  I  do  not  mean  only  the  ability  to  organize  and  co- 
ordinate by  the  forces  of  production  on  the  part  of  the 
captains  of  industry;  I  mean  also  the  more  subtle  qualities 
of  confidence,  faith  in  the  future,  and  speculative  daring. 
These  are  vital  elements  in  commercial  progress,  but  they  are 
of  peculiar  psychological  character  and  are  affected  by  many 
influences  which  are  not  at  all  economic  in  their  nature.  Is 
it  not  to  be  expected  that  under  the  impetus  of  a  great  war, 
when  national  fervor  is  at  its  highest  point  and  the  spirit  of 
daring  and  sacrifice  pervades  the  community,  that  these 
influences  should  also  be  felt  in  the  field  of  business,  and  that 
men  should  confidently  undertake  enterprises  which  in 
calmer  times  would  have  seemed  staggering  and  impossible 
in  their  nature?  I  believe  that  on  this  point  ample  evidence 
could  be  found. 

I  recall  a  conversation  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish  War 
between  two  able  men  of  the  old  school  who  agreed  that  that 
war  would  put  the  United  States  back  morally  and  econom- 
ically a  full  quarter  of  a  century.  This  prophecy  was  scarcely 
fulfilled.  The  period  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish 
War  had  been  a  period  of  great  stagnation  and  hard  times. 
Nobody  cared  to  borrow  capital  to  develop  new  enterprises 
or  to  expand  old  ones,  while  the  half-dozen  years  following 
the  war  were  perhaps  the  most  extraordinarily  prosperous  in 
our  whole  history.  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  hard  times 
would  have  continued  without  the  war,  or  that  the  war  was 
the  fundamental  cause  of  business  revival,  but  I  do  think  it 
played  a  distinct  part.  We  had  come  to  the  point  where  the 


n6  Peace  Insurance 

evils  of  excessive  industrial  expansion  had  worked  them- 
selves out,  supplies  had  been  greatly  diminished,  and  an  in- 
creased demand  was  bound  to  come,  working  toward 
improved  conditions.  But  a  demand  has  to  be  started  by 
somebody.  A  break  had  to  be  made  at  some  point  in  the 
business  timidity  which  has  prevailed  for  so  long,  and  the  war 
came  at  the  psychological  minute  to  start  the  upward  move- 
ment. 

This  was  partly  due  to  the  fillip  given  to  trade  by  Govern- 
ment contracts,  but  much  more,  I  think,  through  the  psy- 
chological change  which  resulted  from  getting  our  minds 
away  from  the  industrial  hardships  of  the  preceding  years 
and  the  stimulating  feeling  that  at  last  there  was  "  some- 
thing doing."  In  other  words,  the  war  came  as  a  trumpet 
call,  not  only  to  the  military  spirit  of  the  country  but  to  the 
industrial  spirit  as  well. 

Certainly  this  psychological  influence  played  a  marked 
role  in  the  extraordinary  industrial  development  of  Germany 
immediately  after  the  Franco-Prussian  War.  Again,  I  can- 
not stop  to  attempt  any  analysis  of  the  many  factors  which 
contributed  to  this  development,  but  I  am  confident  that  a 
primary  one  was  the  increased  confidence  in  their  own  ca- 
pacity which  this  signal  triumph  gave  to  the  German  people. 
Again  I  wish  to  urge  the  fact  that  courage  and  daring  are  as 
essential  elements  in  the  field  of  industry  as  in  the  field  of 
war.  One  reason  why  the  Germans  began  to  beat  their 
rivals  in  the  economic  field  was  that  they  had  at  last  realized 
that  they  could  beat  their  rivals,  and  this  realization  came  to 
them  largely  as  the  result  of  the  fact  that  they  had  beaten 
them. in  the  field  of  war. 

Our  Civil  War  offers  many  examples  of  the  same  kind. 


Advantages  of  Military  Force  117 

The  vigor  of  business  life  in  the  North  throughout  that  great 
conflict  is  still  a  matter  of  amazement  for  the  economic  his- 
torian. Here  again  the  influence  was  two-fold.  The  huge 
Government  contracts  acted  as  an  extraordinary  degree  of 
protection  and  encouragement,  but  equally  important  was 
the  fact  that  the  same  spirit  of  forward  endeavor  which  ani- 
mated the  armies  in  the  field  also  animated  the  leaders  and 
the  rank  and  file  in  the  domain  of  business. 

I  would  only  suggest  one  other  theoretical  result  of  war  in 
this  connection,  but  that  an  all-important  one  on  the  credit 
side  of  the  ledger  and  more  perfectly  illustrated  during  our 
Civil  War  than  at  any  other  period  in  history.  Again  note 
the  ordinary  assumption  of  the  writer  of  the  old  school  that 
capital  and  labor  are  always  employed  to  their  full  extent. 
No  allowance  was  ever  made  for  the  enormous  reserve  pro- 
ductive force  which  can  be  called  out  in  time  of  emergency. 
And  yet  should  we  not  expect  theoretically  that  a  time  of 
great  stress  (as  a  result  of  armed  conflict  and  depletion  of 
the  ranks  of  labor  for  military  purposes)  would  be  in  large 
measure,  at  least,  offset  by  the  utilization  of  this  reserve 
force?  Workmen  who  had  already  been  employed  would 
work  harder  and  longer.  The  very  necessity  of  the  situation 
would  demand  better  organization  and  the  utilization  of  the 
most  economic  methods  of  production,  while  there  is  a  vast 
reserve  fund  of  labor  which,  under  ordinary  circumstances  is 
not  employed,  can  be  called  upon  at  such  a  period.  In  other 
words,  the  destructive  influence  of  war  on  industry,  which 
would  seem  to  be  a  patent  fact  due  to  so  large  a  proportion 
of  the  population  being  removed  from  the  ranks  of  industry, 
proves  not  to  be  a  net  loss  at  all,  but  is  largely  made  up  from 
the  industrial  reserve  force. 


i i 8  Peace  Insurance 

Prof.  E.  D.  Fite  has  recently  published  a  book  entitled, 
Social  and  Industrial  Conditions  in  the  North  During  the 
Civil  War*  We  have  already  been  familiar  with  the  ex- 
traordinary fact  that  production  in  most  lines  did  increase 
during  this  period,  but  he  has  here  collected  a  large  amount 
of  interesting  evidence  to  show  how  general  this  condition 
was.  Certain  industries  were,  of  course,  seriously  crippled, 
especially  the  cotton  industry,  due  to  lack  of  the  supply  of  the 
raw  material,  and  the  serious  effect  of  this  situation  on 
European  industry  is  well-known.  Such  disturbances  as  this 
must  always  stand  on  the  debit  side  of  the  ledger  as  real 
destructive  effects,  but  in  the  main  manufactures  were  not 
only  flourishing  from  the  financial  point  of  view,  but  the 
actual  output  was  increased.  We  produced  in  1864  fifty 
per  cent  more  iron  rails  than  in  any  year  before  the  war. 
Much  the  same  was  true  of  many  other  lines  of  manufacture. 

Even  more  surprising,  perhaps,  was  the  agricultural  situa- 
tion. Here  the  reserve  forces  of  labor  made  themselves  most 
apparent.  In  1864  Indiana,  for  example,  with  ten  per  cent 
of  her  total  population  in  the  Union  ranks,  produced  more 
wheat  than  she  had  produced  in  any  year  before  the  war. 

Here,  as  before,  the  pacifist  cries  that  it  was  in 
spite  of  war,  not  because  of  it;  that  the  industrial, 
commercial,  and  agricultural  booms  would  have  come 
anyhow;  and  they  are  able  to  give  us  several  exam- 
ples where  industrial  revival  did  not  follow  war. 
Here,  as  before,  we  would  suggest  that  the  pacifist 
may  be  partly  right.  We  have,  however,  shown  that 

*  Social  and  Industrial  Conditions  in  the  North  During  the  Civil 
War,  E.  D.  Fite,  The  Macmillan  Company. 


Advantages  of  Military  Force  119 

eminent  authority  which  "  cannot  be  charged  with 
any  personal  or  professional  prejudice,"  gives  much 
credit  to  war.  We  quote  an  economist,  not  a  soldier. 
Some  of  the  greatest  men  of  peace  have  recognized 
the  advantage  of  war.  Among  these  may  be  men- 
tioned John  Ruskin  and  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson. 
Said  Ruskin: 

All  the  pure  and  noble  arts  of  peace  are  founded  on  war; 
no  great  art  ever  rose  on  earth  but  among  a  nation  of  sol- 
diers. There  is  no  great  art  possible  to  a  nation  but  that 
which  is  based  on  battle.  When  I  tell  you  that  war  is  the 
foundation  of  all  the  arts,  I  mean  also  that  it  is  the  founda- 
tion of  all  the  high  virtues  and  faculties  of  men.  It  was  very 
strange  for  me  to  discover  this,  and  very  dreadful,  but  I  saw 
it  to  be  quite  an  undeniable  fact.  The  common  notion  that 
peace  and  the  virtues  of  civil  life  flourished  together  I  found 
to  be  utterly  untenable.  Peace  and  the  vices  of  civil  life 
only  flourish  together.  We  talk  of  peace  and  learning,  of 
peace  and  plenty,  of  peace  and  civilization ;  but  I  found  that 
these  are  not  the  words  that  the  Muse  of  History  coupled 
together :  that  on  her  lips  the  words  were  peace  and  sensuality, 
peace  and  selfishness,  peace  and  death.  I  found  in  brief  that 
all  great  nations  learned  their  truth  of  word  and  strength 
of  thought  in  war;  that  they  were  nourished  in  war  and 
wasted  in  peace;  taught  by  war  and  deceived  by  peace; 
trained  by  war  and  betrayed  by  peace;  in  a  word,  that  they 
were  born  in  war  and  expired  in  peace. 

Emerson's  views  on  war  are  similar: 

Our  culture  must,  therefore,  not  omit  the  arming  of  the 


I2O  Peace  Insurance 


man.  Let  him  hear  in  season  that  he  is  born  into  a  state  of 
war,  and  that  the  commonwealth  and  his  own  well-being 
require  that  she  should  not  go  dancing  in  the  weeds  of  peace ; 
but  warned,  self-collected  and  neither  defying  nor  dreading 
the  thunder,  let  him  take  both  reputation  and  life  in  his 
hands,  and  with  perfect  urbanity  dare  the  gibbet  and  the  mob 
by  the  absolute  truth  of  his  speech  and  rectitude  of  his 
behavior. 

To  the  credit  of  war  we  must  assert,  flatly,  Mr. 
Angell  to  the  contrary,  notwithstanding,  that  both 
nations  and  individuals  do,  in  many  cases,  gain  by 
war.  We  have  shown  in  our  preceding  chapters  that 
this  is  so  under  certain  conditions.  We  may  add  that 
war  gave  the  citizens  of  the  thirteen  colonies  inde- 
pendence. We  will  not  belittle  that  one  great  fact 
by  adding  others.  It  is  sufficient. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   SLANDERING  OF  THE   SOLDIER 

NE  of  the  worst  examples  that  we  have  seen 
of  sensational  exaggeration  and  slandering  of 
the  army,  over  the  name  of  a  person  of  prominence, 
is  the  following,  generally  attributed  to  Jack  London, 
though  Mr.  London  has  since  denied  the  author- 
ship. It  is  similar  to  other  anti-militarist  literature, 
and  is  used  by  the  socialist  to  prevent  enlistment. 

Young  men:  The  lowest  aim  in  your  life  is  to  be  a  soldier. 
The  good  soldier  never  tries  to  distinguish  right  from  wrong. 
He  never  thinks,  never  reasons;  he  only  obeys.  If  he  is 
ordered  to  fire  on  his  fellow  citizens,  on  his  friends,  on  his 
neighbors,  on  his  relatives,  he  obeys  without  hesitation.  If 
he  is  ordered  to  fire  down  a  crowded  street  when  the  poor 
are  clamoring  for  bread,  he  obeys,  and  sees  the  gray  hairs  of 
age  stained  with  red  and  the  life  tide  gushing  from  the 
breasts  of  women,  feeling  neither  remorse  nor  sympathy.  If 
he  is  ordered  off  as  a  firing  squad  to  execute  a  hero  or  bene- 
factor, he  fires  without  hesitation,  though  he  knows  the 
bullet  will  pierce  the  noblest  heart  that  ever  beat  in  human 
breast. 

A  good  soldier  is  a  blind,  heartless,  soulless,  murderous 
machine.  He  is  not  a  man.  He  is  not  even  a  brute,  for 
brutes  only  kill  in  self-defense.  All  that  is  human  in  him, 

121 


122  Peace  Insurance 

all  that  is  divine  in  him,  all  that  constitutes  the  man  has 
been  sworn  away  when  he  took  the  enlistment  roll.  His 
mind,  his  conscience,  aye,  his  very  soul,  are  in  the  keeping  of 
his  officer. 

No  man  can  fall  lower  than  a  soldier  —  it  is  a  depth  be- 
neath which  we  cannot  go.  Keep  the  boys  out  of  the  army. 
It  is  hell. 

Down  with  the  army  and  navy.  We  don't  need  killing 
institutions. 

We  need  life  giving  institutions. 

We  have  seen  some  similar  literature  from  the 
pen  of  less  prominent  anarchists  and  socialists. 

Some  readers  may  have  noticed,  that  throughout 
our  entire  work  one  important  omission  has  been 
made  —  one  that  to  some  extent  affects  the  main 
thought  of  the  book.  Showing  that  wars  are  prob- 
able, we  have  shown  that  military  force  as  an  insur- 
ance against  defeat  in  war  is  but  a  paying  business 
proposition.  We  have  failed,  however,  to  show 
whether  or  not  the  United  States  is  adequately  pro- 
tected by  such  insurance. 

Positively,  it  is  not. 

"  And  if  not,  why  not?  "  is  the  natural  query  of 
the  citizens.  "  Do  we  not  spend  sufficient  money 
on  military  forces?" 

To  which  we  may  answer,  "  Yes,  you  do,  almost." 

Contrary  to  the  belief  of  many,  it  is  not  greatly 
increased  expenditures  that  the  army  and  navy  need, 
but  a  comparatively  small  additional  sum  and  laws 


Slandering  the  Soldier  123 

which  will  permit  the  proper  and  wise  handling  of 
what  we  now  expend.  Under  these  conditions,  the 
United  States  could  have  a  strong  and  ample  pro- 
tective force.  One  of  the  needs  of  the  military 
forces  that  is  really  pressing,  however,  is  the 
removal  of  public  apathy  and  antagonism,  due  in  no 
small  part  to  such  writers  as  London. 

There  is  a  certain  class  of  pacifists  who  join  the 
socialist  in  defaming  the  army  at  every  opportunity, 
regardless  of  truth,  caring  nothing  for  facts  as  they 
really  are.  They  are  joined  by  many  citizens  who 
are  either  actively  antagonistic  or  indifferent  to  the 
welfare  of  the  nation,  who  know  nothing  of  the 
military  needs  of  the  country,  and  can  see  no  need 
whatever  for  the  soldier  or  sailor.  To  them,  he  is 
but  a  parasite,  living,  as  they  believe,  on  the  fat  of 
the  land  at  the  expense  of  the  taxpayer. 

No  one  is  better  acquainted  with  these  facts  than 
an  officer  who  has  been  fortunate  enough  to  command 
a  company  of  the  National  Guard  of  one  of  the 
states.  Such  an  officer,  being  a  citizen  himself  three- 
quarters  of  his  time,  is  thoroughly  acquainted  with 
the  civilian's  theories.  Should  he  attempt  to  recruit 
his  organization  by  appealing  to  the  patriotism  of 
the  community,  he  would  have  but  a  small  command 
indeed.  When  an  American  youth  asks  why  he 
should  join  such  an  organization  and  is  told  that  it  is 
his  duty  to  be  prepared  to  defend  his  country,  his 
answer  is  either  actual  derision  or  evasion;  but  if  it 


124  Peace  Insurance 

is  possible  to  promise  him  a  certain  amount  of  good 
fellowship,  of  social  amusement  and  enjoyment,  the 
matter  assumes  an  entirely  different  turn. 

In  so  far  as  the  criticisms  attributed  to  Mr.  Lon- 
don are  concerned,  they  are  almost  too  ridiculous 
to  invite  reply,  but  as  there  are  those  who  know 
nothing  of  the  facts  who  might  believe  such  state- 
ments, it  may  be  well  to  devote  a  small  amount  of 
space  in  answer  thereto.  An  officer  or  non-commis- 
sioned officer,  and,  in  many  cases,  a  private  in  the 
United  States  service  who  could  never  think  and 
never  reason  but  only  obey,  would  find  himself  liable 
to  court  martial  in  the  first  campaign  in  which  he 
took  part.  The  officers  and  the  men  of  the  United 
States  Army  are  trained  to  think  and  to  accept 
responsibility.  An  officer  who  obeyed  the  command 
of  a  superior,  given  previously,  when  conditions  had 
greatly  changed  so  as  to  make  it  disastrous  to  obey 
that  order,  would  be  as  liable  to  censure  and  would 
receive  as  much  censure  as  one  who  failed  to  obey 
when  he  should  do  so.  Here  is  a  fine  point  for  an 
officer  to  decide,  for  many  a  case  will  arise  when 
an  officer  will  feel  that  by  disobeying,  he  may  be 
court-martialled  for  doing  so,  and  that  if  he  obeys 
he  may  be  censured  for  doing  that.  He  certainly 
must  think.  Our  non-commissioned  officers  and 
privates  are  taught  to  lead  patrols,  to  scout,  to  com- 
mand men.  They  are  required  to  attend  schools  at 
the  post  where  they  are  stationed.  They  are  taught 


Slandering  the  Soldier  125 

to  think.  They  are  trained  in  thinking,  and  the 
enlisted  man  who  cannot  use  his  head  to  advantage, 
has  an  exceedingly  hard  time  in  the  army. 

We  know  of  cases  where  American  troops  have 
stood  in  crowded  streets  and  been  fired  upon,  where 
they  have  stood  and  been  stoned  and  cursed  and 
jeered  without  using  the  great  power  at  their  com- 
mand; but  we  know  of  no  cases  where  they  have 
"  fired  down  a  crowded  street  when  the  poor  are 
clamoring  for  bread  "  and  watched  "  the  gray  hairs 
of  age  stained  with  red  and  the  life  tide  gushing 
from  the  breasts  of  women,  feeling  neither  remorse 
nor  sympathy."  If  the  author  of  the  passage  quoted 
knows  when  American  troops  have  done  these  things, 
we  should  be  glad  to  have  him  inform  us.  We  fear, 
however,  that  he  allowed  his  dramatic  instinct  to 
run  away  with  his  knowledge  of  facts. 

The  most  common  slander  of  the  soldier  is  an 
accusation  of  habitual  drunkenness,  immorality,  and 
laziness,  while,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  men  of  the 
army  and  navy  are  generally  above  civilians  of  equal 
standing  in  these  respects. 

Recently,  we  learned  of  an  occasion  where  about 
5,000  troops  were  in  camp  for  a  short  time  near  a 
small  town.  An  officer  was  standing  nearby  when 
he  heard  two  citizens  of  the  village  discussing  the 
fact  that  an  intoxicated  soldier  had  broken  a  window 
in  one  of  the  town  stores.  The  man  telling  of  the 
incident  was  inclined  to  attribute  this  to  the  moral 


126  Peace  Insurance 


degeneracy  of  the  soldier  as  a  class,  but  the  other 
citizen  scornfully  remarked: 

"  Maybe  so,  but  thank  God  it's  not  5,000  college 
boys  camping  out  there,  or  we  would  have  no  town." 

Similarly,  we  believe  that  the  citizen  might  have 
substituted  for  college  boys,  coachmen,  doctors,  law- 
yers, certainly  legislators,  and  not  improbably  minis- 
ters, for  who  has  seen  a  large  convention  of  any  of 
these  classes  of  men  who  does  not  know  that  among 
all  large  bodies  of  males,  there  are  those  who  cannot 
be  relied  upon  to  maintain  good  order? 

A  sample  of  the  sort  of  criticism  which  the  army 
receives  as  drunkards  and  degenerates  is  that  appear- 
ing in  The  Christian  Work  and  Evangelist  a  few 
years  ago,  as  follows: 

Soldiers,  as  a  class,  are  men  who  have  disregarded  the 
civil  standard  of  morality  altogether.  They  simply  ignore  it. 
Civilians  fight  shy  of  soldiers  because  in  the  game  of  life 
soldiers  do  not  play  the  game  according  to  the  commonly 
accepted  rules.  In  soldiers'  eyes  lying,  thieving,  drunken- 
ness, bad  language  are  not  evils  at  all.  To  "  lie  like  a 
trooper  "  is  a  sound  metaphor.  The  soldier  invents  all  sorts 
of  elaborate  lies  for  the  mere  pleasure  of  inventing  them. 
Looting,  again,  is  one  of  his  joys ;  destroying  property,  not  for 
profit,  but  for  the  sheer  fun  of  the  destruction. 

This  criticism  was  stated  to  have  come  from  "  A 
British  Military  Officer,"  though  the  British  authori- 
ties can  locate  no  such  officer.  It  was  amply  answered 


Slandering  the  Soldier  127 

in  The  Army  and  Navy  Journal  a  short  time  after- 
wards. The  fallacies  of  the  statements  of  the 
so-called  officer  being  made  apparent  to  everyone. 

This  probably  has  never  been  true  of  the  soldier 
any  more  than  any  other  body  of  men.  It  has  been 
pointed  out  that  any  officer  or  soldier  who  answered 
to  the  description  of  soldiers  above  would  be 
promptly  court-martialled,  and  dismissed  from  the 
service.  Every  one  of  the  offenses  mentioned  by  this 
"  officer "  is  subject  to  severe  punishment  in  the 
United  States  Army,  even  to  the  lying,  which  is  not 
so  frequently  punished  in  civil  life, 

Said  The  Army  and  Navy  Journal  in  its  issue  of 
October  26,  1912: 

If  you  go  back  to  the  time  when  children  were  hung  in 
England  for  robbing  an  orchard,  when  John  Bunyan  was 
imprisoned  for  fourteen  years  in  Bedford  jail  for  preaching 
the  Gospel,  when  the  conditions  of  the  prisons  and  insane 
asylums  as  revealed  by  the  missionary  work  of  Mrs.  Eliza- 
beth Fry  were  too  horrible  to  contemplate,  you  may  possibly 
find  conditions  in  armies  in  some  measure  justifying  the  char- 
acterization of  your  anonymous  British  Officer.  But  these 
conditions,  so  far  as  they  may  have  once  existed,  certainly 
exist  no  longer,  and  it  is  cruel  injustice  to  judge  by  them  the 
Army  of  the  United  States,  which  is  governed  by  as  high  a 
standard  of  honor,  truthfulness,  and  respect  for  the  rights  of 
others  as  any  class  in  the  community,  clergy  not  excepted. 

In  support  of  this,  we  may  invite  your  attention 
to  General  Orders  of  the  War  Department,  pub- 


128  Peace  Insurance 

lishing  the  proceedings  of  a  general  court-martial  of 
a  cadet  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy.  This 
cadet  was  charged  with  making  a  false  official  state- 
ment, and  for  this  offense  was  dismissed  from  the 
service  of  the  United  States.  This  is  the  regular 
standard  of  the  United  States  Naval  and  Military 
Academies,  where  lying,  cheating,  or  any  dishonor- 
able actions  are  absolutely  not  tolerated.  In  view 
of  this  fact  it  hardly  seems  reasonable  to  expect  that 
an  officer  trained  in  this  manner  will  become  the 
kind  of  man  described  above,  or  that  an  army  under 
the  training  and  direction  of  officers  of  this  kind 
would  be  composed  of  enlisted  men  fitting  that 
description. 

A  more  correct  idea  of  the  attitude  of  the  army 
on  matters  of  intemperance  and  immorality  may 
be  gained  from  a  news  item  copied  from  The 
Portland  Oregonian,  reporting  a  meeting  held  in  the 
assembly  hall,  Vancouver  Barracks,  on  March  15, 
1914,  in  the  interest  of  temperance.  Chaplain  James 
Ossewaarde,  of  the  Twenty-first  United  States  In- 
fantry, spoke  for  about  an  hour  to  an  audience  that 
is  said  to  have  taxed  the  capacity  of  the  hall,  his 
subject  being  "  The  Saloon,  the  Nation's  Costliest 
Encumbrance."  The  members  of  the  Women's 
Christian  Temperance  Union  of  Vancouver  were 
present  in  a  body,  and  had  distributed  cards  which 
contained  the  following  statement:  "  I  hereby  de- 
clare that  I  am  opposed  to  the  saloon  and  the  liquor 


Slandering  the  Soldier  129 

traffic,  and  that  I  am  in  favor  of  abolishing  the  evil 
from  the  state  and  the  nation."  At  the  close  of  the 
meeting,  Chaplain  Ossewaarde  announced  that  472 
men  in  uniform  had  signed  these  cards,  and  thereby 
declared  their  opposition  to  the  liquor  traffic  and 
their  favor  of  its  abolition.  Among  those  signing 
there  were  twenty-eight  commissioned  officers,  in- 
cluding all  the  officers  of  the  Medical  Corps.  In 
addition,  among  the  signers  there  were  a  large 
number  of  non-commissioned  officers.  Chaplain 
Ossewaarde  stated  that  he  believed  that  at  least 
three-fourths  of  the  Twenty-first  United  States  In- 
fantry would  be  glad  to  see  the  saloon  abolished 
from  the  entire  nation. 

The  objection  may  be  made  that  this  regiment  is 
not  representative  of  the  entire  United  States  Army, 
and  that  may  possibly  have  some  foundation,  as 
Chaplain  Ossewaarde  stated  that  the  Twenty-first 
Infantry  had  a  reputation  as  a  temperance  organiza- 
tion. However,  a  careful  investigation  would  dis- 
close the  fact  that  there  is  a  very  similar  sentiment 
among  other  regiments  in  the  service,  and  that  the 
army  as  a  whole  is  as  temperate  as  any  other  organi- 
zation of  men. 

One  of  the  facts  which  is  partially  responsible  for 
the  bad  reputation  of  the  army  is  the  prominence 
which  the  uniform  gives  to  the  few  who  disgrace  it. 
Whenever  an  enlisted  man  becomes  intoxicated  his 
uniform  attracts  attention;  whenever  an  officer  com- 


130  Peace  Insurance 

mits  an  indiscretion,  the  press  gives  undue  promi- 
nence to  the  fact,  and  hence  it  is  that  the  army's 
entire  reputation  suffers.  The  army,  however,  can 
invite  investigation  in  this  matter,  and  if  those  who 
defame  it  would  become  intimately  acquainted  with 
the  soldiers'  lives,  they  would  find  that  there  is  no 
cleaner  body  of  men  than  in  the  regular  service  of 
the  United  States. 

Another  form  of  slander  has  been  the  charge 
of  abuse  of  the  enlisted  men  by  officers,  unfair  atti- 
tude of  courts-martial  and  the  consequent  increase 
in  desertion.  The  facts  as  they  are  in  regard  to 
courts-martial  are  well  summed  up  by  Robert  A, 
Doremus,  a  civilian: 

I  have  reported  as  stenographer  over  one  thousand  cases, 
and  in  only  one  instance  have  I  felt  that  perhaps  the  court 
erred,  and  this  only  on  account  of  facts  developing  after  the 
conviction.  I  have  never  seen  a  case  where  the  court  took 
snap  judgment  and  where  absolute  fairness  was  not  accorded 
the  accused  during  the  trial.  I  am,  perhaps,  as  familiar  with 
general  courts-martial  and  the  procedure  followed  as  any 
individual  outside  of  the  United  States  Army,  and  more  so 
than  a  great  many  in  it,  and  I  believe  I  can  sum  the  whole 
proposition  up  in  the  following  language:  "  If  I  am  innocent 
I  would  like  to  be  tried  by  a  general  court-martial;  if  I  am 
guilty  give  me  a  jury  in  a  civil  court."  * 

As  for  the  attitude  of  the  enlisted  men,  witness 
the  following  crude,  but  effective,  statement  from 

*  The  Army  and  Navy  Journal. 


Slandering/  the  Soldier  131 

the  leading  non-commissioned  officers  of  the  Fifth 
United  States  Infantry.  Non-commissioned  officers 
—  and  especially  the  non-commissioned  staff  and 
first  sergeants  —  are  enlisted  men  (not  officers)  gen- 
erally with  long  service  to  their  credit.  They  know. 

Whereas,  That  the  articles  appearing  in  Harper's  Weekly 
[early  in  1914]  criticizing  the  system  in  the  Army  are  in- 
accurate and  do  not  show  the  conditions  as  they  actually 
exist. 

Whereas,  That  the  undersigned  non-commissioned  officers 
know  from  long  service  and  personal  knowledge  that  enlisted 
men  are  not  required  to  polish  officers'  shoes  and  that  the 
picture  drawn  by  James  Montgomery  Flagg  as  shown  in  the 
first  number  of  the  above  mentioned  magazine  on  "  The 
Honor  of  the  Army  "  is  not  true.  That  we  have  never 
heard  an  officer  order  an  enlisted  man  to  do  work  of  this 
kind. 

Whereas,  That  officers  exercise  military  authority  with 
firmness,  kindness  and  justice  and  do  not  injure  those  under 
their  authority  by  tyrannical  conduct,  and  that  the  authority 
exercised  compares  favorably  with  that  accorded  employees 
by  employers  of  labor  in  civil  life. 

Whereas,  That  the  interests  of  discipline  would  not  be 
subserved  if  any  greater  leniency  was  shown  those  who  fail 
to  obey  the  orders  of  their  superiors,  and  that  all  well  con- 
ducted mercantile  establishments  and  corporations  maintain 
a  system  of  discipline  which  is  considered  in  some  instances 
more  severe  than  that  of  the  Army. 

Resolved,  That  no  specific  cause  can  be  found  for  deser- 
tion in  time  of  peace  other  than  that  young  men  enlist  in  a 


132  Peace  Insurance 

spirit  of  adventure,  become  dissatisfied  when  this  wish  is  not 
realized  and  desert  for  the  same  reason  they  would  leave  any 
position  they  may  have  in  civil  life  in  which  they  are  re- 
quired to  perform  certain  duties  where  others  were  placed 
over  them.  It  is  also  thought  that  the  aspersion  cast  on  the 
uniform  of  a  soldier  in  certain  communities  and  in  public 
places  of  amusement  are  causes  that  make  them  dissatisfied 
and  wish  to  return  to  civil  life. 

Resolved,  That  a  copy  of  the  above  be  sent  to  Harper's 
Weekly,  The  Army  and  Navy  Journal  and  The  Army  and 
Navy  Register  with  the  request  that  the  same  be  published. 

The  resolutions  are  signed  by  Frank  C.  Reilly, 
sergeant  major;  Fred  W.  Kenny,  quartermaster 
sergeant;  Frank  Mayer,  commissary  sergeant;  Fred 
S.  Scoble,  battalion  sergeant  major;  Anderson  W. 
Sharp,  color  sergeant;  William  G.  Sams,  color  ser- 
geant; Andrew  Gibson,  first  sergeant,  Co.  G;  Henry 
T.  Hyde,  first  sergeant,  Co.  H;  Harry  Kleine,  first 
sergeant,  Co.  F;  Benjamin  C.  Fink,  first  sergeant, 
Co.  L ;  John  H.  Lucas,  first  sergeant,  Co.  I ;  Harry 
H.  Curtis,  first  sergeant,  Co.  K;  Theodore  Schoge, 
first  sergeant,  Co.  A;  George  Moore,  first  sergeant, 
Co.  M;  John  Trush,  first  sergeant,  Co.  E;  Bernard 
F.  Kahn,  first  sergeant,  Co.  D ;  Arthur  Harris,  first 
sergeant,  Co.  B ;  Clayton  Sandoe,  first  sergeant,  Co. 
C;  Andrew  Lindstrom,  acting  first  sergeant,  Reg. 
Det. 

Desertions  are  not  due  to  the  army,  but  to  the 
American  public.  The  fault  lies  neither  in  undue 


Slandering  the  Soldier  133 

severity  nor  in  unfairness  in  the  service,  but  to  the 
fact  that  the  modern  American  youth  is  brought  up 
without  restraint,  without  discipline,  without  train- 
ing. When  he  enlists  he  receives  these  beneficial 
things  and  he  chafes  under  the  restraint  —  becomes 
"  homesick  "  and  deserts.  The  same  reasons  may 
be  given  for  desertion  as  any  principal  of  a  strict 
educational  institution  could  tell  you  influence  spoiled 
and  pampered  boys  to  run  away  from  school. 


CHAPTER  IX 


COMMON  PEOPLE       AND  MILITARY   FORCE 


,  if  not  equal,  in  importance,  to  the  slander- 
ous  attacks  made  upon  the  character  of  the 
personnel  of  the  army  and  navy,  is  the  insidious 
attempt  of  anti-militarists  of  a  certain  class  to  con- 
vince the  so-called  "  common  people  "  that  military 
force  is  opposed  to  the  interest  of  the  plain  citizen. 

The  most  successful  form  which  this  campaign  has 
taken  has  been  in  antagonizing  union  labor  against 
military  force.  In  this  particular  body  of  men  there 
appears  to  be  a  natural  tendency  to  regard  military 
force  as  their  enemy,  and  this  tendency  receives  much 
assistance  from  some  of  the  anti-militarists.  It  is  a 
regrettable  fact  that  at  the  present  time  organized 
labor  has  been  unable  to  see  the  errors  of  its  rea- 
soning. 

Labor  unions  are,  as  a  whole,  patriotic  organiza- 
tions. Many  of  them  are  composed  of  intelligent 
men,  and  it  has  been  found  in  more  than  one  instance 
that  when  conditions  were  properly  explained,  they 
favored  rather  than  opposed  military  force.  The 
opposition  of  labor  lies,  of  course,  in  the  fact  that 
troops  are  frequently  used  to  preserve  order  during 

134 


"  Common  People  "  and  Military  Force  135 

riots  growing  out  of  labor  trouble.  According  to 
the  agitators,  the  soldiers  are  the  tools  of  the  em- 
ployer. Such,  however,  is  far  from  the  case.  A 
soldier,  in  the  first  place,  would  rather  perform  any 
other  duty  than  riot  duty  during  a  strike ;  and,  in  the 
second  place,  when  compelled  to  do  so  he  stands  for 
order  alone.  Union  labor  men  are  not  anarchists; 
they  are  not  lawless;  they  are  not  dishonest;  and 
they  do  not  oppose  a  government  that  insures  good 
order.  In  fact,  such  men  give  a  strong,  high-class  ' 
vote  in  favor  of  what  they  believe  will  be  for  the 
protection  and  interest  of  their  homes.  They  desire 
the  protection  of  police  for  their  own  homes  and 
privileges,  and  would  under  no  circumstances  vote  to 
have  the  police  protection  done  away  with.  Due  to 
agitators,  however,  in  many  cases  they  fail  to  recog- 
nize that  troops  when  called  out  are  merely 
performing  the  duty  which  the  police  have  been 
unable  to  do. 

As  for  the  attitude  of  the  soldier  in  labor  dis- 
turbances, we  quote  from  one  of  the  military  man- 
uals for  riot  duty;  a  book  which  has  been  adopted 
by  the  War  Department  for  study  in  all  officers' 
schools  in  the  National  Guard,  and  which  is  in  use 
in  many  of  the -states: 

The  attitude  of  the  troops  should  be  strictly  impartial, 
especially  in  labor  disturbances.  They  should  absolutely  pre- 
vent all  disorder,  no  matter  from  what  source,  but  should 
take  extreme  care  to  show  no  favors  to  any  side  of  the  con- 


136  Peace  Insurance 

troversy.  Furthermore,  after  preventing  disorder,  damage 
to  property  or  possible  injury  to  person,  no  action  should 
be  taken  which  will  aid  or  hinder  either  party  in  their  lawful 
attempts  to  further  their  purposes. 

In  addition  to  the  legal  and  military  aspects,  there  is  an- 
other point  to  be  considered  in  regard  to  the  use  of  force 
in  riot  duty.  Both  officers  and  men  should  take  into  consid- 
eration the  great  difference  between  the  classes  of  riots  and 
rioters  in  determining  the  amount  of  force  to  be  used. 
Riots  may  be  divided  as  follows:  First,  those  partaken  in  by 
citizens,  usually  law  abiding,  but  temporarily  crazed  through 
real  or  fancied  wrongs;  second,  those  in  which  the  partici- 
pants are  entirely  vicious  and  criminal;  and  third,  those 
assuming  the  nature  of  a  rebellion  against  the  lawful  govern- 
ment, whether  the  participants  be  of  the  lawful  or  criminal 
classes.  Though,  from  a  military  viewpoint,  all  may  be  the 
same,  and,  from  a  legal  viewpoint,  the  first  two  may  be  the 
same,  it  is  obvious  that  every  effort  should  be  made  to  refrain 
from  wounding  or  killing  participants  in  the  first  class  of 
rioters,  while  in  the  second  and  third  cases  greater  force  may 
be  advisable  and  necessary.* 

Time  and  time  again  it  has  been  shown  that  troops 
not  only  take  the  above  attitude,  but  are  more  careful 
not  to  use  unnecessary  force  than  are  forces  com- 
posed of  undisciplined  deputies  sworn  in  for  the 
occasion,  and  certainly  very  much  more  careful  than 
the  private  guards  employed  by  some  of  the  large 
corporations.  We  know  of  no  instance  when  troops 
have  ever  fired  unnecessarily  or  continued  their  fire 

*  Troops  on  Rial  Duty,  Military  Publishing  Co.,  Trenton,  N.  J. 


"  Common  People  "  and  Military  Force  137 

to  an  excessive  point  in  riots;  but  we  do  know  of 
many  cases  where  they  have  withheld  their  full 
power  in  spite  of  personal  injury  sustained  by  mis- 
siles and  even  shots  coming  from  a  crowd. 

The  better  class  of  union  labor  —  and  this  con- 
stitutes the  majority  —  is  in  favor  of  a  stable 
government,  of  one  that  will  be  strong  enough  to 
prevent  disorder  and  anarchy  from  occurring  at  the 
will  of  any  body  or  organization.  The  Government 
accomplishes  this  through  police  and  troops,  both 
bodies  being  men  whose  duty  it  is  to  keep  all  sides 
of  an  argument  in  good  order,  but  not  to  investigate 
the  matter,  form  their  own  opinions,  and  help  one 
side  or  the  other.  The  labor  man  would  not  desire 
to  have  the  police  or  the  soldier  investigate  strike 
conditions  and  take  active  action,  using  offensive 
force  against  one  side  or  the  other.  Such  decisions 
should  be  made  by  other  men  than  soldiers;  for 
instance,  boards  of  arbitration.  In  the  meantime,  the 
soldier  must  keep  his  opinions  to  himself,  and  confine 
his  efforts  to  maintaining  order.  Such  an  attitude  is 
the  cnly  possible  way  of  securing  justice  and  main- 
taining good  government. 

Should  they  give  the  matter  a  little  thought  the 
union  men  would  realize  thoroughly  that,  in  keeping 
order  during  strikes,  the  soldier  is  doing  exactly  what 
the  laboring  man  himself  would  vote  for  at  a  time 
when  he  was  not  impassioned  by  his  own  grievances. 
Moreover,  labor  has  already,  in  some  instances, 


138  Peace  Insurance 

offered  to  furnish  deputies  from  the  ranks  of  strikers 
to  keep  good  order  during  labor  disturbances.  This 
was  a  wise  and  logical  move.  Similarly  the  unions 
could  do  no  better  than  to  fill  the  National  Guard, 
which  is  the  force  usually  called  in  strike  duty,  with 
union  men.  It  would  be  an  insurance  of  justice  to 
labor  on  the  part  of  each  individual  Guardsman,  in 
addition  to  the  present  just  attitude  of  the  Guard  as 
a  whole.  This  attitude  may  now  be  spoiled,  on 
occasion,  by  the  act  of  someone  or  some  few  mem- 
bers of  the  National  Guard  —  exactly,  for  instance, 
as  some  union  men  occasionally  fail  to  stand  for  the 
principles  advocated  by  their  organizations.  It  is 
not  fair,  for  instance,  to  charge  all  union  labor  with 
the  acts  of  dynamiters,  nor  to  charge  the  Guard  with 
the  acts  which  may  occur  through  a  small  proportion 
of  its  members. 

When  the  unions  realize  the  truth  about  the 
soldier,  we  will  secure  most  of  our  citizen  soldiers 
from  their  ranks,  and  the  unions  themselves  will  be 
greatly  strengthened  by  gaining  the  support  of  those 
who  now  look  upon  them  as  advocates  of  disorder 
and  anarchy. 

Furthermore,  we  have  already  pointed  out  one  of 
the  many  instances  where  it  is  in  defense  of  the  rights 
of  the  laboring  classes  that  we  may  be  involved  in 
war.  We  refer  to  the  prevention  of  the  importation 
of  cheap  yellow  labor  —  a  case  where  it  is  certain 
that,  socialists  to  the  contrary,  the  soldier  would  be 


"Common  People"  and  Military  Force   139 

fighting  for  labor  and  not  for  capital.  The  claim 
that  the  "  plain  people  "  fight  the  wars  and  gain 
nothing  through  them  affords  the  pacifists,  the  anti- 
militarists,  and  the  socialists  one  of  their  main, 
though  by  no  means  their  strongest,  arguments.  For 
instance,  intervention  in  Mexico,  to  them,  would 
mean  saving  some  corporation  from  financial  loss  or 
enabling  it  to  secure  some  financial  advantage;  but 
to  the  soldier  it  means  the  saving  of  the  lives  of  the 
clerks  and  laborers  of  that  corporation,  and  of  other 
Americans,  and  the  honor  of  their  wives  and  daugh- 
ters. To  the  soldier  the  fact  that  counts  is  that 
these  men,  with  their  families,  went  into  Mexico  in 
time  of  peace,  just  as  any  other  working  man  would 
have  done,  to  retain  his  position  or  to  get  a  better 
one.  He  knows  also  that  in  the  past  the  Govern- 
ment has  allowed  Americans  to  believe  that  they 
would  be  protected  while  on  foreign  soil.  From 
the  military  man's  viewpoint  these  are  sufficient 
cause  for  intervention,  regardless  of  the  corporation's 
gains  or  losses  thereby.  If  those  in  charge  of  the 
Civil  Government  at  Washington  act  on  other 
grounds  than  these,  that  is  the  fault  of  the  civilians 
in  charge  of  the  Government  and  of  those  who 
elected  them,  and  not  of  the  soldier. 

Similarly,  the  soldier  sees  in  the  Revolution  a  war 
to  free  America,  and  to  give  the  plainest  American 
citizen  political  rights  equal  to  those  of  any  other 
man,  be  he  civilian  or  soldier,  nobleman  or  com- 


140  Peace  Insurance 


moner.  He  believes  such  a  war  is  to  insure  repre- 
sentation of  all  in  our  government  and  to  uphold  the 
principles  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  which 
states : 

That  all  men  are  created  equal,  that  they  are  endowed  by 
their  Creator  with  certain  unalienable  Rights,  that  among 
these  are  Life,  Liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  Happiness.  That 
to  secure  these  rights,  Governments  are  instituted  among 
men,  deriving  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed.  That  whenever  any  Form  of  Government  be- 
comes destructive  of  these  ends,  it  is  the  Right  of  the  People 
to  alter  or  to  abolish  it,  and  to  institute  a  new  Government, 
laying  its  foundation  on  such  principles  and  organizing  its 
powers  in  such  form  as  to  them  shall  seem  most  likely  to 
effect  their  Safety  and  Happiness. 

Again,  the  soldier  sees  in  the  Civil  War  not  a 
struggle  to  meet  the  desires  of  capital,  but  one  grow- 
ing largely  out  of  the  oppression  of  the  negro  —  the 
commonest  of  the  so-called  "  common  people."  If 
there  have  been  wars  waged  solely  in  the  interest  of 
capital,  that  in  no  way  affects  the  justice  or  the 
desirability  of  these  great  wars  waged  in  the  interests 
of  the  rights  and  privileges  of  humanity,  and  in  no 
way  affects  the  likelihood  of  similar  wars  in  the 
future  in  the  interest  of  no  one  except  the  "  common 
people." 

Nor  do  the  "  common  people  "  fail  to  obtain  their 
share  of  glory  and  honor.  As  has  been  pointed  out 
in  service  publications  time  and  time  again,  the 


"  Common  People  "  and  Military  Force  141 

"  common  people  "  secured  the  greatest  honors  in 
the  time  of  the  Civil  War.  Lincoln  and  his  lowly 
origin  need  not  be  called  to  the  attention  of  any 
American  citizen.  Grant,  a  plain  man,  secured  a 
full  share  of  the  honors  growing  out  of  that  war; 
and  Sherman,  Sheridan,  and  others  who  reaped  the 
greatest  rewards  of  the  struggle,  were  men  of  the 
plain  people. 

Our  army,  furthermore,  is  a  democratic  organiza- 
tion. Today  there  is  no  institution  more  democratic 
than  West  Point  —  a  school  where  merit  alone  can 
secure  distinction.  The  cadet  who  is  the  son  of 
a  general,  or  a  senator,  or  of  the  President,  probably 
would  wish  many  times  that  he  could  have  passed 
through  the  academy  in  the  guise  of  the  son  of  a  less 
distinguished  individual.  Certain  it  is  that  any  ten- 
dency in  such  a  cadet  to  assume  superiority  on 
account  of  such  paternity  would  be  eliminated,  more 
rapidly  than  politely,  by  his  fellow  students.  Every 
enlisted  man  has  an  opportunity  to  rise  from  the 
ranks  of  our  army  and  become  a  commissioned 
officer.  Every  civilian  has  a  similar  chance  and  no 
"  pull  "  can  make  lieutenants  of  those  who  do  not 
win  their  commission  in  fair  and  impartial  examina- 
tions. In  the  National  Guard,  in  many  cases,  this  is 
actually  carried  too  far.  In  the  majority  of  states, 
officers  are  elected  by  the  men,  and  frequently  when 
there  is  no  enlisted  man  in  a  company  who  is  capable 
of  becoming  an  officer,  the  men  refuse  to  elect  capa- 


142  Peace  Insurance 

ble  candidates  from  other  organizations,  or  from 
civilian  life,  and  the  service  suffers  accordingly. 

As  we  see  it,  the  only  ground  which  the  anti- 
militarist  has  on  which  to  base  his  ridiculous  claims 
that  war  is  opposed  to  the  interest  of  the  plain 
people  is  the  fact  that  there  are  more  of  that  class 
than  there  are  capitalists,  or  members  of  the  "  four 
hundred,"  in  the  various  armies.  Those  bringing 
out  this  fact,  however,  conveniently  forget  to  state 
that  about  nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine  out  of  one 
thousand  are  "  common  "  men.  Under  the  circum- 
stances, an  equal  representation  can  hardly  be 
expected. 

Neither  are  the  interests  of  the  labor  nor  of  any 
other  class  of  "  common  people  "  in  conflict  with 
adequate  military  protection. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   MILITARY   HISTORY   OF  THE   UNITED  STATES 

'  I  AHE  pacifist  and  the  anti-militarist  are  devotees 
of  untrained  militia  or  volunteers,  as  being  the 
proper  means  of  defense  in  case  of  war.  They  believe 
that  if,  owing  to  some  unforeseen  miscalculation  in 
their  ideas  for  perpetual  peace,  a  war  should  happen 
to  break  out,  the  sixteen  million  militia  of  the 
United  States  would  be  more  than  a  match  for  any 
armies  which  a  foreign  nation  might  send  against  us. 
That  sixteen  million,  which  we  have  actually  heard 
well-known  pacifists  state  was  the  number  of  men  in 
the  National  Guard,  is  the  total  number  of  males  in 
the  United  States  who  are  available  for  military 
service.  They  are  the  constitutional  militia,  which 
includes  every  able-bodied  male  citizen  between  the 
ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-five  years.  We  have  pre- 
viously shown  that,  from  a  viewpoint  of  economy  of 
expenditure,  reliance  on  raw  militia  or  untrained 
volunteers  is  a  serious  error.  Equally  is  this  so  in 
regard  to  the  undesirability  of  trusting  the  defense 
of  the  nation  in  the  hands  of  such  troops. 

When  an  army  officer  or  an  officer  of  our  navy 
makes  a  statement  of  this  kind,  the  anti-militarist 

143 


144  Peace  Insurance 

immediately  cries  that  he  is  influenced  by  personal 
or  professional  prejudice.  It  is  a  peculiar  trait  in 
the  nature  of  Americans  that  although  in  case  of 
sickness  they  call  for  the  advice  of  a  doctor,  and  in 
case  of  legal  trouble  they  consult  a  lawyer,  in  military 
matters  they  think  that  the  soldier  is  influenced  only 
by  personal  or  professional  interest.  It  may,  of 
course,  be  true  that  the  doctor  is  to  some  extent  more 
careful  in  matters  of  health  and  hygiene  than  the 
average  layman,  that  the  lawyer  is  more  particular 
to  have  his  ordinary  business  actions  strictly  legal 
than  is  a  business  man  not  of  that  profession,  and, 
in  the  same  manner,  it  is  possible  that  many  soldiers 
are  a  trifle  over-zealous  in  advocating  military 
preparation.  However,  the  doctor  is  probably  ab- 
solutely correct  in  the  steps  which  he  takes  to 
preserve  health,  the  lawyer  is  probably  equally  so  in 
his  care  to  have  everything  technically  perfect,  and 
similarly  the  soldier,  from  a  military  point  of  view, 
probably  never  asks  any  more  than  is  proper  for  the 
military  welfare  of  the  nation. 

Either  the  soldier  is  correct  and  the  things  which 
he  advocates  are  not  only  desirable,  but  essential,  to 
this  country,  or  else  the  civilian  bodies  which,  unfor- 
tunately, control  our  military  establishment,  and 
which  have  been  responsible  for  our  past  lack  of 
policy,  are  alone  correct,  among  all  the  bodies,  civil 
or  military,  which  control  the  military  forces  of  the 
great  nations  of  the  world.  If  we  are  to  assume  that 


Our  Military  History  145 

the  civilians  who  are  responsible  for  our  military 
policy  —  or  lack  of  it  —  have  been  correct,  then  we 
must,  conversely,  reach  a  decision  that  the  governing 
powers  of  all  other  great  nations,  the  military  experts 
of  such  nations,  and  our  own  military  experts,  as 
well,  are  in  error. 

Such  a  decision,  in  favor  of  military  weakness,  is 
tenable  only  if  supported  by  some  special  conditions 
which  would  permit  the  existence  in  this  one  nation 
of  grounds  for  an  irrefutable  argument  against  the 
military  policy  of  all  other  nations.  As  yet,  no  such 
conditions  have  been  shown  to  exist.  Also,  if  we 
admit  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of  such  condi- 
tions, then  we  must  conclude  that  our  military  ex- 
perts, from  the  time  of  Washington  until  today, 
either  have  been  incapable  of  recognizing  the  needs 
of  the  nation,  or  sufficiently  unprincipled  to  advocate 
unnecessary  military  measures  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  supposed  personal  gain.  On  such  conclusions  no 
comment  is  necessary. 

Among  the  fallacies  that  are  responsible  for  a 
state  of  the  public  mind,  which  is  reflected  in  our 
governing  bodies  to  the  detriment  of  military 
efficiency,  are  three  of  especial  prominence.  First 
among  these  may  be  placed  the  idea  that  every 
American  citizen  is  a  born  soldier,  needing  only  to 
don  a  suitable  uniform  to  become  an  efficient  general 
officer,  or  drummer  boy,  as  the  case  may  be.  Second, 
is  the  idea  that  the  United  States  is  so  isolated  by 


146  Peace  Insurance 

the  waters  of  two  oceans  that  no  foreign  nation  can 
attack  us  in  force.  Last  may  be  placed  ideas  due  to 
victories  in  past  wars,  in  which  the  works  of  historians 
show  only  the  ultimate  victory,  minimize  or  eliminate 
the  shameful  conditions  which  were  caused  in  each  by 
our  military  weakness,  and  belittle  the  corresponding 
weakness,  or  the  more  important  military  operations 
of  our  enemy,  which,  as  much  as  our  own  forces, 
have  won  our  victories.  Who  among  us  cannot 
remember,  after  our  schoolboy  studies  of  American 
History,  the  boastful  statement,  "  The  United  States 
could  lick  the  world?  " 

It  is  upon  the  third  item  —  the  misleading  his- 
tories, or  the  misreading  of  the  more  accurate 
histories  —  that  the  anti-militarist  bases  his  argu- 
ments in  favor  of  little,  if  any,  military  preparation. 
It  is  upon  this  item  that  the  idea  of  the  great  martial 
qualities  of  the  American  civilian  is  founded;  and  it 
is  largely  upon  the  conditions  of  transportation,  etc., 
which  existed  during  our  wars  with  England  that  the 
idea  of  our  isolation  is  based.  It  is,  therefore,  well 
for  us  to  consider  briefly  the  actions  of  our  raw 
volunteers  and  untrained  militia  as  they  actually  were 
in  our  various  wars. 

Practically  the  first  step  for  the  organized  defense 
of  the  Thirteen  Colonies  was  taken  on  April  22, 
1775,  when  the  Congress  of  Massachusetts  resolved 
to  raise,  at  once,  13,000  men,  this  to  be  done  by 
commissioning  as  captain  anyone  who  could  raise 


Our  Military  History  147 

a  company,  and  as  colonel  any  man  who  raised  ten 
such  companies.  This  was  the  beginning  of  the 
extraordinary  and  unique  method  of  appointing 
officers  which  prevails  to  a  great  extent  to  this  day 
in  the  volunteers  and  in  the  National  Guard. 

As  early  as  November,  1775,  General  Washing- 
ton began  to  complain  of  the  inefficiency  of  the  raw 
troops.  Under  that  date  he  wrote  to  Congress: 

Instead  of  pressing  to  be  engaged  in  the  cause  of  their 
country,  which  I  vainly  flattered  myself  would  be  the  case, 
I  find  we  are  likely  to  be  deserted  in  a  most  critical  time. 
Those  that  have  enlisted  must  have  a  furlough,  which  I  have 
been  obliged  to  grant  to  fifty  at  a  time,  from  each  regiment. 
The  Connecticut  troops,  upon  whom  I  reckoned,  are  as  back- 
ward, indeed,  if  possible,  more  so  than  the  people  of  this 
colony.  Our  situation  is  truly  alarming. 

On  December  2,  in  a  letter  to  Governor  Trumbull 
of  Connecticut,  he  added: 

Connecticut  troops  were  requested  and  ordered  to  remain 
here,  as  the  time  of  most  of  them  would  not  be  out  before 
the  loth,  when  they  would  be  relieved.  Notwithstanding 
this,  yesterday  morning  most  of  them  resolved  to  leave  the 
camp.  Many  went  off,  and  the  utmost  vigilance  and  indus- 
try were  used  to  apprehend  them.  Several  got  away  with 
their  arms  and  ammunition. 

Desertion,  even  at  this  early  stage  of  the  war, 
became  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception.  Discipline 
was  but  a  farce,  and  homesick  soldiers  took  every 


148  Peace  Insurance 

action  to  get  away.    According  to  a  report  of  General 
Schuyler : 

Near  three  hundred  of  them  arrived  a  few  days  ago,  unable 
to  do  any  duty;  but  as  soon  as  I  administered  that  grand 
specific,  a  discharge,  they  instantly  acquired  health,  and 
rather  than  be  detained  a  few  days  to  cross  Lake  George, 
they  undertook  a  march  from  here  of  two  hundred  miles 
with  the  greatest  alacrity. 

All  through  the  year  1775  the  American  troops, 
numbering  37,683  men,  lay  inactive  through  want 
of  discipline  and  training,  through  failure  of  supply 
officers,  and  through  the  inability  of  the  higher 
officers  to  be  sure  of  the  presence  of  their  troops 
when  wanted.  The  British  numbered  but  11,500 
men,  of  whom  but  6,500  were  fit  for  duty.  This 
condition  continued  with  various  attempts  to  raise 
troops  until  August  29,  when  Washington  was 
defeated  in  the  Battle  of  Long  Island,  after  which 
the  militia  deserted  "  almost  by  whole  regiments,  by 
half  ones,  and  by  companies  at  a  time."  It  was  in 
his  report  of  this  that  Washington  said: 

All  of  these  circumstances  fully  confirm  the  opinion  I  ever 
entertain,  and  which  I  more  than  once  in  my  letters  took  the 
liberty  of  mentioning  to  Congress,  that  no  dependence  could 
be  put  in  a  militia  or  other  troops  than  those  enlisted  and  em- 
bodied for  a  longer  period  than  our  regulations  heretofore 
have  prescribed.  I  am  persuaded,  and  as  fully  convinced  as 
I  am  of  any  one  fact  that  has  happened,  that  our  liberties 


z 

o 

H 

MALL  ARMIES  BUT 

3 

-* 

U) 

£*» 

s 

H 

1 
S 

^ 

g 

7 

1 

O 

Q 

ww 
£ir 

i 

i 

8" 

i 

1 

1 

e 

LU 

w£ 
<o 

i 

1 

s 
o 

"s 

K 

L—   — 

^ 

'1 

eft 

4A 

• 

JJZ 

§ 

e 

UJ 

0 

| 

Q, 

•§ 

"e 

i 

H 

OZ 

! 

00 

1 

s 

1 

KL 

z 

« 

10 

^ 

1 

00 

O 

0 

i 

1 

t> 

rO 
§ 

^ 

1 

K 

> 

"Jr^ 

•^ 

s 

'I 

< 
K 

1 

5 

g 

•^ 

H 

r§ 

Si 

•c-a 

SHOW1NG  EX 

TotaZ  Number  1 

\ 

1  Largest  Arm 

1  Number  of  Sold 

Our  Military  History  149 

must  of  necessity  be  greatly  hazarded,  if  not  entirely  lost,  if 
their  defense  is  left  to  any  but  a  permanent  standing  army. 
Nor  would  the  expense  incident  to  the  support  of  such  a 
body  of  troops  as  would  be  competent  to  almost  every  exi- 
gency far  exceed  that  which  is  daily  incurred  by  calling  in 
succor  and  new  enlistments,  which  when  effected  are  not 
attended  with  any  good  consequences. 

On  September  15,  the  same  raw  troops,  including 
the  firing  line  and  Parson's  and  Fellow's  brigades, 
ran,  without  firing  a  shot,  from  sixty  or  seventy 
British  soldiers  —  this  in  spite  of  their  officers'  efforts 
to  prevent  it.  Thus,  throughout  the  entire  Revolu- 
tion, the  militia  continued  to  run,  desert,  mutiny,  and 
generally  imperil  the  welfare  of  the  Thirteen 
Colonies. 

At  Cowpens,  Morgan's  injunction  to  the  militia 
was  "  Just  hold  up  your  heads,  boys;  three  fires  and 
you  are  free."  At  Guilford  Court  House,  the  same 
moderate  demand  was  made  upon  the  militia,  but  as 
soon  as  the  enemy  came  in  sight  they  gave  way. 
Although  a  total  of  395,858  men  were  called  out 
during  the  war  and  thereby  became  eligible  for  pen- 
sions, the  largest  force  that  Washington  was  able  to 
muster  for  battle  at  any  one  time,  was  17,000.  At 
Trenton  and  at  Princeton,  when  he  needed  men  most, 
he  had  an  effective  strength  of  but  4,000  (Plate  5). 

The  late  Brevet  Major-General  Emory  Upton, 
United  States  Army,  in  what  is  undoubtedly  the  most 
valuable  and  accurate  contribution  to  America's 


150  Peace  Insurance 


military  history  —  his  Military  Policy  of  the  United 
States,  says : 

Looking  back  at  the  whole  Revolutionary  struggle,  not- 
withstanding our  employment  from  first  to  last  of  almost 
400,000  men,  we  find  that  but  two  military  events  had  a 
direct  bearing  upon  the  expulsion  of  the  British.  One  of 
these  was  the  capture  of  Burgoyne;  the  other  that  of  Corn- 
wallis  —  an  event  which  was  only  made  possible  by  the  co- 
operation of  a  French  army  and  a  French  fleet. 

This  certainly  is  somewhat  different  from  the 
school  boy's  conception  of  our  raw  troops  in  the 
Revolution.  It  certainly  affords  the  anti-militarist 
but  little  ground  for  faith  in  untrained  or  in  raw 
volunteers. 

When  the  War  of  1812  broke  out,  conditions  were 
no  better.  Again  militia  showed  its  worthlessness. 
The  first  serious  matter  in  this  connection  grew  out 
of  the  refusal  of  the  Governors  of  Massachusetts 
and  Connecticut  to  furnish  militia  at  the  call  of  the 
President  —  an  evil  not  yet  entirely  removed,  as  was 
but  recently  shown  in  the  tendency  of  a  number  of 
states  to  oppose  certain  military  requirements  which 
the  Federal  War  Department  believed  to  be  for  the 
best  interest  of  the  nation. 

The  invasion  of  Canada  gave  excellent  example 
of  the  militia's  worth  —  or  rather  worthlessness. 
In  July,  1812,  General  Hull  with  about  300  regulars 
and  1,500  militia  and  volunteers  crossed  from  De- 


Our  Military  History  151 

troit  to  Canada.  General  Hull,  who  was  an  expe- 
rienced officer  of  the  Revolution,  and  in  whom 
Washington  had  placed  great  confidence,  retreated 
without  battle  on  August  8.  His  militia  had  been 
found  mutinous,  and  on  one  occasion  they  refused  to 
march  until  the  Fourth  United  States  Regiment, 
under  Colonel  Miller,  compelled  them  to  do  so  with 
fixed  bayonets.  On  August  16,  General  Hull's  whole 
force,  then  in  Detroit,  surrendered  to  an  invading 
force  of  only  720  English  and  600  Indians.  Not  a 
shot  was  fired. 

Shortly  after,  General  Hopkins'  expedition  of 
4,000  mounted  militia  from  Kentucky,  marched 
against  the  Indians.  On  the  fourth  day  of  their 
march,  a  fire  being  seen  on  the  prairie,  they  thought 
that  it  might  be  the  enemy,  their  ardor  cooled,  and 
totally  ignoring  their  officers,  they  turned  about  and 
soon  after  dispersed  to  their  homes.  Three  other 
columns  of  militia  from  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Vir- 
ginia, and  Pennsylvania,  amounting  to  10,000  men, 
were  organized  about  the  same  time  for  service 
against  the  hostile  Indians.  The  column  from  Ken- 
tucky mutinied  within  a  few  days,  but  was  pacified 
by  its  officers.  That  from  Virginia,  having  had  a 
slight  engagement  with  the  enemy,  refused  to  obey 
orders  for  a  pursuit,  returned  to  camp  and  shortly 
afterward  the  entire  force  suffered  defeat.  At 
Queenstown  the  militia  under  General  Van  Rens- 
selaer  refused  to  obey  orders  for  battle.  General 


152  Peace  Insurance 

Dearborn's  3,000  militia,  organized  to  invade 
Canada,  nearly  all  refused  to  cross  the  line  —  and 
thus  the  war  continued,  affording  throughout  nought 
but  proof  of  the  fact  that  raw  troops  are  indeed  a 
"  broken  staff  "  to  lean  upon. 

Our  burned  Capital  was  the  crowning  humiliation 
of  the  war.  This  occurred  on  August  24,  1814, 
when  the  American  defending  force  "  suddenly 
assembled  without  organization  or  discipline  or 
officers  of  the  least  knowledge  of  the  service  "  num- 
bered 5,401,  consisting  of  400  regulars,  600  marines, 
20  sailors,  and  the  balance  militia  or  volunteers. 
The  British  force  numbered  3,500,  only  a  portion 
of  the  advance  guard,  which  consisted  of  1,500  men, 
being  engaged.  The  Americans  retired  with  so  little 
resistance  that  there  were  but  eight  killed  and 
eleven  wounded,  and  the  enemy,  without  opposition, 
marched  into  Washington,  set  fire  to  "  The  Presi- 
dent's Palace,  the  Treasury,  and  the  War  Office," 
and  on  the  next  day  they  completed  the  destruction 
of  all  the  American  public  buildings. 

Upton,  commenting  upon  this  campaign,  says: 

The  conduct  of  the  regular  troops  on  several  occasions, 
gave  abundant  proof  that  the  officers,  just  appointed  from 
civil  life,  were  little  better  than  officers  of  militia,  and  that 
with  no  standard  of  discipline  fixed  in  their  minds,  many  of 
them  were  incapable  of  imparting  to  their  soldiers  the  firm- 
ness expected  of  regulars  in  the  hour  of  battle. 

Nevertheless,  a  few  young  officers  like  Brown,  Scott,  and 


Our  Military  History  153 

Ripley  were  slowly  acquiring,  in  the  sure  but  expensive 
school  of  war,  the  military  knowledge  that  was  destined  in 
some  degree  to  retrieve  the  honor  of  our  arms. 

During  the  Mexican  War  this  same  fact  —  the 
necessity  for  trained  troops  —  was  amply  borne  out. 
Fortunately,  however,  by  the  wisdom  of  our  generals 
and  the  good  fortune  of  the  campaigns,  we  were  able 
to  train  our  raw  volunteers  before  they  went  into 
serious  action.  The  result  was  victory.  Such  dis- 
credit as  there  was  in  this  war  was  largely  due  to 
mismanagement  at  Washington,  rather  than  to  the 
troops  in  the  field. 

The  Civil  War  found  us  with  but  17,000  men  in 
the  regular  army.  At  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run 
there  were  but  800  regulars,  the  balance  of  the 
Union  Army  consisting  of  28,000  militia  and  volun- 
teers. These  800  soldiers  covered  the  retreat  of  the 
thousands  of  brave  but  disorganized  civilians  who 
had  imagined  that  they  were  an  army.  Had  the 
United  States  had  a  trained  army  on  the  field  instead 
of  an  untrained  mass  of  civilians,  Bull  Run  would 
have  been  the  end  of  the  Civil  War  —  not  the  begin- 
ning. It  was  only  when  our  volunteers,  through 
experience  and  training,  became  practically  regulars 
that  they  were  an  effective  fighting  force.  Had  not 
the  South  been  almost  equally  unprepared,  it  would 
have  meant  disaster  to  the  Union.  A  trained  foreign 
army  at  that  time  would  have  marched  victoriously 
throughout  the  North. 


154  Peace  Insurance 

Finally,  in  the  Spanish-American  War  we  did  our 
fighting  with  regulars,  there  being  but  three  volun- 
teer regiments  in  Shafter's  original  expedition.  Our 
volunteers  with  a  few  exceptions  were  unfit  to  embark 
at  the  time  that  Shafter's  expedition  set  out,  and 
in  fact  most  of  them  were  unfit  to  enter  a  campaign 
on  the  date  that  they  were  mustered  out  of  the  service 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  war.  Had  the  Spanish 
commander  in  Cuba  used  but  ordinary  military 
judgment,  he  would  have  placed  Shafter's  army  in 
a  most  perilous  position,  for  it  was  shown  that, 
properly  led,  the  Spaniards  were  brave  fighters.  It 
would  have  been  necessary  to  reenforce  our  army 
of  occupation  with  raw  volunteers,  and  we  fear  for 
the  result  had  this  been  the  case.  Moreover,  it  was 
not  necessary  for  us  to  place  the  volunteers  in  active 
service  in  order  to  prove  the  worthlessness  of  the 
system  which  depends  on  untrained  troops.  The 
confusion,  lack  of  discipline,  illness,  deaths  from 
disease,  failure  of  supply  departments,  and  a  hun- 
dred other  proofs  in  our  peaceful  southern  camps 
were  sufficient  (Plate  6). 

Our  militia  and  volunteers  were  not,  are  not, 
cowards.  They  are  brave  men,  but  not  soldiers. 

Says  Upton,  referring  to  a  defeat  of  raw  troops: 

The  disaster  that  ensued  demands  that  the  causes  leading  to 
it  be  carefully  considered.  First  among  them  was  the  popu- 
lar but  mistaken  belief  that  because  our  citizens  individually 
possess  courage,  fortitude,  and  self-reliance,  they  must  nee- 


SHOWING  THE  NUMBER  OF  TROOPS  WHICH 
INEFFICIENCY  COMPELLED  THE  U.  S.  TO  USE 
IN  VARIOUS  WARS,  ALSO  NUMBER  OF  TROOPS 
USED  BY  ENEMY. 

AN  EXPLANATION  OF  OUR  PENSION  EXPENSES. 


American — 395, 858 
British— 150,000 


REVOLUTION 


American — 527, 652 
British— 55,000 


WAR  OF  1812 


P 


American — 44, 521 
Creek — 2,000 


CREEK 


P 

r 


American — 68, 784 
Indians— 2,000 


American — 104, 556 
Mexican— 46,000 


FLORIDA 


MEXICAN 


Union— 2, 672, 341 


CIVIL 


Confederate— 1,000,000 


American — 281,503 
Spanish— 200,000 


SPANISH 


PLATE    NO.  6 


Our  Military  History  155 

essarily  possess  the  same  qualities  when  aggregated  as  soldiers. 
And  next  to  this  error  was  the  fatal  delusion,  that  an  army 
animated  by  patriotism  needed  neither  instruction  nor  dis- 
cipline to  prepare  it  for  battle. 

The  fallacy  of  a  system  depending  upon  raw 
troops  is  attested  by  soldiers,  of  all  time,  too  great 
and  too  noble  to  permit  us  to  disregard  their  warn- 
ings. Washington,  Taylor,  Scott,  Grant,  Sherman, 
and  the  leading  officers  of  today  all  agree  on  this 
point. 

Washington,  summing  up  the  campaign  of  1780, 
expressed  his  views  in  a  manner  that,  should  every 
American  read  them,  would  be  of  great  benefit  to 
our  country : 

Had  we  formed  a  permanent  army  in  the  beginning,  which, 
by  the  continuance  of  the  same  men  in  service,  had  been 
capable  of  discipline,  we  never  should  have  had  to  retreat 
with  a  handful  of  men  across  the  Delaware  in  1776,  trem- 
bling for  the  fate  of  America,  which  nothing  but  the  infatua- 
tion of  the  enemy  could  have  saved ;  we  should  not  have 
remained  all  the  succeeding  winter  at  their  mercy,  with  some- 
times scarcely  a  sufficient  body  of  men  to  mount  the  ordi- 
nary guards,  liable  at  every  moment  to  be  dissipated,  if  they 
had  only  thought  proper  to  march  against  us;  we  should  not 
have  been  under  the  necessity  of  fighting  Brandywine,  with 
an  unequal  number  of  raw  troops,  and  afterwards  of  seeing 
Philadelphia  fall  a  prey  to  a  victorious  army;  we  should  not 
have  been  at  Valley  Forge  with  less  than  half  the  force  of 
the  enemy,  destitute  of  everything,  in  a  situation  neither  to 


156  Peace  Insurance 

resist  nor  to  retire;  we  should  not  have  seen  New  York  left 
with  a  handful  of  men,  yet  an  overmatch  for  the  main  army 
of  these  States,  while  the  principal  part  of  their  force  was 
detached  for  the  reduction  of  two  of  them;  we  should  not 
have  found  ourselves  this  spring  so  weak  as  to  be  insulted  by 
5,000  men,  unable  to  protect  our  baggage  and  magazines, 
their  security  depending  on  a  good  countenance  and  a  want 
of  enterprise  in  the  enemy,  indebted  for  our  safety  to  their 
inactivity,  enduring  frequently  the  mortification  of  seeing 
inviting  opportunities  to  ruin  them  pass  unimproved  for  want 
of  a  force  which  the  country  was  completely  able  to  afford, 
and  of  seeing  the  country  ravaged,  our  towns  burnt,  the 
inhabitants  plundered,  abused,  murdered,  with  impunity 
from  the  same  cause. 

Nor  have  the  ill  effects  been  confined  to  the  military  line. 
A  great  part  of  the  embarrassments  in  the  civil  departments 
flow  from  the  same  source.  The  derangement  of  our  finances 
is  essentially  to  be  ascribed  to  it. 

Nor  is  the  cost  in  money,  or  the  cost  to  the  nation 
all  that  is  to  be  considered.  A  moral  question  enters 
strongly.  In  civil  life  we  recognize  criminal  negli- 
gence clearly  as  both  a  moral  and  a  legal  offense. 
The  motorman  who  runs  down  a  child,  the  chauffeur 
who  kills  a  pedestrian,  and  other  men  who,  failing 
to  take  proper  precaution,  cause  death,  are  not 
infrequently  convicted  of  manslaughter  and  sen- 
tenced to  long  terms  in  prison.  Our  legal  system 
clearly  recognizes  the  guilt  of  those  who  know  of 
crime  before  the  act  is  committed  and  aid  or  fail  to 
attempt  to  prevent  it.  Thus  those  responsible 


Our  Military  History  157 

for  the  needless  deaths  among  untrained  troops  are 
morally  guilty  of  murder.  Homer  Lea  dramatically 
expresses  this  view  when  he  says: 

In  civil  life  a  butcher  is  not  called  upon  to  exercise  the 
skill  of  an  oculist  nor  to  remove  a  cataract  from  the  dulled 
eye;  barbers  do  not  perform  the  operation  of  laparotomy; 
nor  farmers  navigate  sea-going  vessels,  nor  stone-masons  try 
cases  at  the  bar,  nor  sailors  determine  the  value  of  mines, 
nor  clerks  perform  the  functions  of  civil-engineers.  Yet,  in 
the  time  of  war  in  this  Republic,  these  same  men,  together 
with  all  other  varieties  of  humanity,  go  forth  in  the  capacity 
of  volunteer  officers  to  be  learned  by  the  end  of  one-and- 
thirty  days  in  the  most  varied  of  all  sciences,  the  science 
of  war. 

The  most  promiscuous  murderer  in  the  world  is  an  ig- 
norant military  officer.  He  slaughters  his  men  by  bullets,  by 
disease,  by  neglect;  he  starves  them,  he  makes  cowards  of 
them  and  deserters  and  criminals.  The  dead  are  hecatombs 
of  his  ignorance;  the  survivors,  melancholy  specters  of  his 
incompetence.* 

More  correctly  does  the  celebrated  "  Light  Horse 
Harry  "  Lee  of  cavalry  fame  in  the  Revolution  place 
the  blame  when  he  rebukes  not  the  green  officer, 
serving  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  but  the  government 
which  sends  him,  saying: 

Convinced  as  I  am  that  a  government  is  the  murderer  of 
its  citizens  which  sends  them  to  the  field  uninformed  and 
untaught,  where  they  are  to  meet  men  of  the  same  age  and 
strength,  mechanized  by  education  and  discipline  for  battle, 

*  The  Valor  of  Ignorance. 


158  Peace  Insurance 

I  cannot  withhold  my  denunciation  of  its  wickedness  and 
folly. 

All  of  which  we  respectfully  modify,  for  it  is  the 
pacifist,  the  anti-militarist,  the  politician,  the  clergy- 
man, the  magazine  writer,  the  editor,  and  similar 
men  of  prominence  and  position,  who,  without  the 
slightest  knowledge  of  the  facts,  without  study,  and 
perhaps  without  thought,  are  accessories  before  the 
fact  —  nay  the  instigators  —  of  the  wholesale  mur- 
ders which  will  occur  in  our  next  great  war,  if  we 
rely  on  untrained  troops.  It  is  these  men  whose  utter- 
ances and  writings  sway  popular  opinion.  It  is 
popular  opinion  which  in  turn  sways  the  government 
to  the  detriment  of  a  sane  military  policy.  It  is  to 
be  hoped  that  these  men  may  be  persuaded  some  day 
to  reflect  as  to  their  responsibility,  to  study  the  facts, 
and  then  to  spread  broadcast  their  conclusions. 
There  is  no  doubt  of  their  change  of  mind  under 
such  conditions  of  fair  investigation.  In  the  mean- 
time we  can  but  hope  that  now,  as  in  the  past,  "  God 
takes  care  of  babes,  fools,  and  the  United  States." 


CHAPTER  XI 

ECONOMY  OF  THE  RECOMMENDATIONS  OF  THE 
GENERAL  STAFF 

'""pHE  great  objection  to  the  so-called  militarist's 
-*-  ideas  which  many  persons  —  otherwise  unde- 
cided in  their  attitude  —  put  forth  is  due  to  the  fact 
that,  as  the  military  experts  state  we  are  now  utterly 
unprepared  for  war,  it  will  be  necessary  not  only  to 
continue  to  spend  the  present  amounts  of  money,  but 
also  to  increase  our  national  defense  expenditures 
manyfold.  This  idea,  of  course,  is  carefully  nour- 
ished by  the  anti-militarists  until  the  military  authori- 
ties' requests  grow,  by  exaggeration,  out  of  all  pro- 
portion to  the  truthful  needs  of  the  nation.  Further- 
more, one  of  the  objections  made  by  pacifists  and 
others  to  the  writings  of  military  authors  lies  in  the 
fact  that,  while  they  expose  the  weakness  of  our 
present  system,  no  adequate,  and  at  the  same  time, 
reasonable,  remedy  is  suggested. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  will  undertake  to 
demonstrate  that  the  requests  of  the  military  authori- 
ties are  reasonable,  will  not  entail  tremendous  ex- 
pense, and  yet  will  place  the  United  States  on  a  firm 
military  basis.  In  doing  this,  we  are  considering 

i59 


160  Peace  Insurance 

the  decisions  of  the  best  military  authorities  of  the 
United  States  Army. 

These  authorities,  and  in  fact  all  military  officers, 
are  a  unit  in  stating  that  the  United  States  is  utterly 
unprepared  for  war.  They  echo  the  solemn  warn- 
ings of  the  great  soldiers  and  statesmen  of  the  past, 
and  point  out  that  we  may  not  always  be  fortunate 
enough  to  engage  a  first-class  nation  in  war  while  it 
is  occupied  with  other  enemies,  elsewhere,  and  that 
some  day,  as  has  never  been  the  case  in  the  past,  we 
may  find  ourselves  in  a  struggle  against  one  of  the 
great  powers  which  is  adequately  prepared  for  war, 
and  which  is  giving  its  full  attention  to  defeating  the 
military  forces  of  the  United  States.  Such  a  contest, 
we  are  warned,  would  probably  mean  defeat  for  this 
country.  Nor  is  it  only  American  officers,  or  others 
who  are  open  to  the  charge  of  prejudice,  who  utter 
these  warnings.  Foreign  officers,  pacifists,  and  all 
who  have  studied  the  facts  agree  in  this  respect. 
The  German  General  Staff  has  made  an  official  state- 
ment to  the  effect  that  it  could  place  200,000  men 
around  New  York  City  within  ten  days.  English 
military  officers  have  openly  expressed  their  belief 
that  the  United  States  will  be  defeated  in  its  next 
great  war;  and  the  pacifist,  General  Chittenden,  de- 
votes a  large  portion  of  his  book  to  a  warning  of  the 
inadequacy  of  the  military  system  of  the  United 
States.  Angell,  in  his  pacifist  book,  The  Great  Illu- 
sionf  is  strongly  and  plainly  in  favor  of  adequate 


Recommendations  of  General  Staff        161 

military  strength  for  his  own  nation,  as  has  been 
shown  in  our  previous  quotations  from  that  work. 

In  an  attempt  to  present  these  matters  in  a  man- 
ner readily  comprehended  by  the  average  civilian, 
there  are  numerous  difficulties  and  it  is,  therefore, 
possibly  advisable  first  to  invite  attention  to  some 
important  facts  relating  to  the  determining  factors 
in  any  attempt  of  either  European  or  Asiatic  pow- 
ers to  invade  the  United  States,  as  well  as  to  attack 
our  colonial  possessions. 

To  insure  the  successful  operation  of  an  invading 
army,  an  enemy  must  control  the  sea.  This,  how- 
ever, does  not  necessarily  mean  that  it  must  first 
defeat  its  opponent's  fleet;  what  it  does  mean  is  that 
it  must  have  a  strategic  advantage  which  will  insure 
the  safe  movement  of  troops  in  transports.  For  in- 
stance, we  had  not  defeated  the  Spanish  fleet  at  the 
time  that  Shafter's  expedition  sailed  for  Cuba,  but 
we  had  located  it,  and  so  placed  our  own  fleet  that 
it  was  extremely  improbable  that  the  Spaniards  could 
secure  the  necessary  freedom  to  damage  or  annoy 
our  convoy.  Again,  should  our  navy  ever  be  on  one 
ocean  and  the  enemy  in  the  other,  it  is  not  impossible 
that  they  could  prevent  our  passage  through  the 
Canal  or  around  the  Horn,  and  in  that  manner  retain 
control  of  the  ocean;  also  political  pressure  or  mis- 
taken statesmanship  might  cause  a  disposition  of 
our  navy  that  would  be  strategically  fatal ;  the  mighty 
elements  might  disable  our  fleet  and  be  more  kind 


1 62  Peace  Insurance 


to  our  opponents;  and,  furthermore,  should  the  har- 
bors used  as  naval  bases  be  suddenly  captured  by  an 
enemy,  the  navy  would  be  helpless  —  for  without 
a  base  no  navy  can  operate.  In  the  present-day  im- 
possibility of  forecasting  just  when  a  nation  will 
strike,  this  is  not  at  all  an  impossible  situation  for 
an  unprepared  nation.  Finally,  as  two  nations,  Eng- 
land and  Germany,  already  have  navies  superior  to 
our  entire  naval  force,  with  France,  Japan,  and 
Russia  pushing  us  so  hard  that  without  a  change  in 
our  program,  we  will  soon  fall  to  fifth  or  sixth  place, 
it  becomes  evident  that,  in  a  war  with  a  first-class 
power,  the  United  States  cannot  rely  on  control  of 
the  sea,  nor,  for  that  matter,  can  any  nation  do  so,  so 
perverse  is  the  fortune  of  war. 

The  recent  report  of  the  General  Staff,  United 
States  Army,  on  the  organization  of  the  land  forces 
of  the  United  States,  opens  with  the  following  state- 
ment: 

A  general  consideration  of  our  responsibilities  and  our 
geographical  position  indicates  that  the  maintenance  of  our 
policies  and  interests  at  home  and  abroad  demand  an  adequate 
fleet  and  a  well-organized  and  sufficient  army.  The  func- 
tion of  the  navy  is  to  secure  and  maintain  the  command  of 
the  sea.  To  accomplish  this  it  must  be  free  to  seek  and 
defeat  the  enemy.  The  use  of  any  part  of  the  fleet  for  local 
defense,  therefore,  defeats  the  chief  object  of  naval  power. 
The  principal  role  of  the  navy  is  offensive,  and  the  require- 
ments of  local  defense  must  be  met  by  other  means.  A  fleet 


Recommendations  of  General  Staff        163 

unsupported  by  an  army  is  unable  to  secure  the  fruits  of 
naval  victory;  a  fleet  defeated  at  sea  is  powerless  to  prevent 
invasion.  "The  solution  of  the  problem  of  national  defense 
lies,  therefore,  in  the  provision  of  suitable  land  and  sea  forces 
and  a  due  recognition  of  their  coordinate  relations. 

After  the  navy,  the  next  resource  of  any  nation 
is  assumed  to  be  its  coast-defense  fortifications.  To 
the  average  citizen  these  are  indeed  invincible,  and 
to  a  certain  extent  that  may  be  so.  It  has  been  ques- 
tioned if  the  combined  navies  of  the  world  could 
reduce  the  defenses  of  New  York  harbor  and  sail 
into  the  Hudson  River  —  and  it  is  certain  that  it 
will  not  ever  be  attempted,  at  least  not  while  the  open 
"  back  door  "  invites  a  comparatively  small  landing 
party  to  take  these  defenses  from  the  rear,  with  little 
or  no  loss. 

The  defenses  of  New  York,  like  all  other  modern 
seacoast  defenses,  are  constructed  upon  the  plan  that 
they  are  for  defense  against  attack  from  the  sea 
alone  —  and  that  their  rear  and  flanks  will  be  pro- 
tected by  troops  of,  or  detached  from,  the  mobile 
army;  or  in  other  words,  by  infantry  and  certain 
of  the  auxiliary  troops.  Unless  so  protected,  these 
forts  are  helpless  to  protect  the  cities  or  harbors 
which  they  defend.  In  many  cases  the  large  guns 
cannot  be  brought  to  bear  on  certain  places  open 
for  land  attack.  When  they  can  they  are  ineffective, 
not  being  designed  for  that  purpose. 

Furthermore,   these   fortified  harbors   represent 


164  Peace  Insurance 


only  a  small  proportion  of  the  number  of  places  on 
our  various  seacoasts  at  which  an  enemy  could  land. 
Not  only  are  there  numerous  unprotected,  if  less 
important,  harbors  which  afford  suitable  landing 
places,  but  there  are  miles  of  coast  upon  which  a 
landing  can  be  made,  as  was  done  by  our  troops 
when  they  landed  from  the  open  sea  for  the  cam- 
paign of  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

Secretary  of  War  Stimson,  in  his  special  report  to 
Congress  in  December,  1910  —  a  document  since 
known  as  the  "  suppressed  report  "  because  Con- 
gress refused  to  receive  such  a  "  horrible  "  state- 
ment of  truth  —  indicated  that  there  were  several 
nations  that  might  be  expected  to  bring  a  force  of 
from  100,000  to  200,000  men  against  the  United 
States  in  a  space  of  time  varying  from  ten  to  thirty 
days,  adding: 

This  country  cannot,  so  far  as  land  forces  are  concerned, 
be  considered  in  readiness  for  defense  or  to  repel  invasion  by 
any  first-class  power  having  the  navy  to  protect  and  the  ship- 
ping to  transport  her  armed  forces  over  the  sea. 

Such  forces  would  have  the  choice  of  a  number 
of  points  of  landing  whether  on  the  Atlantic,  the 
Gulf,  or  the  Pacific  coasts.  As  it  could  not  be  fore- 
seen just  where  they  would  land,  we  should  have  to 
be  prepared  to  defend  a  number  of  points  at  the 
same  time.  With  this  in  view  and  acting  on  the 
assumption  that  it  is  likely  that  but  one  of  our  sea- 


Recommendations  of  General  Staff        165 

coasts  would  be  threatened  at  any  given  time,  the 
General  Staff  has  estimated  that  at  least  460,000 
mobile  troops  (infantry,  cavalry,  field  artillery, 
etc.),  and  no  less  than  52,000  coast  artillery  are  ab- 
solutely necessary.  This  is  for  the  United  States 
alone.  For  the  Panama  Canal,  Hawaii,  the  Philip- 
pines, etc.,  it  is  estimated  that  about  50,000  troops 
are  required.  Our  total  requirements,  if  we  are  to 
be  prepared  for  war  with  any  first-class  power,  is, 
therefore,  at  least  550,000  men. 

To  meet  these  needs,  we  have  available  the  regu- 
lar army  and  the  organized  militia,  or  National 
Guard.  The  Guard,  by  the  way,  though  by  no 
means  an  efficient  body  of  troops,  is  a  very  different 
force  from  the  militia  of  Washington's  time,  the 
latter  resembling  more  closely  the  unorganized 
militia  of  today.  For  this  reason  what  we  have 
said  about  "  militia  "  and  "  raw  troops  "  does  not 
fully  apply  to  the  National  Guard;  at  least  not  to 
the  extent  that  it  did  in  the  past.  The  comments 
of  our  experts  did  not  mean  that  citizen  soldiers 
could  not  become  efficient  under  proper  conditions. 
Some  of  these  conditions  have  already  been  granted 
the  Guard  and  caused  some  decided  improvement. 
Ultimately  it  is  hoped  conditions  will  permit  a  really 
efficient  citizen  soldiery. 

The  Regular  Army  of  the  United  States  consists 
of  about  80,000  men,  of  whom  not  more  than 
64,000  may  actually  be  included  in  the  fighting  force 


1 66  Peace  Insurance 

and  which  number  of  effectives  probably  would  be 
still  further  reduced  in  case  of  war.  Of  the  mobile 
troops,  not  over  32,500  are  in  the  territorial  limits 
of  the  United  States  and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  this 
number  will  be  shortly  reduced.  The  National 
Guard  consists  of  about  120,000  men,  of  which  it 
has  been  estimated  not  over  86,200  are  effective. 
It  is  believed  that  the  most  advanced  thought  on 
the  subject  gives  the  National  Guard  a  place  in  the 
first  line,  even  though  it  be,  at  present,  but  illy  pre- 
pared for  such  responsibility,  and  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  it  is  not  unlikely  that  in  most  cases  regular 
forces  would  take  the  field  somewhat  in  advance  of 
the  Guardsmen.  Even  at  full  war  strength,  unless 
increased  beyond  what  now  seems  to  be  reasonable 
hope,  the  Regular  Army  would  be  totally  inadequate 
as  a  first  line.  We  are,  therefore,  compelled  to  give 
the  National  Guard,  or  some  similar  force  of  citizen 
soldiery,  the  place  in  the  first  line  that  the  Guard 
is  so  anxious  to  occupy,  even  though,  in  doing  so, 
we  anticipate  the  state  of  efficiency  toward  which  the 
citizen  soldier  is  struggling.  Thus,  by  including  the 
Guard,  we  may  roughly  estimate  our  first  line  at 
150,000  effectives,  of  which  only  about  114,500  are 
effective  mobile  troops  in  the  United  States. 

Hence  it  will  be  seen  that  there  is  a  deficiency  of 
at  least  400,000  troops,  or  five  times  the  present  size 
of  the  Regular  Army,  and  almost  three  times  the  size 
of  the  combined  Army  and  National  Guard. 


Recommendations  of  General  Staff        167 

"  This  is  the  minimum  number  of  first  line  troops 
necessary;  and  to  augment  this  force  and  replace  its 
losses,  we  should  have  plans  made  for  raising  imme- 
diately an  additional  force  of  300,000  men,"  says 
the  General  Staff. 

It  is  these  figures,  at  first  sight  rather  startling, 
from  which  some  pacifists  and  the  anti-militarists 
derive  their  conclusions  that  the  military  authorities 
are  demanding  additional  expenditures  which,  for 
the  army  above  recommended,  would  be  five  times 
the  present  army  appropriation,  or  about  $475,- 
000,000  annually.  It  is  from  these  figures  that  such 
men  claim  that  the  military  authorities  are  urging 
a  huge  standing  army.  In  this  manner  the  anti- 
militarist  enlists  the  support  of  both  the  "  cash  con- 
servator," and  those  who  fear  the  menace  of  large 
standing  armies.  When,  however,  one  goes  more 
carefully  into  the  details  of  the  army  authorities' 
scheme,  it  is  found  that  they  ask  neither  greatly  in- 
creased expenditures  nor  a  large  Regular  Army. 
Such  a  study  discloses  the  fact  that  the  additional 
troops  are  to  be  secured,  first,  through  a  slightly  in- 
creased Regular  Army  sufficient  for  peace  duties  in 
the  United  States  and  to  garrison  our  colonial  posses- 
sions; second,  by  an  improved  citizen  soldiery;  and 
third,  by  a  system  of  reserves  for  both  the  regular 
and  the  citizen  soldier  forces.  These  facts  throw 
an  entirely  different  light  on  the  matter.  We  find 
that  the  regular  force  is  to  be  but  slightly  increased 


1 68  Peace  Insurance 


at  a  minimum  of  additional  cost;  we  find  instead  of 
a  large  standing  army  it  is  a  citizen  soldiery  that  is 
requested  —  men  who  perform  all  the  duties  of  citi- 
zens, who  are  civilians  about  ninety-five-hundredths 
of  the  time,  and  soldiers  the  other  one-twentieth, 
and  who  receive  little  or  no  pay  for  their  serv- 
ices; and  we  find  that  a  great  part  of  both  of  these 
forces  is  to  be  permitted  to  return  to  the  reserve 
when  they  can  devote  all  their  time  to  civil  duties, 
only  holding  themselves  in  readiness  to  respond  to 
a  call  when  needed.  Thus  it  is  that  the  plan  calls 
for  efficiency,  for  organization,  and  for  an  available 
supply  of  trained  soldiers  without  any  material  in- 
crease in  our  present  organization. 

Considering  these  changes  in  order,  we  find  that 
the  regular  army  at  present  is  composed  of  thirty 
regiments  of  infantry,  fifteen  regiments  of  cavalry, 
five  regiments  of  field  and  mountain  artillery,  one 
regiment  of  horse  artillery,  twelve  companies  of 
engineers,  nine  companies  of  signal  corps,  four  field 
hospitals,  four  ambulance  companies,  and  one  hun- 
dred and  seventy  companies  of  coast  artillery.  Of 
these,  the  Philippines,  Oahu,  Alaska,  Panama,  and 
Porto  Rico  require  for  their  defense  fourteen  regi- 
ments of  infantry,  three  and  one-third  regiments  of 
cavalry,  three  regiments  of  field  artillery,  four  com- 
panies of  engineers,  six  companies  of  the  signal 
corps,  three  field  hospitals,  three  ambulance  com- 
panies, and  fifty-two  companies  of  coast  artillery. 


0) 


1  z 

8  Q 


N 

Z 
< 

o 
o: 

o 


o 

z 

UJ 

< 

DL 


Recommendations  of  General  Staff        169 

This  leaves  only  sixteen  regiments  of  infantry,  eleven 
regiments  of  cavalry,  two  regiments  of  field  and 
mountain  artillery,  one  regiment  of  heavy  artillery, 
eight  companies  of  engineers,  six  companies  of  the 
signal  corps,  one  field  hospital,  one  ambulance  com- 
pany, and  one  hundred  and  eighteen  companies  of 
coast  artillery  in  the  United  States  (Plate  7). 

For  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  troops  in  the 
United  States  proper  to  a  force  which  would  be 
capable  of  defending  it  when  supported  by  citizen 
soldiers,  the  General  Staff  asks  for  an  increase  of 
about  fourteen  regiments  of  infantry,  five  regiments 
of  field  artillery,  one  regiment  of  heavy  artillery,  one 
field  company  of  the  signal  corps,  two  companies  of 
engineers,  eight  field  hospitals,  and  eight  ambulance 
companies.  This  total  increase  in  the  regular  estab- 
lishment at  the  low  peace  strength  at  which  they 
would  be  carried  (except  in  our  colonies  where  war 
strength  would  be  maintained)  would  amount  to 
about  25,000  or  30,000  men,  and  would  bring  our 
army  up  to  a  strength  of  105,000  to  120,000  all 
told.  To  make  these  requirements  moderate,  this 
has  been  divided  into  five  increments,  it  being  clearly 
pointed  out  to  Congress  just  what  additions  should 
be  made  in  each  of  the  five  times  that  that  body  is 
requested  to  increase  the  army. 

At  the  estimated  average  cost  of  $800  per  man, 
this  increase  would  cost  $20,000,000  per  year.  In 
making  this  request,  however,  the  General  Staff  points 


170  Peace  Insurance 


out  that  by  abandoning  certain  useless  army  posts 
which  were  formerly  maintained  for  defense  against 
the  Indians  and  which  are  now  retained  merely  to 
satisfy  certain  politicians,  we  could  save  $5,500,000 
per  year.  Thus  the  total  additional  expense  at  such 
date  in  the  future  after  all  five  increments  had  been 
made  would  be  about  $14,500,000  annually. 

As  a  comparison  for  the  sake  of  those  who  heed 
the  anti-militarist's  claim  that  100,000  to  125,000 
is  an  excessive  standing  army,  we  may  state  that  the 
regular  standing  army  of  Russia  is  1,200,000,  that 
of  Germany,  634,000,  that  of  France,  634,000,  that 
of  Austria-Hungary,  327,000,  that  of  Italy,  288,000, 
and  that  of  England,  255,000,  which  makes  the  Gen- 
eral Staff's  request  for  a  total  of  a  little  over  100,- 
ooo  men  seem  very  moderate  (Plate  8).* 

Estimating  that  this  force  of  regulars,  including 
the  coast  artillery,  when  at  war  strength,  will  pro- 
vide about  200,000  of  the  550,000  troops  which  are 
needed  in  the  United  States,  the  General  Staff  shows 
that  there  would  be  left  about  350,000  to  be  fur- 
nished by  the  citizen  soldiery.  As  has  been  pointed 
out  by  all  military  authorities,  the  fact  that  the  Na- 
tional Guard  consists  of  some  fifty  small  military 
forces,  only  partially  controlled  by  the  Government, 
and  subject  to  the  whims  of  a  half-hundred  Govern- 

*The  latest  reports  of  the  General  Staff  give  Russia  1,280,000, 
Germany  800,000,  France  727,000,  Italy  258,000,  Austria  472,000. 
England's  figures  as  given  here  include  colonial  troops. 


STANDING   ARMIES  OF  THE 
LEADING  NATIONS 

Peace  Strength 

Russia— 1,200,000  * 


Germany — 634,000 


France— 694,000 


Austria-Hungary — 327, 000 


Italy— 288,000 
England— 255, 000 


Japan— 230,000 


U.  S.-81,000 


Russia's  Great  and  Turbulent  Territory  Greatly 
Lessens  the  Number  Available  for  War. 


PLATE    NO.   8 


Recommendations  of  General  Staff        171 

ors,  legislators,  and  Adjutants-General,  presents  a 
serious  difficulty.  Upton,  in  his  Military  Policy  of 
the  United  States,  gives  as  the  third  lesson  of  the 
Revolution: 

That  in  proportion  as  the  general  government  gives  the 
states  authority  to  arm  and  equip  troops,  it  lessens  the  mili- 
tary strength  of  the  whole  people  and  correspondingly  in- 
creases the  national  expenditures. 

The  General  Staff  of  the  United  States  Army,  in 
its  report  of  1912,  says: 

Our  traditional  theory  of  a  small  Regular  Army  and  a 
great  war  army  of  citizen  soldiers  is  not  yet  embodied  as  a 
definite  institution.  The  mobilization  of  our  citizen  soldiery 
today  would  not  result  in  a  well-knit  national  army.  It 
would  be  an  uncoordinated  army  of  fifty  allies,  with  all  of 
the  inherent  weaknesses  of  allied  forces,  emphasized  by  the 
unusual  number  of  the  allies. 

The  National  Guard  as  it  exists  is  a  very  poorly 
balanced  force.  There  is  infantry  for  sixteen  divi- 
sions, cavalry  for  six  divisions,  artillery  for  three 
divisions,  and  practically  no  sanitary  troops.  An 
army  of  this  kind  would  be  seriously  handicapped, 
and  this  is  thoroughly  realized  by  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment. Owing,  however,  to  the  control  of  the 
National  Guard  by  the  various  states,  the  War 
Department  is  powerless  to  secure  a  proper  propor- 
tion of  the  various  arms.  Similarly,  the  troops  of 
the  different  states,  varying  in  size  from  a  division 


172  Peace  Insurance 


to  a  depleted  battalion,  differ  equally  in  efficiency, 
and  it  is  feared  that  the  efficiency  of  the  National 
Guard  will  always  vary  inversely  as  to  the  amount 
of  state  control. 

It  is  for  these  reasons  that  all  officers,  from  a 
military  viewpoint  alone,  consider  Federal  control 
as  essential.  When  certain  political  factors  are  con- 
sidered, such  a  Federal  force,  though  it  becomes  no 
less  desirable,  appears  to  have  many  obstacles  in 
its  path.  National  Guardsmen  are  in  favor  of  Fed- 
eral control,  but  politicians  in  the  various  states 
would  probably  oppose  the  relinquishing  of  author- 
ity over  the  state  troops,  as  would  the  few,  but 
powerful,  Guardsmen  who  are  in  the  service  for 
parades  and  receptions  alone.  Therefore,  though 
Congress  has  the  power  to  provide  for  a  Federal 
citizen  soldiery,  the  General  Staff  recommends,  as 
an  immediate  step,  but  partial  Federal  control,  Fed- 
eral pay,  Federal  assistance  to  secure  more  field 
artillery,  cavalry,  etc.,  and  the  more  definite  organi- 
zation of  the  National  Guard  in  tactical  divisions. 
On  paper,  this  divisional  organization  is  already 
fully  planned,  but  the  shortage  of  auxiliary  troops, 
and  the  sub-division  into  states,  makes  these  divi- 
sions thus  far  only  a  paper  force. 

Captain  William  Mitchell,  of  the  General  Staff, 
U.  S.  A.,  however,  has  come  out  definitely  with  a 
suggestion  for  a  Federal  citizen  soldiery.  His  idea 
appears  to  be  practical,  desirable,  and  economical, 


Recommendations  of  General  Staff        173 

and  is  one  that  will  surely  meet  with  approval  among 
National  Guardsmen.  Furthermore,  Captain  Mit- 
chell's theories  are  in  harmony  with  the  report  of 
the  General  Staff  Corps  on  the  organization  of  our 
land  forces,  being  an  effective  second  step  to  the  sug- 
gestions outlined  therein. 

Captain  Mitchell  believes  that  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment should  take  over  the  National  Guard,  and, 
resurrecting  the  famous  and  honored  old  Revolu- 
tionary term,  name  it  the  "  Continental  Army  of  the 
United  States."  This  would  be  accomplished  by 
taking  advantage  of  the  constitutional  provision 
allowing  the  Federal  government  to  "  raise  and  sup- 
port "  armies  and  passing  a  Federal  law  authorizing 
the  enlistment  and  organization  of  the  Continental 
Army,  permitting  the  present  National  Guard  as 
organizations  to  enlist  therein,  wherever  the  state 
authorities  would  grant  such  permission.  This  force 
would  then  be  organized  in  divisions  by  providing  for 
the  present  shortage  of  cavalry,  field  artillery,  and 
other  auxiliary  troops.  In  this  manner,  the  National 
Government  could  secure  a  well-balanced  force,  and 
could  make  provisions  for  uniform  training  and 
standards  of  requirements  for  officers  and  men. 
The  present  lack  of  uniformity  and  efficiency  would 
be  eliminated.  For  local  disorders,  such  as  strike 
duty  (which  is  a  duty  most  distasteful  to  the  Na- 
tional Guard)  the  bill  provides  that  if  other  forces 
at  the  Governor's  command  could  not  maintain 


174  Peace  Insurance 

order,  the  state  executive  could  draw  upon  the  Con- 
tinental Army  troops  within  his  state.  This  would 
permit  the  entire  elimination  of  any  organized 
militia  in  all  states  which  so  desired  it.  Captain 
Mitchell  offers  a  draft  of  a  bill  that,  he  believes, 
would  bring  about  these  ends. 

Should  we  supply  the  350,000  citizen  soldiers, 
desired  by  the  General  Staff,  the  Continental  Army 
at  peace  strength  would  have  to  number  about  192,- 
ooo  men.  Such  a  force,  at  the  rate  of  pay  proposed 
for  the  present  National  Guard,  and  wisely  using  the 
present  $10,000,000  now  appropriated  by  state  and 
nation  for  the  Guardsmen,  would  cost  about  $42,- 
000,000  annually. 

Providing,  however,  that  we  secure  the  suggested 
105,000  or  thereabouts  in  the  Regular  Army  and 
192,000  Continental  Army,  or  citizen  soldiers,  we 
would  have  a  total  of  only  297,000  men  out  of  the 
550,000  men  deemed  necessary.  Thus  leaving 
about  255,000  men  still  to  be  provided  for. 

These,  the  General  Staff  recommends,  should  be 
provided  for  by  reservists.  At  present  there  is  a 
small,  but  poorly  organized  regular  army  reserve, 
serving  without  pay  and,  as  yet,  of  little  or  no  con- 
sequence. Under  the  proposed  reserve  system, 
every  man  in  the  Regular  or  Continental  Army 
would  enlist  for  a  certain  period  of  actual  training 
with  troops  (color  service).  The  balance  of  the 
time  would  be  served  as  reservists,  the  men  going 


Recommendations  of  General  Staff        175 

about  their  civil  occupations,  but  holding  themselves 
in  readiness  to  bring  their  organizations  from  peace 
to  war  strength  in  case  of  necessity.  Should  this 
reserve  receive  no  pay,  it  would  cost  practically 
nothing;  should  it  be  paid  a  small  amount,  say  one- 
third  that  of  the  Continental  Army's  pay,  it  would 
cost  $12,500,000. 

Even  with  pay,  however,  a  reserve  is  an  economy 
and  a  necessity.  The  organizations  at  peace 
strength  number  less  than  half  of  the  proper  war 
strength  necessary  for  efficiency.  Should  we  fill 
them  to  a  war  footing  by  enlisting  untrained  men 
our  existing  forces  would  be  badly  demoralized,  and 
much  of  the  value  secured  by  previous  expenditures 
on,  and  training  of,  our  land  forces  would  be  lost. 
On  the  other  hand,  should  we  fail  to  bring  the  peace 
organizations  up  to  war  strength,  not  only  would 
our  first  line  be  deficient  in  numbers  but  the  units 
would  be  of  a  size  that  is  both  tactically  absurd  and 
ruinously  expensive.  In  the  Spanish  War  our  regi- 
ments had  no  reserve  with  which  to  pass  from  a 
peace  to  a  war  footing,  and  no  reserve  to  maintain 
the  initial  strength  in  the  field  by  offsetting  the  losses 
due  to  sickness,  battle,  and  desertion.  Referring  to 
statistics  which  have  been  most  carefully  compiled 
by  Hon.  John  Q.  Tilson,  Member  of  Congress  from 
Connecticut,  it  will  be  seen  that  400,000  infantry 
maintained  as  war  strength  organizations  by  use  of 
a  reserve  would  cost  one  hundred  and  sixty-nine 


176  Peace  Insurance 

million,  six  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand,  nine 
hundred  and  twenty  dollars  less  per  year  than  would 
the  same  number  of  men  maintained  in  regiments 
of  the  strength  to  which  our  lack  of  a  reserve 
reduced  us  in  1898.  As  we  might  be  called  upon  to 
put  1,200,000  or  more  men  in  the  field  in  any  serious 
war  with  a  first-class  power,  it  will  be  seen  that  for 
each  year  of  such  a  war  an  adequate  reserve  would 
save  an  amount  sufficient  to  pay  the  reserve  for 
forty-five  years.  It  is  thus  that  a  reserve  is  not  only 
a  necessity  but  an  economy.  In  this  manner  would 
we  raise  the  balance  of  the  550,000  men  necessary 
for  the  first  defense  of  the  United  States  in  any 
great  war. 

Finally,  the  300,000  additional  men  which  the 
General  Staff  states  we  should  be  prepared  immedi- 
ately to  raise  for  the  support  of  our  other  troops,  we 
could  secure  through  volunteers  —  which  form  of 
troops  cost  nothing  until  the  time  of  need  arrives. 
These  soldiers,  not  being  needed  at  first,  could  be 
trained  and  equipped  before  being  called  upon. 

The  total  increase  of  expenditures  provided  above 
amounts  to  $47,000,000  annually,  and  this,  of 
course,  according  to  the  anti-militarist,  is  a  tremen- 
dous sum.  However,  as  we  have  previously  stated, 
it  should  be  compared  not  with  one's  own  income, 
but  with  the  other  far  greater  expenditures  of  our 
government  (Plate  9). 

Furthermore,  it  should  be  considered  that  spend- 


THE  RECOMMENDATIONS  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  GENERAL  STAFF 

PRESENT 

Present  Expenditures 
$110,000,000  ~ 


fective  Strength  Army  andNational  Guard 


150,000  Men 


PROPOSED 


$157,000,000 


550,000  Men 


Proposed 
Expenditures 


Proposed 

Effective 

Army 


INCREASE 


$47,000,000 


400,000  Men 


PLATE   NO.   9 


Recommendations  of  General  Staff        177 

ing  at  the  present  time  $105,000,000  on  our  army 
and  National  Guard,  we  have  available  an  effective 
first  line  of  less  than  150,000  men,  about  half  of 
whom  are  only  partially  trained  and  hardly  fit  for 
war  within  three  months'  time.  By  adding  less  than 
half  to  our  present  expenditures,  we  can  secure  a 
well-organized,  well-disciplined,  and  uniformed  army 
of  550,000  men,  or  practically  four  times  the  pres- 
ent effective  first  line.  The  ratio  of  additional  effi- 
ciency to  additional  expense  is  as  eight  is  to  one. 
This  includes  pay  for  citizen  soldiers  and  reserves 
—  which  is  not  now  available.  Without  the  item  of 
pay  the  cost  would  be  reduced  greatly,  but  pay  is  so 
essential  to  efficiency  that  it  cannot  properly  be  ex- 
cluded. 

Thus  is  reality  an  entirely  different  thing  from 
the  anti-militarist's  cry  that  the  authorities  desire 
to  increase  our  military  expenditures  fivefold,  and 
to  maintain  a  standing  army  six  or  eight  times  the 
strength  of  our  present  force.  It  will  be  seen  that, 
by  heeding  the  advice  of  the  military  authorities, 
the  United  States  at  comparatively  small  cost,  can 
secure  a  trained  force  fully  capable  of  defending 
the  nation  until  such  time  as  volunteers  could  be 
raised  and  trained  if  needed  in  a  great  war. 

For  those  who  think  our  suggested  force  exces- 
sive, we  may  point  out  that  by  similar  methods  of 
utilizing  trained  reserves  Russia  can  mobilize  5,000,- 
ooo  to  6,000,000  trained  soldiers,  Germany  4,610,- 


178  Peace  Insurance 

ooo,  France  3,000,000  to  4,000,000,  Austria- 
Hungary  1,800,000,  Japan  1,300,000,  and  England 
about  1,000,000  counting  territorial  and  colonial 
troops.  These  numbers,  in  fact,  should  probably 
now  be  increased  somewhat,  owing  to  recent  addi- 
tions to  foreign  military  forces.  Furthermore,  the 
only  nation  of  these  six  which  cannot  mobilize  a 
trained  army  at  least  three  times  greater  than  we 
ask  for,  balances  the  scale  by  maintaining  the  great- 
est navy  on  earth.  We  ask  for  approximately  only 
one-tenth  of  Russia's  force,  one-eighth  of  the  Ger- 
man's, one-fifth  of  France's,  one-fourth  of  Austria's, 
one-third  of  Japan's,  and  one-half  of  England's 
(Plate  10). 


NUMBER  OF  TRAINED  SOLDIERS  AVAILABLE 
IN  SEVEN  OF  THE  GREAT  NATIONS.  BY  USE 
OF  RESERVES,  SHOWING  ALSO  THE  NUM- 
BER ASKED  FOR  BY  GENERAL  STAFF  U.  S.  A.. 
AND  NUMBER  ACTUALLY  AVAILABLE  IN  U.  S. 


Russia— 5, 000, 000 


Germany — 4, 610, 000 


France— 3, 000, 000 


Austria-Hungary — 1, 800,000 


Japan — 1,300,000 


England— 1,000,000 


U.  S.  Asked  by  General  Staff— 550,000 


U.  S.  Actual— 150,000 

NOTE:  Latest  reports  indicate  even 
larger  forces  in  Russia  and  France. 


PLATE   NO.   10 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  RECOMMENDATIONS  OF  THE  NAVAL  BOARD 

UR  navy,  though  at  present  ranking  third  and 
not,  like  the  army,  last  among  the  military 
forces  of  the  great  powers,  is,  nevertheless,  not  what 
it  should  be  at  the  present  time  in  point  of  strength. 
It  is  not,  moreover,  the  present,  as  much  as  the 
future  condition  of  our  navy  which  alarms  the  naval 
authorities.  Like  the  recent  report  on  the  land 
forces  by  the  General  Staff  of  the  army,  the  Gen- 
eral Board  of  the  navy,  about  ten  years  ago,  made 
a  report  on  the  necessities  of  that  service,  and,  un- 
fortunately, like  the  army  report,  the  advice  of  the 
naval  experts  received  but  little  attention. 

In  considering  our  navy's  needs  we  must  consider 
that  we  have,  unlike  other  great  powers,  two  great 
coast  lines,  of  our  nation  proper,  with  great  cities 
and  vast  wealth  bordering  thereon.  This  nation 
is  the  only  power  on  earth  of  which  this  is  true. 
Even  England  with  her  vast  colonial  possessions 
has  but  a  comparatively  trivial  and  concentrated 
coast  line  of  the  kingdom  proper  to  defend.  The 
capture  of  England's  greatest  and  most  wealthy 
colony  would  be  nothing  as  to  the  landing  of  a 
strong  hostile  force  near  London,  nor  would  the 

179 


180  Peace  Insurance 

loss  of  the  Philippines  compare  with  the  conquest 
of  our  Pacific  Coast.  Thus  it  is  that  a  nation  having 
two  immense  coast  lines  has  additional  need  of  a 
strong  fleet,  even  if  it  is  to  be  used  only  for  defense, 
which  is  a  serious  error  in  naval  warfare.  A  navy 
should  be  free  to  seek  and  destroy  the  enemy.  By 
aggressive  offensive  action,  if  successful,  it  can 
quickly  end  a  war;  by  defensive  action  it  can  but 
delay  it. 

On  our  navy  depends  much  of  the  success  of  our 
foreign  policies.  We  could  not  transport  troops 
(if  we  had  them)  over  any  portion  of  the  seas, 
unless  our  navy  controlled  those  seas.  Therefore 
our  defense  of  the  Philippines,  Alaska,  Oahu,  the 
Panama  Canal,  Porto  Rico,  etc.,  depends  greatly 
upon  the  navy.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  largely 
"  as  strong  as  the  navy."  The  open  door  in  China, 
the  neutrality  of  the  Panama  Canal,  the  protection 
of  our  citizens  abroad,  and  all  of  the  other  foreign 
policies  of  the  United  States  could  not  be  enforced 
by  the  biggest  army  in  the  world  were  it  confined  to 
the  territory  of  the  forty-eight  states,  and  unable  to 
move  on  the  sea.  An  army  insures  only  the  terri- 
tory which  it  can  control,  and  it  cannot  control  over- 
seas territory  without  the  aid  of  a  navy.  Dislike  it 
as  we  may,  it  may  some  day  be  desirable  to  enforce 
our  views  of  right  and  wrong  on  some  overseas 
nation.  The  navy,  without  the  army,  is  by  no  means 
a  capable  weapon  for  such  an  end;  but  similarly,  the 


Recommendations  of  Naval  Board        181 

army  without  the  navy  is  most  ineffective.  It  is  a 
proper  understanding  of  the  coordinate  relation  of 
these  forces  that  will  bring  success. 

The  General  Board  of  the  navy  proposed  that  we 
should  build  two  battleships  per  year,  and  had  this 
plan  been  carried  out,  it  would  have  called  for  a 
total  of  forty-eight  capital  ships  in  1920,  in  addition 
to  four  torpedo  boat  destroyers  for  each  battleship. 
This  program,  however,  has  not  been  followed,  and 
the  result  is  that  in  order  to  make  up  for  the  deficien- 
cies of  the  past,  the  General  Board  is  now  asking 
four  ships  quite  regularly.  It  is  thus  that  parsimony 
in  regard  to  the  navy  has  been  responsible  for  the 
seemingly  large  demands  of  the  General  Board, 
which  never  intended  originally  to  ask  for  anything 
but  a  standard  building  program  of  two  ships  per 
year.  It  is  our  failure  to  make  these  appropriations 
that  has  placed  the  United  States  in  third  place  in 
naval  power  instead  of  in  its  former  position  as  sec- 
ond among  the  great  navies.  Should  we  continue 
our  so-called  economy  in  this  respect,  France,  Japan, 
and  Russia  will  have  superior  navies  within  a  few 
years,  and  the  United  States  will  then  drop  to  sixth 
place.  Most  of  these  nations  have  regular  building 
programs,  which  they  follow  out;  and,  through  sys- 
tematic expenditures,  they  confine  their  appropria- 
tions within  any  one  year  to  reasonable  amounts, 
instead  of  economizing  on  one  occasion  and  being 
compelled  to  forfeit  their  standing,  or  to  spend  vast 


i 82  Peace  Insurance 

sums,  in  the  future.  It  is  in  this  manner  that  Russia, 
whose  navy  was  practically  destroyed  by  the  Japan- 
ese only  a  few  years  ago,  will  probably  soon  outstrip 
the  United  States,  and  take  her  place  in  the  struggle 
for  naval  supremacy,  among  other  great  nations. 

Much  has  recently  been  said  in  regard  to  claims 
that  the  navy  officers  were  misrepresenting  when 
they  stated  that  a  ship  like  the  Oregon  should  be 
eliminated  and  not  counted  in  the  strength  of  our 
first-class  fighting  fleet.  It  has  been  assumed  that 
the  13-inch  gun  on  a  ship  like  the  Oregon  was  equal 
to  the  12-inch  gun  of  the  modern  super-dread- 
naught,  and  that  the  older  ship  would  be  an  addition 
to  our  fleet  in  battle.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however, 
there  are  other  elements  to  be  considered.  In  the 
gun  it  includes  initial  velocity,  trajectory,  range,  and 
penetrative  power  at  various  distances.  The  size 
of  the  bore  of  the  rifle  is  only  one  of  the  elements 
to  be  considered.  There  were,  for  instance,  1 5-inch 
guns  in  the  Civil  War,  but  they  were  mere  cumber- 
some toys  compared  with  the  modern  rifles  of  the 
navy. 

Furthermore,  to  place  one  of  the  slower  and  more 
obsolete  ships  in  our  fighting  line  is  to  impair  the 
entire  fleet.  It  would  compel  the  fleet  to  sacrifice  the 
additional  speed  which  modern  ships  have  attained 
in  order  to  keep  at  the  same  speed  as  the  old  and 
slow  ships.  Were  that  not  done,  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  allow  the  slow  ships  to  fall  behind  and  be  at 


DREADNAUGHT  STRENGTH 
OFTHE  GREAT  SEA  POWERS 

BUILT.    BUILDING,    AND    AUTHORIZED 


England — 42  Capital  Ships 


Germany— 26  Capital  Ships 


United  States— 12  Capital  Ships 


France— 11  Capital  Ships 


Russia— 11  Capital  Ships 


Japan— 10  Capital  Ships 


Italy— 9  Capital  Ships 


PLATE  NO.    11 


Recommendations  of  Naval  Board        183 

the  mercy  of  superior  force.  Finally,  a  modern 
dreadnaught  could  probably  entirely  destroy  a  ship 
like  the  Oregon  without  even  coming  within  effective 
range  of  the  Oregon's  guns.  It  could,  as  was  said 
in  the  old  navy,  almost  "  sail  rings  around  "  the  old 
style  battleship,  and  could  run  or  fight  as  it  saw  fit, 
keeping  constantly  out  of  reach  of  the  old  ship's 
rifles  and  at  the  same  time  within  easy  range  for 
its  own. 

It  is  thus  that  the  naval  experts  can  conclusively 
prove  to  the  most  ignorant  civilian,  or  to  the  great- 
est authority,  the  correctness  of  these  reports  and 
the  soundness  of  their  recommendations.  At  the 
present  time,  England  has  42  capital  (or  dread- 
naught)  ships  built,  building,  or  authorized,  Ger- 
many, 26,  the  United  States,  12,  Russia,  n,  France, 
u,  Japan,  10,  and  Italy,  9.  This  fact  shows  clearly 
the  narrow  margin  by  which  we  now  hold  even  third 
place  and  the  importance  of  carrying  out  the  desires 
of  the  General  Board.  Germany  has  a  continuous 
ship-building  program  that  calls  for  an  eventual 
strength  of  61  dreadnaughts  —  our  recommenda- 
tion, which  Congress  refuses  to  grant,  calls  for  only 
48  (Plate  n). 

An  erroneous  impression  of  the  value  of  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  to  the  navy  has  been  formed.  Many 
believe  that  it  doubles  the  effectiveness  of  the  navy 
by  making  it  available  for  both  coasts.  This  is 
certainly  not  true.  Though  of  immense  value  from 


184  Peace  Insurance 

a  naval  viewpoint,  it  is  questionable  if  the  increased 
efficiency  is  anywhere  near  twice  that  of  our  navy 
without  the  canal.  Our  navy  should  be  strong 
enough  to  meet  any  attack  on  either  ocean  and  yet 
not  have  our  interests  unguarded  on  the  other. 
Thus  we  should  not  count  on  transferring  the  entire 
fleet  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  or  the  reverse, 
and  for  this  reason  alone  the  canal  does  not  double 
our  power. 

Moreover,  there  is  a  possibility  of  its  temporary 
destruction.  Every  precaution  is  taken,  of  course, 
to  prevent  this.  The  canal  is  to  be  guarded,  it  is 
fortified,  and  it  is  planned  to  allow  the  dense  tropical 
vegetation  to  grow  wild  for  some  distance  along 
each  bank,  making  an  almost  impassable  barrier. 
Colonel  Goethals  is  quoted  as  saying  that  in  order 
to  disable  a  lock  a  charge  would  have  to  be  placed 
in  a  certain  position  behind  the  gate,  and  that  more 
dynamite  would  be  necessary  than  one  man  can 
carry.  To  let  the  water  out  entirely  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Chagres  spillway  in  the  center  of  the 
Gatun  dam  has  been  suggested  as  the  most  prac- 
ticable form  of  attack.  This,  however,  would 
require  the  possession  of  this  part  of  the  canal  by 
a  considerable  party  of  men  for  about  two  days. 

While  neither  of  these  situations  seem  probable, 
either  is  possible.  Today,  more  than  ever  before, 
nations  will  strike  first  —  and  warn  their  enemy  to 
be  prepared  afterward.  Thus,  as  long  as  we  have 


Recommendations  of  Naval  Board        185 

disputes  with  any  nation,  a  sudden  attempt  might  be 
made  to  destroy  the  canal,  by  stealth  or  by  force, 
previous  to  any  declaration  of  hostilities,  or  diplo- 
matic rupture  that  would  place  us  on  our  guard. 
The  Japanese  action  in  the  recent  war  with  Russia 
affords  an  excellent  example  of  this  possibility. 

Captain  Harry  S.  Knapp,  U.  S.  NM  in  a  paper 
in  the  Proceedings  of  the  United  States  Naval  In- 
stitute, concludes  that  without  a  canal  the  navy  on 
each  ocean  should  be  capable  of  meeting  the  strong- 
est probable  opponent  on  that  ocean.  Such  a  navy 
he  calls  a  "Two  Ocean  Standard;"  the  one  fleet 
called  the  "  Standard  Atlantic  Fleet  "  and  the  other 
the  "  Standard  Pacific  Fleet."  Captain  Knapp,  after 
fully  expounding  the  facts  bearing  upon  the  question, 
in  which  the  matter  of  steaming  distance,  time,  and 
available  force  figure  largely,  concludes : 

When  the  canal  is  finished,  our  policy  should  be  to  have 
eventually,  and  as  soon  as  possible,  a  total  strength  not  less 
than  that  of  the  Standard  Atlantic  Fleet  plus  three-quarters 
that  of  the  Standard  Pacific  Fleet.  These  so-called  "  stand- 
ard "  fleets  are  not  fixed  quantities,  but  will  vary  from  year 
to  year  as  foreign  nations  increase  their  own  naval  strength. 
The  policy  itself  can,  however,  be  fixed,  and  some  policy 
should  be  established. 

This  seems  not  unreasonable,  yet  it  is  more  than 
the  General  Board  of  the  navy  has  yet  asked  for. 
Our  navy  —  or  rather  the  modern  navy,  which 


1 86  Peace  Insurance 

has  come  into  existence  after  we  lost  our  position  as 
a  commercial  maritime  power  —  has  not  had  a  real 
test  against  a  first-class  power.  As  with  the  army, 
we  see  in  victory  only  excellence  on  our  part,  and 
overlook  weakness  on  the  part  of  our  enemy.  The 
easy  naval  victories  of  the  Spanish  War  are  respon- 
sible for  the  general  opinion  that  the  modern  United 
States  Navy  is  invincible. 

Actually,  however,  the  Spanish  navy  was  unfit  for 
action  with  a  force  of  its  own  size.  When  we  fought 
it  we  outnumbered  it.  The  Spanish  ships  were 
poorly  provisioned,  short  of  ammunition,  their  bot- 
toms were  foul,  and  many  of  their  guns  useless. 
With  such  conditions  it  was  but  little  credit  to  the 
American  navy  to  win  a  victory  and  but  little  reflec- 
tion on  the  bravery  or  skill  of  the  Spaniards  to  lose. 
Our  credit  was  that  of  doing  well  our  part  —  almost 
as  if  simply  practicing  —  against  an  enemy  which 
could  do  but  little  to  hinder  us. 

Said  Admiral  Cervera,  speaking  of  his  squadron, 
when  ordered  to  sail  for  the  West  Indies  to  meet 
the  American  fleet: 

It  is  impossible  for  me  to  give  you  an  idea  of  the  surprise 
and  consternation  experienced  by  all  on  the  receipt  of  the 
order  to  sail.  Indeed,  that  surprise  is  well  justified,  for  noth- 
ing can  be  expected  of  this  expedition  except  the  total  de- 
struction of  the  fleet  or  its  hasty  and  demoralized  return; 
while  if  it  should  remain  in  Spain  it  might  be  the  safeguard 
of  the  nation.  .  .  .  The  Colon  does  not  yet  have  her 


Recommendations  of  Naval  Board        187 

big  guns,  and  I  asked  for  the  poor  ones  if  there  were  no 
others.  The  5. 5-inch  ammunition,  with  the  exception  of 
about  three  hundred  rounds,  is  bad.  The  defective  guns  of 
the  Vizcaya  and  Oquendo  have  not  been  changed.  The  cart- 
ridge cases  of  the  Colon  cannot  be  recharged.  We  have  not 
a  single  Bustamente  torpedo.  .  .  .  But  I  will  trouble 
you  no  more.* 

Shortly  after,  Cervera  added: 

I  will  try  to  sail  tomorrow.  As  the  act  has  been  con- 
summated I  will  not  insist  upon  my  opinion  concerning  it. 
May  God  grant  that  I  be  mistaken !  .  .  .  With  a  clear 
conscience  I  go  to  the  sacrifice.f 

Captain  Villaamil,  of  the  Spanish  Navy,  who  was 
second  in  command,  and  who  was  killed  in  the  naval 
battle  of  Santiago,  made  the  following  remarks  in 
a  private  telegram  sent  to  the  Spanish  premier: 

In  view  of  the  importance  to  the  country  of  the  destina- 
tion of  this  fleet,  I  deem  it  expedient  that  you  should  know, 
through  a  friend  that  does  not  fear  censure,  that  while  as 
seamen  we  are  all  ready  to  meet  an  honorable  death  in  the 
fulfillment  of  our  duty,  I  think  it  undoubted  that  the  sacrifice 
of  these  naval  forces  will  be  as  certain  as  it  will  be  fruitless 
and  useless  in  terminating  the  war  if  the  representations 
repeatedly  made  by  the  Admiral  to  the  Minister  of  Marine 
are  not  taken  into  consideration.* 

*  The  Campaign  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  by  Colonel  H.  H.  Sargent, 
A.  C.  McClurg  &  Co.,  Chicago. 


1 88  Peace  Insurance 

We  should  by  no  means  consider  our  navy  - 
ship  for  ship  or  man  for  man  —  as  necessarily  su- 
perior to  that  of  any  other  first-class  power.  It  is 
positively  not  an  invincible  force.  Unless  we  so 
view  it  and  heed  the  General  Board  of  the  navy 
we  will  some  day  meet  disaster  on  the  sea  which 
will  only  be  exceeded  by  the  disaster  on  land  that 
will  follow  neglect  to  consider  the  reasonable  sug- 
gestions of  the  General  Staff  of  the  army. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

DEMAGOGUE    VERSUS    STATESMAN 

TTT'E  ARE  not,  in  this  work,  expressing  the  the- 
ories of  any  one  man,  nor  of  any  set  of  men; 
but  we  endeavor  to  express  facts  as  they  have  been 
determined  to  exist  by  all  those  who  actually  make  a 
thorough  study  of  war,  its  possibilities,  probabilities, 
and  the  consequent  needs  of  the  United  States.  The 
asininity  of  those  who  first  form  pacifist  and  anti- 
militarist  opinions  and  then  set  out  to  seek  some  evi- 
dence which  will  corroborate  their  ideas,  is,  unfor- 
tunately, equaled  by  the  money  and  resources  which 
are  at  the  disposal  of  these  men,  in  order  that  they 
may  spread  broadcast  their  propaganda.  Equally 
unfortunately,  armies  and  navies  afford  an  excellent 
chance  for  politicians  to  make  a  reputation  for  econ- 
omy without,  in  most  cases,  appearing  parsimonious 
to  the  direct  interests  of  those  constituents  who  are 
always  so  dearly  thought  of,  and  an  equal  oppor- 
tunity is  afforded  by  the  military  forces  for  eloquent 
and  impressive  oratory,  which  will  inflame  the  coun- 
try with  the  great,  but  economic,  patriotism  of  their 
representatives. 

There  is  no  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  majority 
189 


190  Peace  Insurance 

of  pacifists  to  ascertain  facts  —  excepting  in  so  far 
as  these  facts  may  be  favorable  to  their  own  the- 
ories. This,  of  course,  may  be  done  in  any  contro- 
versy. Never  has  there  been  disagreement  on 
important  issues,  unless  there  were  facts  that  sup- 
ported both  sides.  The  coward,  for  instance,  who 
deserted  all  his  comrades  and  ran  from  battle,  could 
easily  argue  that  it  took  greater  courage  to  face  the 
inevitable  scorn  and  ridicule  of  his  fellow  men  than 
to  face  the  bullets  of  the  enemy.  Probably  such,  in 
the  opinion  of  those  who  remained,  would  actually 
be  a  fact,  and,  on  the  surface,  the  man  who  ran 
should  be  called  a  hero.  The  weakling,  however, 
when  he  flew  from  danger  was  thinking  of  the  pres- 
ent —  giving  no  thought  whatever  to  future  scorn 
or  ridicule  or  anything  except  the  terrible  hail  of 
lead  from  the  enemy's  rifles.  It  is  thus  that  the 
absolute  fact  that  the  man  really  faced  the  more 
horrible  of  the  two  alternatives  —  a  life  despised 
by  his  fellows  —  fails  to  relieve  him  of  the  charge  of 
cowardice. 

Similarly,  many  of  the  contentions  of  the  pacifists 
and  anti-militarists  are  founded  upon  truth,  but  they 
are  not  founded  upon  the  whole  truth,  and  the 
points  in  favor  of  the  pacifists  and  anti-militarists 
are  overshadowed  by  other  facts  which  they  either 
have  not  taken  the  trouble  to  learn,  or,  as  we  are 
reluctant  to  believe,  that  they  conceal.  The  absurd- 
ity of  some  of  the  theories  of  those  opposed  to  any- 


Demagogue  versus  Statesman  191 

thfng  recommended  by  a  member  of  the  army  or 
navy,  is  frequently  illustrated.  Only  recently  it  was 
suggested  that  our  army  and  navy  be  "  put  to  work," 
and  that  the  United  States  employ  no  civilian  labor- 
ers as  long  as  there  were  soldiers  who  could  be  used 
either  in  army  or  navy.  However,  Mr.  Taylor,  one 
of  the  best  known  efficiency  experts  in  the  world, 
stated  that  he  "  found  that  more  work  and  more 
efficient  work  was  done,  per  capita,  aboard  a  United 
States  battleship  than  in  any  other  known  place 
where  labor  was  employed."  It  is  unfortunate  that 
those  who  believe  our  military  men  are  idlers  can- 
not be  required  to  serve  an  enlistment  in  the  army 
to  open  their  eyes;  but  these  men,  like  other  anti- 
militarists,  first  form  their  opinions  and  then  seek 
only  such  facts  as  corroborate  them. 

The  theory  has  also  recently  been  advanced  that 
army  officers  should  not  be  permitted  to  write,  pub- 
lish, speak,  or  otherwise  make  public,  any  matter 
which  attempts  to  show  that  the  United  States  is 
unprepared  for  war.  An  advocate  of  this  restriction 
said,  in  part: 

I  believe  that  anybody  knowing  the  American  Army,  as  I 
believe  I  know  it,  who  casts  reflections  upon  its  efficiency  or 
upon  our  preparedness  for  war  ought  to  be  criticized  and 
dismissed  from  the  service. 

In  this  the  gentleman  is  referring  especially  to 
the  higher  officers,  including  the  Chief  of  Staff  of 


192  Peace  Insurance 

the  Army.  Whether  or  not  he  intends  to  include  the 
Secretary  of  War  in  his  displeasure,  we  cannot  state, 
though  it  is  certain  that  all  men  holding  that  office 
have  recently  dwelt  at  some  length  on  the  unpre- 
paredness  of  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States. 

We  have  no  hesitation,  whatever,  in  saying  that 
the  gentleman  demonstrated  thoroughly,  in  the 
course  of  his  speech,  that  while  anybody  who  knew 
the  American  Army  as  he  "  believes  "  he  knows  it, 
might  be  well  informed  indeed;  those  who  knew  it 
only  as  he  actually  does  know  it  would  have  much 
to  learn.  For  instance,  he  evidently  does  not  know 
the  difference  between  a  number  of  well  trained 
regiments  of  the  various  arms  and  an  army.  Exactly 
as  a  number  of  efficient  individual  soldiers  do  not 
form  a  good  company  until  they  are  organized  and 
can  maneuver  together  as  a  unit,  neither  is  an  army 
efficient  until  it  is  trained  in  the  field  in  the  large 
units.  Exactly  as  a  company  composed  largely  of 
men  who  commanded  with  skill  and  few  who  actu- 
ally fought  and  fired  a  rifle,  or  entirely  of  privates 
and  no  officers,  would  be  unbalanced,  and  therefore, 
inefficient,  so  is  an  army  which  is  not  composed  of 
a  proper  proportion  of  infantry,  cavalry,  artillery 
and  other  auxiliary  troops.  Unfortunately,  large 
unit  training  is  a  kind  of  which  our  army  has  had 
little,  owing  to  our  scattered  possessions,  and  lack 
of  large  army  maneuvers.  Unfortunately,  our  army 
lacks  an  adequate,  complete  and  well  balanced  tac- 


Demagogue  versus  Statesman  193 

tical  organization.  These  things  and  the  trivial  size 
of  our  force,  the  gentleman  believes,  are  of  no  im- 
portance. When  he  says  "  we  have  a  splendidly 
trained  militia,"  in  spite  of  great  admiration  for  the 
things  that  the  National  Guard  has  succeeded  in 
doing,  those  knowing  that  service  must  actually 
laugh.  As  a  matter  of  fact  it  would  take  about  three 
months  to  put  the  most  effective  National  Guard 
organization  into  real  condition  for  war,  and  as  for 
the  worst,  it  is  impossible  to  make  an  estimate. 

Nor  does  the  gentleman  fail  to  insert  the  "  elo- 
quent and  impressive  oratory,"  which  we  have 
already  referred  to.  He  says : 

For  my  part,  I  believe  today  it  is  the  most  efficient  and 
best  prepared  army  there  is  on  the  face  of  the  earth,  because 
it  is  composed  of  American  citizens  who  are  not  afraid  to 
fight  and  who  are  the  superiors  of  any  race  of  men  on  the 
globe. 

Which,  sentimentally,  is  fine,  but,  practically,  is 
tommyrot.  It  does  little  good  for  an  army  to  be 
"not  afraid  to  fight"  if  it  is  unable  to  fight;  less 
good  to  be  morally,  intellectually,  or  physically 
superior  (if  we  are)  if  we  are  militarily  inferior. 
Military  superiority  requires  these  things  and  much 
more. 

We  wonder  if  the  citizens  of  the  United  States 
want  the  men  who  are  trained  as  military  experts  at 
public  expense,  to  keep  all  that  they  learn  to  them- 


194  Peace  Insurance 

selves?  Rather  it  would  seem  to  us  that  it  is  their 
duty  to  allow  the  public  to  have  the  results  of  their 
study  in  the  art  of  war.  No  business  house  would 
train  employees  to  a  great  degree  of  expertness,  and 
then  prohibit  them  from  making  suggestions  for  the 
betterment  of  the  business;  nor  would  such  sugges- 
tions when  they  were  made  be  regarded  as  merely 
personal  interest  for  the  betterment  of  some  partic- 
ular employee's  department.  Rather  do  business 
houses  encourage  suggestions  and  criticism,  and  re- 
ward those  employees  whose  recommendations  are 
of  value.  We  cannot  believe  that  the  American  pub- 
lic desires  that  all  of  its  military  information  should 
come  through  civilians. 

We  have  previously  quoted  Doctor  Jordan  of 
Leland  Stanford  University,  who  represents  well 
another  type  of  anti-militarist  and  pacifist,  when  he 
says,  "  There  is  no  nation  that  could  attack  us  if  it 
would,  there  is  no  nation  that  would  attack  us  if  it 
could."  We  have  previously  at  some  length  con- 
sidered that  statement,  and  have  found  that  it  is 
either  most  maliciously  or  most  stupidly  false;  that 
facts,  and  those  best  acquainted  with  them,  show 
that  several  nations  may  at  any  time  be  so  placed 
that  they  "  would  attack  us  if  they  could  "  and  that 
the  majority  of  these  "  could  attack  us  if  they  would." 
The  European  War  should  silence  such  absurd  talk 
for  some  time  to  come. 

One  of  the  favorite  claims  of  those  who  advance 


Demagogue  versus  Statesman  195 

these  absurd  theories  is  well  and,  from  the  anti- 
militarist's  viewpoint,  conservatively  expressed  by 
the  gentleman  previously  referred  to  when  he  says: 

I  do  not  believe  that  these  officers  ought  to  be  permitted  to 
give  out  these  idle  vaporings  about  the  inefficiency  of  our 
army  or  about  our  unpreparedness  for  war.  They  are  mis- 
leading and  incorrect,  and  may  at  any  time  involve  us  in 
trouble,  and  I  want  to  suggest  in  all  candor  that  I  hope  that 
these  officers  will  not  permit  themselves  to  give  out  more  such 
gloomy  statements  —  such  misleading  and  improper  state- 
ments. 

This,  of  course,  implies  that  the  officers  in  ques- 
tion are  either  unanimously  ignorant  of  the  profes- 
sion which  they  have  spent  a  lifetime  attempting 
to  master,  and  that  such  men  know  less  of  the  army 
and  navy  than  the  civilian  in  question  does,  or  else 
that  they  are  deliberately  deceiving  the  public  and 
Congress.  It  also  implies  that  foreign  governments 
do  not  know  of  our  military  weakness. 

When  we  consider,  however,  the  character  and 
education  of  the  men  who  agree  with  the  so-called 
misleading  and  incorrect  statements  which  are 
essential  features  of  this  book,  it  seems  ridiculous 
for  us  to  add  our  own  theories  in  an  attempt  to  show 
the  absurdity  of  the  opposition's  claims.  When  one 
can  quote  Washington,  Lincoln,  Grant,  Roosevelt, 
Wilson,  and  numerous  of  the  great  military  and 
naval  experts  of  the  world,  further  addition  is  un- 


196  Peace  Insurance 

necessary.  When  one  reads  foreign  military  writ- 
ings, one  finds  that  there  need  be  no  fear  of  "  giving 
away  "  our  weakness. 

Each  of  our  Secretaries  of  War  for  some  time 
past  has  pointed  out  in  one  way  or  another  our 
unpreparedness  for  war.  Our  Chiefs  of  Staff  do  so. 
The  General  Staff  of  the  Army,  the  most  expert 
body  of  military  men  in  the  country,  certainly  makes 
some  such  inference  when  it  points  out  that  we  need 
550,000  trained  soldiers,  and  have  available  but 
about  150,000  all  told;  that  both  the  Regular  Army 
and  National  Guard  are  badly  balanced  organiza- 
tions, in  some  respects  poorly  equipped  and  in  no 
sense  a  unified  fighting  force.  The  General  Board 
of  the  Navy  does  so  when  it  shows  that  we  are 
slowly  but  surely  dropping  down  in  the  list  of  navies 
of  the  world. 

It  is  an  interesting  comparison  to  place  the  United 
States  in  Germany's  place,  contending  with  the 
odds  against  which  Germany  struggles  today.  Were 
the  United  States  in  Germany's  place,  the  war  would 
be  over  by  this  time  and  the  United  States  would 
now  be  in  process  of  division  among  the  victorious 
allies. 

Rather  than  continue  our  own  theories,  it  may  be 
well  to  quote,  first,  President  Roosevelt  (a  man  who 
was  awarded  the  Nobel  peace  prize  a  few  years 
ago).  In  a  speech  at  Norfolk  in  1913  he  said,  in 
part: 


Demagogue  versus  Statesman  197 

We  see  before  our  eyes  at  this  moment  a  great  and  populous 
empire,  now  a  great  and  populous  republic,  China,  which  has 
suffered  partial  dismemberment  purely  because  she  has  per- 
mitted herself  to  become  impotent  in  war,  so  that  she  has  no 
navy  and  not  an  adequate  army. 

In  consequence,  Russia,  Japan,  Germany,  England,  France, 
now  hold  Chinese  provinces,  some  of  them  themselves  the 
size  of  empires.  If  the  American  people  deliberately  choose 
to  follow  in  Chinese  footsteps  doubtless  some  decades  would 
pass  before  we  would  suffer  to  the  extent  of  China ;  but  long 
before  that  time  had  come  we  should  have  had  to  abandon 
all  pretense  of  upholding  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  we  should 
have  had  to  abandon  Panama  and  Alaska  and  every  insular 
possession,  and  we  should  have  had  to  surrender  all  right 
to  say  what  immigrants  shall  and  what  immigrants  shall  not 
be  admitted  to  our  country,  and  the  terms  upon  which  they 
shall  come  here  and  become  citizens  or  hold  land.  Remem- 
ber that  we  should  not  be  permitted  to  say  what  was  to  be 
done  on  these  vital  matters  affecting  even  our  most  intimate 
home  policies,  unless  we  were  able  and  willing  to  defend  our- 
selves, by  force  of  arms,  if  our  right  to  decide  these  questions 
for  ourselves  was  ever  definitely  and  peremptorily  challenged. 
It  is  a  matter  of  vital  concern  to  all  our  people,  but  above 
all  it  is  a  matter  of  vital  concern  to  our  wageworkers  and 
farmers  and  small  business  and  professional  men  to  have  the 
undisputed  right  to  decide  every  such  question  for  themselves; 
and  our  claim  so  to  decide  these  questions  would  be  treated 
with  utter  derision  if  we  did  not  have  an  efficient  navy  and 
if  we  did  not  possess  both  the  will  and  the  power  to  back  up 
our  words  by  our  deeds. 

To  advocate  universal  arbitration  treaties,  the  arbitration 


198  Peace  Insurance 

of  questions  of  national  interest  and  honor  is  folly  so  great 
as  fairly  to  be  wicked.  We  have  the  right  to  insist  on  the 
Monroe  Doctrine;  we  have  the  right  to  insist  that  we,  and 
we  alone,  are  to  decide  as  to  what  immigrants  shall  come  to 
our  shores  and  as  to  whether  these  immigrants  shall  become 
citizens  or  own  land;  these  and  other  similar  rights  are  not 
merely  rights  but  duties. 

President  Cleveland  in  one  of  his  annual  messages 
to  Congress  said: 

All  must  admit  the  importance  of  an  effective  navy  to  a 
nation  like  ours,  having  such  an  extensive  seacoast  to  protect. 
The  nation  that  cannot  resist  aggression  is  constantly  ex- 
posed to  it.  Its  foreign  policy  is,  of  necessity,  weak  and  its 
negotiations  are  conducted  with  disadvantage  because  it  is 
not  in  condition  to  enforce  the  terms  dictated  by  its  sense  of 
right  and  justice. 

The  defenseless  condition  of  our  seacoast  and  lake  frontier 
is  perfectly  palpable.  The  absolute  necessity,  judged  by  all 
standards  of  prudence  and  foresight  of  our  preparation  for 
an  effectual  resistance,  is  so  apparent  that  I  hope  effective 
steps  will  be  taken  in  that  direction  immediately. 

President  McKinley  in  his  annual  message  of 
December  5,  1898,  after  the  Spanish  War,  referring 
to  the  Regular  Army,  said: 

There  can  be  no  question  at  this  time,  and  probably  for 
some  time  in  the  future,  100,000  men  will  be  none  too  many 
to  meet  the  necessities  of  the  situation. 


Demagogue  versus  Statesman  199 

A  glance  at  Chapter  XI  will  show  that  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  asks  for  a  standing  army  of  but  a  few 
more  men  on  the  active  list;  the  balance  of  the  550,- 
ooo  needed,  to  be  citizen  soldiers  and  reserves. 

President  Grant,  in  his  fifth  and  sixth  annual  mes- 
sages, said: 

There  are  two  things  which  I  would  especially  invite  you 
to  consider:  first,  the  importance  of  preparing  for  war  in 
the  time  of  peace.  [And  again],  There  is  no  class  of  Gov- 
ernment employees  who  are  harder  worked  than  the  army  — 
officers  and  men;  none  who  perform  their  tasks  more  cheer- 
fully and  efficiently. 

President  Wilson  in  a  speech  to  officers  of  the  New 
Jersey  National  Guard,  by  his  references  to  that 
branch  of  our  land  forces,  shows  both  his  apprecia- 
tion of  the  good  qualities  of  the  soldier  and  his 
knowledge  of  the  importance  of  having  a  military 
force  which  is  capable  of  taking  the  offensive  at  the 
outset,  and  conducting  the  campaign  aggressively 
and  skillfully  to  a  successful  and  speedy  end.  Presi- 
dent Wilson  said: 

This  is  the  particular  kind  of  public  service  in  which  a 
man  cannot  be  selfish.  He  may  harbor  an  ambition  to  attain 
a  higher  rank,  but  the  end  of  it  all  is  danger. 

While  I  am  among  those  who  passionately  love  peace,  I 
recognize  that  there  is  a  business  side  to  everything.  No 
man  in  the  ranks  goes  into  war  without  knowing  that  there 
is  nothing  in  it  for  him  but  danger.  This  ought  to  hearten 


2OO  Peace  Insurance 


any  man  that  goes  into  the  National  Guard.  It  is  an  act  by 
which  he  shows  an  entire  devotion  to  the  public  service. 
The  principal  part  of  your  training  is  skill,  and  while  it  is 
not  pleasant  to  contemplate  the  marks  you  might  shoot  at  in 
war,  still  it  is  well  to  be  prepared  for  it.  The  straighter  you 
shoot  the  sooner  the  war  will  be  over.  The  more  men  you 
kill  right  away,  the  fewer  you  have  to  kill  in  the  long  run. 

Washington,  of  whom  we  hope  none  will  question 
either  the  skill,  knowledge,  or  honesty  of  pur- 
pose, described  well  the  results  of  dependence  on 
untrained  troops.  The  militia  of  his  day  did  not 
approximate  the  training  received,  even  by  the  pres- 
ent National  Guard;  and,  therefore,  Washington's 
words  should  not  be  taken  as  applying  to  all  classes 
of  citizen  soldiers.  What  we  do  apply  them  to  is 
all  untrained  soldiers,  whether  militia,  volunteers, 
or  otherwise,  and  not  to  any  force  which  has  received 
a  reasonable  amount  of  training.  He  said: 

To  place  any  dependence  upon  militia  is  assuredly  resting 
upon  a  broken  staff.  Men  just  dragged  from  the  tender 
scenes  of  domestic  life,  unaccustomed  to  the  din  of  arms, 
totally  unacquainted  with  every  kind  of  military  skill  (which 
is  followed  by  want  of  confidence  in  themselves  when  op- 
posed by  troops  regularly  trained,  disciplined,  and  appointed, 
superior  in  knowledge  and  superior  in  arms),  are  timid  and 
ready  to  fly  from  their  own  shadows. 

Besides,  the  sudden  change  in  their  manner  of  living,  par- 
ticularly in  their  lodging,  brings  on  sickness  in  many,  im- 
patience in  all,  and  such  an  unconquerable  desire  of  returning 


Demagogue  versus  Statesman  201 

to  their  respective  homes  that  it  not  only  produces  shameful 
and  scandalous  desertions  among  themselves,  but  infuses  the 
like  spirit  in  others.  Again,  men  accustomed  to  unbounded 
freedom  and  no  control  cannot  brook  the  restraint  which  is 
indispensably  necessary  to  the  good  order  and  government 
of  any  army,  without  which  licentiousness  and  every  kind  of 
disorder  triumphantly  reign.  To  bring  men  to  a  proper 
degree  of  subordination  is  not  the  work  of  a  day,  a  month,  or 
even  a  year.  No  militia  will  ever  acquire  the  habits  necessary 
to  resist  a  regular  force.  The  firmness  requisite  for  the 
real  business  of  fighting  is  only  to  be  attained  by  constant 
course  of  discipline  and  service. 

I  have  never  yet  been  a  witness  to  a  single  instance  that 
can  justify  a  different  opinion,  and  it  is  most  earnestly  to  be 
wished  that  the  liberties  of  America  may  no  longer  be  trusted, 
in  a  material  degree,  to  so  precarious  a  defense. 

It  was  Washington,  furthermore,  who  was  the 
originator  of  the  proverb,  "  In  time  of  peace,  pre- 
pare for  war." 

Finally,  John  Adams,  the  second  president  of  the 
United  States,  tersely  expressed  the  feeling  of  the 
majority  of  our  leading  statesmen,  when  he  said: 

National  defense  is  one  of  the  cardinal  duties  of  a  states- 
man. On  this  head  I  recollect  nothing  with  which  to  re- 
proach myself.  The  subject  has  always  been  near  my  heart. 
The  delightful  imaginations  of  universal  and  perpetual  peace 
have  often  amused,  but  have  never  been  credited  by  me. 

We  could  continue  indefinitely  to  quote  our  recog- 
nized American  statesman;  can  the  anti-militarist  do 


2O2  Peace  Insurance 


this?  It  is  seen  that  Americans  of  all  times  too  great 
to  be  charged  with  selfish  interests,  men  who  have 
themselves  had  opportunity  to  secure  correct  knowl- 
edge of  the  facts,  are  in  accordance  with  the  mili- 
tary authorities  in  the  essentials  of  their  requests 
and  suggestions. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

CONCLUSIONS 

/CONSIDERING  the   foregoing   facts,  we  con- 
^   elude: 

1 .  That  an  Army  and  Navy  is  not  a  burden  during  peace, 
but  if  properly  maintained  is  but  a  paying  business  proposi- 
tion. 

2.  That  there  is  no  cheaper  substitute  for  trained  military 
force. 

3.  That  at  the  present  time  the  United  States  is  as  likely 
as  any  other  great  power  to  be  involved  in  war. 

4.  That,    desirable    as    universal    peace    may    be,    there 
is  no  immediate  prospect  of  such  condition  either  through 
arbitration,    disarmament,   limited    armament,    financial   or 
economic  pressure,  or  otherwise. 

5.  That  the  European  war  offers  no  sound  ground  for 
belief  that  armaments  will  be  reduced,  owing  either  to  Ger- 
man or  allied  success. 

6.  That  the  cost  of  war  in  lives,  misery,  and  money  has 
been  exaggerated. 

7.  That  there  are  many  compensations  for  the  "  horrors  " 
of  war,  and  that  much  in  excess  of  that  lost  has  been  gained 
in  many  wars. 

8.  That  the  character  of  the  soldier  and  sailor  is  as  good 
as  any  other  class  of  men  in  corresponding  stations  of  life. 

203 


204  Peace  Insurance 

g.  That  military  force  is  not  opposed  to  the  interests  of  the 
"  common  people." 

10.  That  our  past  wars  show  an  urgent  need  for  a  definite 
military  policy  in  the  United  States. 

11.  That  the  recommendations  of  the  General  Staff  of  the 
Army,  and  the  General  Board  of  the  Navy  are  reasonable 
and  wise. 

12.  That  the  men  concurring  in  the  ten  previous  con- 
clusions are  of  a  character  which  prohibits  the  charge  of 
ignorance,  or  of  self-interest,  being  made  against  them. 

It  is  in  view  of  these  conclusions  that  we  firmly 
believe  and  maintain : 

That,  while  the  United  States  should  do  all  in  its 
power  to  encourage  peace  among  nations,  avoid 
unnecessary  wars,  and  assist  in  the  education  of  the 
human  race  to  a  point  that  may,  in  the  distant  future, 
bring  about  the  changes  that  will  make  possible  uni- 
versal peace,  nevertheless,  it  is  vitally  important 
that  the  Government  should  take  immediate  steps 
to  carry  out  the  recommendations  of  the  General 
Staff,  United  States  Army,  in  regard  to  the  land 
forces,  and  of  the  General  Board,  United  States 
Navy,  in  regard  to  the  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States. 


INDEX 


Adams,  John,  on  national  de- 
fense, 201. 

Angell,  Norman,  economic  view 
of  war,  41,  42;  on  national 
defense,  48 ;  gains  from  war, 
58;  the  militarists,  79-82; 
causes  of  war,  84-87;  peace 
and  its  toll  of  blood,  99,  100; 
the  French  war  indemnity, 
107,  108 ;  favors  adequate  de- 
fense, 1 60. 

Anti-militarists,  and  cause  of 
war,  74,  75 ;  atrocities  of  war, 
103 ;  achievements  of  arms, 
113;  work  with  union  labor, 
134;  war  and  plain  people, 
142;  belief  in  militia,  143; 
expense  for  national  defense, 
J59>  I77l  their  opinions  and 
the  facts,  189-191,  201. 

Arbitration,  and  national  inter- 
ests, 42;  and  oriental  inva- 
sion, 61,  62;  when  it  avails, 
89;  Roosevelt's  views  of  uni- 
versal, 197,  198. 

Arms,  character  of  modern 
weapons,  26-28. 

Army,  achievements  at  Panama, 
112;  medical  corps,  112;  ar- 
gument for  a  strong,  114-118; 
slandering  the,  121-133;  men 
of,  trained  to  think,  124,  125; 


action  of  regiment  in  regard          on,  29. 
205 


to  saloon,  128,  129;  temper- 
ance sentiment  in,  129 ;  crit- 
icism of,  131,  132;  courts-mar- 
tial in  the,  130;  desertions, 
132,  133;  Washington's  desire 
for  a  permanent,  155,  156; 
recommendations  of  General 
Staff  for  increase,  159-178; 
inadequacy  of  for  national  de- 
fense, 160168;  increase  asked, 
169-178;  a  "Continental,"  173, 
174;  its  limitations,  180. 

Army  and  navy,  cost  of  during 
peace,  3-23;  annual  expense 
to  the  nation,  6,  15;  expense 
compared  with  other  expend- 
itures, 14-19;  efficiency  com- 
pared with  volunteer  forces, 
25-38;  of  foreign  nations,  46; 
as  educational  institutions, 
109 ;  conclusions  regarding, 
203,  204. 

Army  and  Navy  Journal,  The, 
quoted,  44,  47,  127,  130. 

Artillery,  modern,  26,  27;  pres- 
ent strength  of  U.  S.,  168. 

Austria,  money  cost  in  war  of 
1914,  107;  standing  army, 
170;  utilizing  reserves,  178. 

Automobiles,  annual  expend- 
iture for  in  U.  S.,  17,  105. 

Battlefield,    behavior    of    troops 


2O6 


Index 


Battleship,  work  done  aboard, 
191 ;  see  Dreadnaught. 

Bull  Run,  battle  of,  and  ineffi- 
ciency of  untrained  troops,  12, 

13,  32,  33,  35,  *53- 

Burning  of  Washington  and  de- 
fense of  the  city,  152. 

Canada,  invasion  of,  and  weak- 
ness of  militia,  150,  151. 

Casualties,  needless  and  crim- 
inal due  to  untrained  officers 
in  war,  156,  157;  and  to  gov- 
ernment, 157,  158. 

Central  and  South  America,  ex- 
emption from  conquest,  51. 

Cervera,  Admiral,  and  the 
Spanish  fleet,  186,  187. 

China,  losses  through  military 
weakness,  4,  10;  and  possible 
power,  70. 

Chittenden,  Hiram  M.,  on  mili- 
tary expense,  8,  10;  on  the 
condition  of  the  North  at  be- 
ginning of  Civil  War,  35;  on 
possible  causes  of  war,  55;  on 
deaths  in  war,  96;  and  in 
peace,  98,  101,  on  German 
military  training,  109;  on  ef- 
fects of  camp  and  barrack 
life,  in. 

Christian  ffork  and  Evangelist, 
The,  quoted,  126. 

Civil  War,  the,  cost  of  military 
forces,  12;  U.  S.  regular 
forces  at  its  opening,  32-34, 
37;  early  ending  was  possible, 
34,  35;  resignation  of  officers, 
36;  casualties  in,  94,  95,  102, 


105;  cost  in  money,  104,  105; 
effect  on  industrial  develop- 
ment, 116,  117;  views  of 
soldiers  of,  140,  141 ;  conduct 
of  troops  at  Bull  Run,  153. 

Cleveland,  President,  and  the 
navy,  198. 

Coast  artillery,  needed,  165; 
present  strength,  168,  169. 

Coast  defense,  New  York  City's, 
163-165;  necessity  of,  179, 
1 80. 

"Common  people"  and  military 
force,  134-142;  and  the  civil 
war,  140,  141. 

Conclusions  from  the  facts  of 
the  book,  203,  204. 

Confectionary  and  soft  drinks, 
annual  expense  for  in  U.  S., 
17,  105. 

"Continental  army"  of  the  U.  S. 
plans  for  a  modern,  173,  174. 

Cost  of  armies  and  navies,  is  it 
a  burden  during  peace?  3- 
23 ;  annual  cost  to  the  U.  S., 
6 ;  compared  with  other  ex- 
penditures, 14-19;  contrasted 
with  cost  of  education,  18; 
annual  cost  of  a  soldier,  dif- 
ferent countries,  66;  expense 
of  a  war,  66 ;  cost  of  wars 
and  their  horrors,  90-108 ;  cost 
of  pleasures  and  vices,  17,  18, 
104,  105,  107;  of  untrained 
troops,  156;  additional  for 
carrying  out  General  Staff's 
recommendations,  167,  169, 
174,  177. 


Index 


207 


Courts-martial,  high  standard 
of  justice  in,  130. 

Deaths,  through  industrial  acci- 
dents and  war,  93-102;  in  war 
since  Napoleon's  campaigns, 
96. 

De  Bloch,  Jean,  on  the  financial 
burden  of  war,  22. 

Defense,  present  necessity  of 
military,  48,  159-167;  of  for- 
eign possessions,  180;  economy 
of  recommendations  of  Gen- 
eral Staff  for,  159-168. 

Demagogue  versus  statesman, 
189-202;  ignorance  of  the  for- 
mer, 192,  193,  195. 

Disarmament,  impractical  and 
improbable,  69-71 ;  and  what 
it  means,  70. 

Dreadnaught,  warship,  cost  of, 
16;  power  of  a  modern,  183; 
number  of  in  foreign  navies, 
183. 

Economic  theories  of  war,  weak- 
ness of,  79,  80,  85. 

Education,  expense  of,  compared 
with  cost  of  army  and  navy, 
1 8 ;  the  schooling  of  an  army 
officer,  27,  28 ;  value  of  the 
soldier's,  19-21 ;  what  is  learned 
in  military  schools,  no. 

Eliot,  Charles  W.,  on  world- 
wide peace,  47. 

Emerson,  R.  W.,  on  the  arming 
of  man,  119. 

Emery,  Henry  C.,  on  economic 
value  of  Germany's  military 
policy,  13,  14;  resignations  at 


beginning  of  Civil  War,  36; 
theories  of  social  progress,  72, 
73;  value  of  military  train- 
ing, in;  in  favor  of  strong 
military  organization,  114-118. 

England,  losses  on  account  of 
military  weakness,  10;  navy, 
75,  162;  money  cost  in  war 
of  1914,  107;  standing  army, 
170;  utilizing  reserves,  178. 

Europe,  why  her  nations  desire 
expansion,  51 ;  armaments,  21. 

European  war  of  1914,  i,  2;  and 
Wall  Street,  67;  and  social- 
ists, 74;  and  militarism,  74, 
75;  cost  of,  106;  lessons  from 
for  the  U.  S.,  194;  and  dis- 
armament, 203. 

Federal,  control  of  militia  nec- 
essary, 172;  citizen  soldiery, 
172,  173. 

Fifth  U.  S.  Infantry,  non-com- 
missioned officers  reply  to  criti- 
cisms of  the  army,  131,  132. 

Finance  and  commerce,  cannot 
prevent  war,  62,  63,  68 ;  dur- 
ing war,  67;  Angell's  econ- 
omic theories,  79,  80. 

Finance  and  War,  quoted,  65, 
108. 

Financing  wars,  63,  65;  and 
financiers,  67. 

Fite,  E.  D.,  on  the  industrial 
production  following  the  Civil 
War,  118. 

Foreign  policies  of  U.  S.,  and 
the  navy,  180. 


208 


Index 


Fourth  U.  S.  Regiment  in  War 
of  1812,  151. 

France,  losses  on  account  of 
military  weakness,  9;  military 
strength,  75,  76;  money  cost 
in  war  of  1914,  107;  1871  in- 
demnity to  Germany,  107, 
108 ;  navy,  162;  standing 
army,  170;  utilizing  reserves, 
178. 

Franco-Prussian  War,  followed 
by  industrial  development, 
116. 

Future  of  War,  The,  Jean  de 
Bloch,  quoted,  22. 

General  Staff  of  U.  S.  Army, 
plans  for  adequate  increase 
of  army,  159-178;  economy 
of  recommendations,  159-178; 
and  need  of  soldiers,  196, 
199;  recommendations  reason- 
able, 204. 

Germany,  her  strong  military 
force,  4;  years  of  peace,  4; 
economic  value  of  military 
policy,  13,  14;  proportion  of 
population  in  military  service, 
21 ;  expense  for  intoxicants, 
22;  cost  of  maintaining  army 
and  navy,  22 ;  exports  of  U. 
S.  during  war,  68 ;  and  dis- 
armament, 69 ;  military  forces, 
69,  70,  170;  and  militarism, 
75,  77;  money  cost  in  war  of 
1914,  107;  French  indemnity, 
1871,  107,  108;  value  of  mili- 
tary training  in,  109,  in;  her 
General  Staff  and  defense  of 


New  York  City,  160;  navy, 
162;  utilizing  reserves,  177; 
resistance  in  present  war, 
196. 

Goethals,  Colonel,  on  possible 
attack  on  Panama  Canal, 
184. 

Grant,  President,  and  prepared- 
ness for  war,  199. 

Great  Illusion,  The,  quoted,  41, 
42,  48,  84-87,  160. 

Hamilton-Grace,  on  financing 
wars,  65,  108 ;  on  Germany's 
war  indemnity  from  France, 
108. 

Harper's  Weekly,  reply  to  its 
slander  of  the  army,  131,  132. 

Horrors  of  war,  90-93 ;  deaths 
in  war,  97-101 ;  atrocities  ex- 
aggerated, icxj,  104. 

Industrial  casualties,  number 
and  variety  annually  in  U. 
SM  93~95)  98-101 ;  compared 
with  those  of  war,  102. 

Inefficiency  of  untrained  troops, 
see  Militia. 

Insurance,  value  and  cost  of 
against  war,  4-9;  annual  cost 
against  fire  and  crime  in  U. 
S.,  ii ;  what  war  insurance 
protects  in  U.  S.,  6-7 ;  what  it 
has  meant,  12. 

Invasion  of  U.  S.  by  foreign 
powers,  views  of  Dr.  Jordan, 
44,  45 ;  possible  oriental,  51, 
57-66. 


Index 


209 


Italy,  standing  army,  170. 

James,  William,  on  cost  and 
horror  of  war,  91 ;  on  heroic 
ideals,  113. 

Japan,  reasons  for  expansion, 
51;  serious  issues  with  the 
U.  S.,  53,  54;  imaginary  diffi- 
culty with,  57-66;  her  war 
loans,  63,  64;  army  and  navy, 
70;  sacrifices  for  military  effi- 
ciency, 76;  navy,  162;  utiliz- 
ing reserves,  178. 

Jewelry  and  ornaments,  annual 
expense  for  in  the  U.  S.,  17, 
105. 

Johnston,  Joseph  E.,  on  obliga- 
tions of  officers,  36,  37. 

Johnston,  R.  M.,  on  the  lessons 
of  Bull  Run,  32,  33 ;  com- 
ments on  AngelPs  theories,  79, 
80. 

John  Wanamaker  Commercial 
Institute,  no,  in. 

Jordan,  David  Starr,  on  pos- 
sibility of  war,  43,  45,  194. 

Kirkpatrick,  G.  R.,  on  war  as 
hell,  92,  93 ;  cost  of  Civil 
War,  105. 

Knapp,  Harry  S.,  on  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  and  the  navy,  and 
"Standard  Fleets,"  185. 

Labor  unions  and  military  force, 
134-138. 


Lea,  Homer,  on  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  51,  52;  on  wartime 
salaries,  66;  on  laws  respon- 
sible for  certain  wars,  77, 
78 ;  on  arbitration,  89 ;  on 
guilt  of  ignorant  military  offi- 
cers, 157. 

Lee,  "Light  Horse  Harry,"  re- 
bukes government  for  military 
losses,  157,  158. 

Liquor,  amount  of  money  ex- 
pended for  annually  in  U.  S., 
17,  18,  104,  107;  in  Ger- 
many, 22. 

London,  Jack,  denies  slandering 
the  soldier,  121. 

Long  Island,  battle  of,  effect  on 
American  troops,  148. 

McClure's  Magazine,  quoted, 
91. 

McKinley,  President,  and  the 
army,  198. 

Mexican  War,  necessity  for 
trained  troops,  153. 

Mexico,  losses  on  account  of 
military  weakness,  3,  9;  rea- 
sons for  exemption  from  con- 
quest, 51 ;  meaning  of  inter- 
vention in,  to  the  soldier  and 
others,  139. 

Militarism,  and  Germany,  69; 
other  nations  leaders  in,  70; 
held  as  cause  of  war,  74; 
what  is  it?  75,  77. 

Militarist,  his  case  for  war,  50. 


2IO 


Index 


Military  education,  value  of, 
19-21 ;  extent  of,  for  officers 
and  enlisted  men  in  the  U.  S. 
army,  27,  28. 

Military  forces,  as  insurance,  5- 
23;  annual  cost  in  U.  S.,  6; 
gains  through,  12;  cost  in 
Germany,  22;  a  less  expen- 
sive substitute  for  regular 
troops,  24-38;  size  of  in  1860, 
32;  loyalty  of  the,  at  begin- 
ning of  war,  37;  advantages 
of,  and  of  war,  109-120; 
Emery's  arguments  for  strong, 
114-118;  and  the  "common 
people,"  134-142;  public  fal- 
lacies about,  145,  146;  present 
inadequacy  of  for  national 
defense,  160-166;  recommend- 
ations for  increase,  159-168; 
navy  must  control  the  seas, 
161,  162. 

Military  information  should 
come  through  experts,  193- 

195- 

Military  history  of  the  U.  S., 
143-158. 

Military  policy  of  the  U.  S., 
The,  quoted,  36,  150. 

Military  schools  of  the  U.  S., 
value  of,  no. 

Militia,  inefficiency  of  untrained, 
compared  with  regular  forces 
in  U.  S.,  25-38 ;  expense  of, 
30;  Washington  quoted  in  re- 
gard to,  30,  31;  at  Bull  Run, 
32-35;  expense  of  system,  66; 
difficulty  in  recruiting  for, 


123;  on  riot  duty,  135-138; 
opportunity  for  promotion  in, 
141 ;  hypothetical  number  of, 
143 ;  fallacies  regarding,  145, 
146;  in  War  of  Revolution, 
147-150;  in  War  of  1812,  150, 
151;  at  Queenstown,  151,  152; 
in  Mexican  War,  153 ;  at  Bull 
Run,  12,  13,  32-35,  153;  vol- 
unteer forces  in  Spanish- 
American  War,  154;  expense 
of  and  casualties  to  as  un- 
trained troops,  156,  157;  ig- 
norant officers,  157;  present 
available  force,  165 ;  addi- 
tional number  called  for  by 
General  Staff,  170;  poorly 
balanced,  171 ;  present  condi- 
tion, 196;  President  Wilson 
on,  199-201. 

Mitchell,  William,  suggestion 
for  Federal  citizen  soldiery, 
172,  173. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  essentials  of, 
49,  50;  not  a  protection,  51; 
invites  wars,  52;  "as  strong 
as  the  navy,"  180;  Roosevelt's 
view  of  national  danger  to, 
197,  198. 

Narrative  of  Military  Opera- 
tions, quoted,  37. 

National  Guard,  see  Militia. 

Nations,  why  they  fight,  80,  81; 
their  relative  goodness  and 
improvement,  86-89. 

Naval  Board  recommendations, 
179-188;  reasonable,  203,  204. 


Index 


ill 


Navies  of  the  nations,  46,  181; 
dreadnaughts,  183. 

Navy,  must  control  the  seas,  161, 
162;  recommendations  of 
General  Staff  regarding,  162, 
163;  our  need  of  a,  179-181; 
old  ships  and  new,  182,  183; 
strength  necessary,  184,  185; 
has  not  had  real  test,  185, 
186;  fight  with  Cervera's 
Spanish  fleet,  186,  187;  work 
done  on  a  battleship,  191 ; 
Cleveland  urged  strengthen- 
ing, 198. 

New  Orleans,  death  rate,  and 
losses  in  war,  97. 

New  York  Herald,  The,  quoted, 

53,   54- 
New    York    Independent,    The, 

quoted,   93,   94. 
Nixon,     Lewis,     and     Panama 

Canal,  53. 
North   American   Review,   The, 

quoted,  94,  95. 

Oregon,  The,  battleship,  super- 
seded, 182,  183. 

Pacific  Coast  and  Japan,  59. 

Pacifists,  39,  classes  of,  40;  ar- 
guments of  do  not  encourage, 
56;  some  urge  adequate  ar- 
mament, 71 ;  arguments  they 
cannot  argue  away,  86-89; 
reasonable  position  for,  90, 
91;  and  deaths  in  war,  102; 
views  as  to  industrial  devel- 
opment following  wars,  118; 


defaming  the  army,  123 ;  be- 
lief in  militia  protection,  143 ; 
responsibility  for  unnecessary 
deaths  in  possible  wars,  158; 
and  facts,  190. 

Panama  Canal,  and  issues  pro- 
voking war,  52;  its  success 
due  to  the  soldier,  112;  value 
and  weakness,  183,  184;  dan- 
ger to,  184. 

Peace,  theories  about  day  of, 
2;  ex-President  Eliot's  views 
of,  47;  expense  for  military 
force  in  order  to  preserve,  not 
disproportionate  to  other  ex- 
penditures, 3-23 ;  will  war 
ever  be  abolished?  56-71;  con- 
ditions which  end,  72-89;  in- 
dustrial casualties  in  times  of, 
93-101 ;  deaths  in  times  of, 
and  war  compared,  95-99; 
continuance  uncertain,  48-55, 
90,  91,  194,  199,  201. 

Pensions,  cost  of  Civil  War  in, 
104. 

Philippine  War,  casualties  in, 
93-95,  102. 

Portland  Oregonian,  The, 
quoted,  128,  129. 

Public  fallacies  about  the  mil- 
itia and  national  defense,  145, 
146 ;  ignorance  of  dema- 
gogues, 193,  194. 

Queenstown,  battle  of,  and  mil- 
itia, 151,  152. 


212 


Index 


Regular  army,  strength  in  1860, 
32;  result  if  had  been  large 
and  available  at  that  time, 
34.  35.  J53J  loyalty  of,  at  be- 
ginning of  Civil  War,  37; 
service  in  1812,  151;  in  Span- 
ish-American War,  154;  pres- 
ent strength  insufficient,  165- 
168;  needed  increase,  165, 
166;  and  militia,  171;  present 
condition,  196;  President  Mc- 
Kinley  urged  increase,  198. 

Reservists,  General  Staff  pro- 
poses system  of,  174,  175. 

Revolution,  War  of  the,  the 
soldier's  view  regarding,  139, 
140;  first  defense  steps,  146, 
147;  inefficiency  of  the  Amer- 
ican troops,  148,  149 ;  com- 
plaints of  Washington  about 
the  troops,  147,  '148 ;  cam- 
paign of  1780  summed  up, 
155,  156. 

Riot  duty,  behavior  of  soldiers 
doing,  125,  135-138. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  on  ade- 
quate defense  and  arbitration, 
196-198. 

Ruskin,  John,  on  the  value  of 
war,  119. 

Russia,  losses  on  account  of  mili- 
tary weakness,  9;  standing 
army,  75,  76,  170;  money  cost 
in  war  of  1914,  107;  navy, 
162;  utilizing  reserves,  177; 
rebuilding  of  navy,  182. 

Russo-Japanese  War,  loans  for, 
63,  66;  casualties  in,  93-97; 


and    annual    death   rate,    101, 

tosh 

Slandering  the  soldier,   121-133. 

Social  and  Industrial  Conditions 
in  the  North  During  the  Civil 
War,  referred  to,  118. 

Social  evil,  the,  annual  cost  of 
to  U.  S.,  17,  105,  107. 

Socialists,  attitude  towards  war, 
39;  vicious  arguments,  40; 
fallacy  of  propaganda,  62; 
and  future  peace,  68 ;  and 
causes  of  war,  73 ;  view  of 
war,  92,  93 ;  estimate  of  cost 
of  Civil  War,  105. 

Society  and  theories  of  historical 
development,  72,  73. 

Soldier,  as  a  producer,  19; 
value  to  the  community,  19- 
21 ;  schools  for  education  of 
officers  and  enlisted  men,  27, 
28 ;  the  professional,  an  au- 
thority on  war,  46;  cost  each 
per  year  in  different  coun- 
tries, 66;  the  ideal,  113; 
slandering  the,  121-133; 
trained  to  think,  124,  125;  on 
riot  duty,  125 ;  behavior,  125, 
126,  135-137;  his  view  of  the 
Revolution,  and  of  interven- 
tion in  Mexico,  139,  140;  and 
of  the  Civil  War,  140;  an 
authority  in  his  line,  144,  145. 

Some  Economic  Aspects  of  War, 
quoted,  13,  14,  30-22,  72,  73. 

Spain,  losses  on  account  of  mili- 
tary weakness,  9. 


Index 


213 


Spanish-American  War,  deaths 
in  from  disease,  97;  effect  of, 
115,  116;  fighting  done  by 
regular  troops,  154;  no  re- 
serves for,  175 ;  the  naval  bat- 
tles of,  1 8  6,  187. 

Spanish  fleet  unprepared  for 
battle,  in  Spanish-American 
War,  186,  187. 

Spooner,  Charles  S.,  on  the 
weakness  of  U.  S.  military 
forces  in  1860,  31,  32. 

"Standard   Atlantic   Fleet,"   185. 

"Standard  Pacific  Fleet,"  185. 

State  control  of  troops,  171. 

Stimson,  Secretary  of  War,  re- 
port on  unpreparedness  of 
U.  S.  for  war,  164. 

Strong,  Josiah,  on  industrial  ac- 
cidents, 94,  95. 

Substitutes,  less  expensive,  for 
trained  forces,  24-38. 

"Suppressed  Report,"  Secretary 
Stimson's,  unpreparedness  of 
U.  S.  for  war,  164. 

Tilson,  John  Q.,  statistics  of 
army  strength,  175,  176. 

Tobacco,  money  expense  for  an- 
nually in  U.  S.,  17,  18,  104, 
107. 

Training,  importance  of  for  effi- 
cient soldiery,  29. 

Troops  on  Riot  Duty,  quoted, 
I3S,  136. 

Turkey,  losses  on  account  of 
military  weakness,  9. 


Twenty-first  U.  S.  Infantry,  ac- 
tion in  favor  of  temperance, 
128,  129. 

United  States,  wealth  of,  7; 
future  possible  war  losses,  10; 
expense  of  army  and  navy, 
3-23 ;  other  national  expend- 
itures, 14-19;  proportion  of 
population  in  military  service, 
21 ;  modern  arms,  26,  27; 
schools  for  military  education, 
27,  28 ;  has  escaped  great  mil- 
itary reverses,  32;  danger  of 
invasion  considered,  44-55; 
and  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  49- 
52;  and  issues  with  Europe, 
51;  with  Japan,  51,  53,  54; 
imagined  trouble  with  Japan, 
57-66;  as  representing  mili- 
tarism, 76;  industrial  casual- 
ties annually,  93,  94;  value 
of  military  schools,  no; 
pacifists'  idea  of  strength  of 
militia,  143 ;  and  popular 
view  of  volunteer  defense, 
145,  146 ;  War  of  Revolution, 
146;  unpreparedness  for  war, 
160-166,  196,  197;  foreign 
policies  and  the  navy,  180; 
naval  strength  of  foreign  na- 
tions, 181 ;  danger  of  attack, 
194;  condition  compared  with 
Germany's  resistance  in  war 
of  1914,  196. 

V.  S.  Infantry  Journal,  The, 
quoted,  32,  33. 


214 


Index 


United  States  Military  Acad- 
emy, its  moral  standard,  128; 
democratic  character,  141. 

United  States  Naval  Academy, 
its  moral  standard,  128. 

Upton,  Emory,  on  the  Revolu- 
tionary struggle,  i  go;  com- 
ments on  the  burning  of 
Washington,  152,  153,  and  de- 
feat of  raw  troops,  154,  155. 

Untrained  soldiery,  inefficiency 
of,  24-38;  increased  cost  of, 
in  war,  30;  Washington's 
views  of,  30,  31;  at  Bull  Ruh, 
32-35;  not  soldiers,  38;  see 
Militia. 

Valor  of  Ignorance,  The,  quoted, 

51,  52,  66,  77,  78,  89. 
Vera  Cruz,  seized  by  the  U.  S., 

4- 

Villaamil,  Captain,  on  condition 
of  Spanish  fleet  in  Spanish- 
American  War,  187. 

Volunteer  forces,  see  Militia, 
and  untrained  soldiery. 

War,  insurance  against,  3-9; 
likelihood  of  today,  39-55 ; 
economic  views  of,  41,  42; 
"this  is  the  last,"  43,  44; 
causes  of  possible,  50-55 ;  will 


it  ever  be  abolished  ?  56-71 ; 
will  continue,  57 ;  underlying 
causes  of,  72-89 ;  laws  respon- 
sible for,  77,  78 ;  the  argument 
that  war  does  not  pay,  79, 
80;  why  nations  fight,  80, 
81;  cost  of  war  and  its  hor- 
rors, 90-108 ;  deaths  in  since 
Napoleon's  campaigns,  96, 
and  from  disease,  97;  losses 
compared  with  industrial 
death  rate,  102;  cost  of  in 
money,  104-108 ;  pensions 
since  Civil  War,  104;  some 
advantages  of,  109-120;  U.  S. 
unprepared  for,  159-168. 

War  of  1812,  weakness  of  mil- 
itia, 150,  151. 

War    or    Peace,    quoted,    8,    35, 

55,  9<5,  98. 

War— What  For?  quoted,  16, 
92,  105. 

Washington,  George,  on  un- 
trained troops,  30;  complains 
about  inefficiency  of  troops, 
147,  148 ;  sums  up  campaign 
of  1780,  155,  156;  on  depend- 
ance  on  untrained  troops,  200, 
201. 

West  Point,  see  U.  S.  Military 
Academy. 

Wilson,  President,  on  qualities 
of  the  soldier,  199,  200. 


A     000  640  674     8 


